

# NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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# Governmental Affairs

TIME, MAY 13, 1974

## The President Gambles on Going Public

*"Never before in the history of the presidency have records that are so private been made so public. In giving you these records—blemishes and all—I am placing my trust in the basic fairness of the American people."*

With those words in his televised address to the nation last week, Richard Nixon declared the greatest bet of his lifetime of high-risk politics, making a desperate and dangerous wager on his place in history. The stakes were nothing less than his survival in office and his ultimate image as a man and as a President. In still another effort "to put Watergate behind us," to show once and for all "that the President has nothing to hide in this matter," he announced that he was making public 1,254 pages of transcribed tape recordings of his personal conversations about the Watergate scandal with his most trusted aides.

That was not what had been asked of him. He was acting against the deadline of a subpoena by the House Judiciary Committee, which is weighing his impeachment, for the actual tapes of 42 White House conversations. But he would or could not deliver the tapes, for reasons he did not explain in his speech. (Later the White House said that tapes of eleven of the requested discussions had been lost or never, in fact, existed.) Instead, the President chose to gamble that he could defy the subpoena and go over the heads of the Congressmen to protest his innocence directly to the American people, basing his case on the enormous mass of evidence contained in the 150,000-word transcripts.

**Best Light.** He admitted that the extraordinary picture they painted of deliberations in the inmost sanctity of the White House was in places ambiguous, confusing and contradictory. At various times the President can be found saying, as he and his aides tried to cope with the exploding Watergate scandals, such diverse things as "I am being the devil's advocate," "We have to keep the cap on the bottle," and "I say [expletive removed] don't hold anything back." He acknowledged that even with the White House's deletions of the obscenities, the style and tone of many of his talks with aides "will become the subject of speculation and ridicule." But, he said, "I know in my own heart that, through the long, painful and difficult process revealed in these transcripts, I was trying in that period to discover what was right and to do what was right."

The President's speech was followed a day later by a 50-page legal brief by his attorney, James St. Clair. It attempted to argue the best case possible for the President by seeking to discredit the testimony of former White House Counsel John Dean against Nixon and by pointing up parts of the transcript that show the President in the best light. "In all the thousands of words spoken," it says, "even though they are often unclear and ambiguous, not once does it appear that the President of the U.S. was engaged in a criminal plot to obstruct justice."

**Damning Evidence.** Speaking as an advocate, St. Clair could hardly be expected to read evidence of wrongdoing into any Nixonian ambiguities. But many a reader of the transcripts did just that—and saw a record of presidential transgressions against both the letter and the spirit of the law. That was all the more damning because the conversations on which St. Clair had based his brief were selected by Nixon and his staff. The mass of material that they did not hand over or that was found "unintelligible" by Administration stenographers could hardly have been more helpful to the beleaguered President.

The searing reality of the transcripts made the White House campaign an almost Sisyphean enterprise. By delaying their issuance for half a day so that St. Clair's brief could have an unrivaled circulation, the White House won a few hours of suspended judgment. But once the transcripts became available and began to be plumbed, the severity of the President's difficulties soon began to seep across the capital and the rest of the nation. Not many Republicans, who had initially rejoiced at his speech, had the temerity of Vice President Gerald Ford, who proclaimed that the transcripts "show the President to be innocent." With few exceptions, the press analyses were devastating.

By and large, legal and law enforcement professionals were aghast at the damning evidence against Nixon. Chicago Professor Philip B. Kurland, one of the nation's leading experts on the Constitution and a consultant to the Senate Watergate Committee, said that he found "strong evidence" in the transcripts that Nixon was guilty of inducing his aides to commit perjury and of obstructing justice—both indictable crimes and therefore impeachable offenses by Nixon's own definition. Kurland added: "I can't find either ambiguity or any evidence which tends to exonerate him." Dean Michael Sovern of Columbia University Law School looked closely at the transcript for the crucial March 21, 1973, meeting at which, Nixon later said, he learned for the first time that White House aides were deeply enmeshed in Watergate. Sovern concluded: "In context, the transcript would support a prima facie case for impeachment." One former high Nixon Administration official said bluntly and bitterly that the President's impeachment was now guaranteed, adding: "If I were Pete Rodino [Judiciary Committee chairman], I'd say we don't need anything else. I'd say thank you, Mr. President—and *adios*."

The President in his speech and St. Clair in his brief attempted to defend Nixon in some—but not all—of the most potentially damaging areas of evidence presented in the transcripts. An analysis of their contentions and of the transcript evidence in three key areas:

**When did the President learn of the cover-up?** John Dean testified to the Senate Watergate committee that he inferred that Nixon was "fully aware" of the effort to hide White House staff in-

early as Sept. 15, 1972. Nixon and St. Clair argue that the President learned of the cover-up only on March 21, 1973, when Dean told him. They point out that Dean, after all, himself requested the meeting to lay out for the President all the facts of the cover-up. They cite that in the process of doing so, Dean said: "I can just tell from our conversation that these are things you can have no knowledge of."

There may well have been many aspects of the cover-up that Nixon had no knowledge of until Dean spelled out the chapter and verse on March 21. But the transcripts before indicate he certainly had knowledge that more than just the seven men indicted on Sept. 15 were involved, and that in at least one instance, that of White House Aide Gordon Strachan, a member of his staff had twice lied to federal investigators in denying knowing about the break-in and was prepared to lie again before the Senate Watergate committee. Dean told Nixon of that on March 13, and Nixon agreed that committing the perjury was probably a good idea: "I guess he should have, shouldn't he?" The exchange even led Nixon to wonder whether Strachan might have informed White House Chief of Staff H.R. ("Bob") Haldeman of the cover-up.

**On learning of the cover-up, what did the President do?** The operation that Dean described to the President on March 21 constituted a criminal conspiracy to obstruct justice. By law, any citizen must report the discovery of a crime at once. In his speech, Nixon asserted that "after March 21, my actions were directed toward finding the facts and seeing that justice was done fairly and according to the law."

But he also admitted that, in trying to decide what to do, he was motivated by more than simple considerations of justice and law. He was concerned for "close advisers, valued friends" who might be involved, the "human impact on ... some of the young people and their families," and "quite frankly" the "political implications." He said: "I wanted to do what was right. But I wanted to do it in a way that would cause the least unnecessary damage in a highly charged political atmosphere to the Administration."

However laudatory or understandable in human terms, those motives might not hold up in a court of law—or an impeachment proceeding. They do not really explain why, having learned of evident crimes from Dean on March 21, it was not until April 16 that Nixon finally discussed with his Attorney General his knowledge of probable crimes by White House aides. That conversation was initiated by Richard Kleindienst, then Attorney General. Moreover, the evidence of the transcripts (see excerpts beginning page 20) shows time and again a President torn between trying to let the truth come out and then agreeing to some fresh device or attempt to avoid just that. His disclosures on April 16 seem to have come only be-

talking to the Watergate prosecutors. Clearly, the cover-up was going to be exploded with or without his acting. When he learned that Jeb Stuart Magruder, deputy director of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, had gone to the prosecutors and changed his earlier perjured story, Nixon asked almost pathetically: "What got Magruder to talk? I want to take the credit for that."

**Did Nixon order the payment of hush money to E. Howard Hunt?** One of the reasons that Dean laid out the cover-up for Nixon on March 21 was that at least one of the jailed Watergate seven was escalating his money demand for keeping silent. The immediate problem was a fresh request for \$120,000 by Hunt, the CIA alumnus and White House consultant who had pleaded guilty to break-in and bugging charges. Dean did not know how to meet the urgent request. Hunt was threatening to tell about some of his pre-Watergate clandestine activities for the White House, including the burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. (Ellsberg was the man who released the secret Pentagon papers on the Viet Nam War.) Authorizing or paying such money is, of course, a crime.

In his speech, Nixon said: "I returned several times to the immediate problem posed by Mr. Hunt's blackmail threat, which to me was not a Watergate problem but one which I regarded, rightly or wrongly, as a potential national security problem of very serious proportions."

**Little Choice.** "I considered long and hard whether it might in fact be better to let it go forward, at least temporarily, in the hope that this national security matter would not be exposed in the course of uncovering the Watergate cover-up. I believed then and I believe today that I had a responsibility as President to consider every option, including this one, where protection of sensitive national security matters was at stake."

"In the course of considering it and of just thinking out loud, as I put it at one point, I several times suggested that meeting Hunt's demands might be necessary... [but] my conclusion at the end of the meeting was clear. And my actions and reactions... show clearly that I did not intend the further payment to Hunt or anyone else be made."

The evidence in the transcripts seems far less ambiguous than the President has suggested. The last time the President raises the Hunt money problem, he says: "That's why for your immediate things you have no choice but to come up with the \$120,000, or whatever it is. Right?" Dean replies: "That's right." And Nixon says: "Would you agree that that's the prime thing that you damn well better get that done?" To which Dean says: "Obviously he ought to be given some signal anyway." And the President says: "[Expletive deleted] Get it."

That same night, according to a Watergate grand jury, Hunt was given \$75,000, and in the subsequent discussions in the White House all anxiety about Hunt's blackmail vanished. The subject did not come up again until much later, when the cover-up was collapsing.

Given the enormous hazards for Nixon in the transcripts, it seemed baffling that he released them at all. He

may have felt that he had little choice. Having resolved not to turn over the tapes to the Judiciary Committee, he had to make some extraordinary gesture to avoid almost certain impeachment for defying Congress. He pondered the move all the previous weekend in the privacy of Camp David. Then, Sunday afternoon, he learned that former Attorney General John Mitchell and former Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans had been acquitted in New York City of charges of perjury, obstruction of justice and conspiracy. The welcome news may have convinced Nixon that at last things were looking up. That same weekend he decided to release the transcripts.

According to aides, he reasoned that the move would end the spiraling demands of the committee—as well as those of Special Watergate Prosecutor Leon Jaworski—for more tapes. Explained one presidential adviser: "We felt a growing concern that it was becoming a test of manhood between the two branches. We decided this might be a way to defuse that feeling." In addition, aides reported, the President saw disclosure as a way of repairing his damaged credibility. Said St. Clair: "People were getting more and more imbued with the idea that the President had something to hide."

**Touchdown Cheers.** Nixon had already spent many hours reviewing the transcripts, which a staff of secretaries and lawyers, headed by White House Special Counsel J. Fred Buzhardt, had been painstakingly preparing since mid-March. After the secretaries transcribed each tape, it was gone over by Buzhardt and his assistants, who marked proposed deletions of irrelevancies, national security matters and profanity. But the final editor was Nixon. "As far as I know," Buzhardt said, "he read the entire package, and he had the final say on it all." About three dozen passages were marked "Material not related to presidential actions deleted." Buzhardt explained: "These were sections that had no relation to what he did or knew. Other people came into the room. He was interrupted by a telephone call. Other topics were discussed."

At first—before what was in the transcripts became widely known—the Nixon counteroffensive brought joy to the Republicans. Supporters looked on the offer of transcripts as the evidence of innocence they had been begging the President for months to release. Washington Governor Dan Evans said that he felt "like a football fan cheering on the home team. I think the President threw a touchdown pass." The Richmond (Va.) *News Leader* exulted: "This is an immensely happy development. For the first time, those who want to support the President—those who have clung to vestiges of hope that he was not involved—have something tangible."

There was much negative reaction as well, centered mostly on the fact that the President was not obeying the law by complying fully with the subpoena. The Gallup poll surveyed some 700 adults by telephone following Nixon's speech and found that it had left 17% with a more favorable opinion of Nixon but 42% with a less favorable view. By 44% to 41%, those interviewed said

that they thought there was now enough evidence for the House to impeach the President, though by 49% to 38% they said Nixon's actions were not serious enough to justify the Senate's removing him from office. A survey conducted earlier for TIME by Daniel Yankelovich, Inc., found that 55% of Americans wanted Nixon to resign or be impeached, up from 39% in November (see story, page 19).

#### Members of the House Judiciary

Committee agreed that Nixon had not satisfactorily met the terms of their subpoena. They also resented the fact that he had replied to it with a public speech. Democrat John F. Seiberling of Ohio complained: "To respond to a lawful subpoena by going on television was not a decent thing to do." But the committee members split over what their reaction should be. Republicans urged another attempt at negotiation. Michigan Congressman Edward Hutchinson, the committee's ranking Republican, argued: "In our system of government, it was never contemplated that the separate branches should confront each other. It should be avoided at all costs." A few Democratic liberals wanted Nixon cited for contempt of Congress.

Chairman Rodino, however, wanted to avoid the question of contempt to keep the committee from splitting irrevocably on partisan grounds. In a rare night session, he persuaded the members to approve a letter that mildly chastised the President by advising him that his delivery of edited transcripts instead of tapes "failed to comply" with the committee's subpoena. Even on that relatively innocuous rejoinder, the committee split 20-18, by party (although two Democrats and one Republican crossed party lines). But Rodino had succeeded in keeping the committee from being diverted from the hearings on Nixon's impeachment that it will open this week.

**Dropped Words.** The first few sessions, in which the committee staff will summarize the evidence it has collected, will be closed. But, partly in anger at Nixon's use of television, the committee voted unanimously to allow the rest of the hearings, which are expected to last about six weeks, to be televised. In addition, the committee granted Lawyer St. Clair the right to question and call witnesses. Mindful of his reputation as a brilliant courtroom tactician, the committee also granted Rodino stringent powers to shut off St. Clair if necessary to stop him from obstructing the proceedings or filibustering.

During the meeting, Committee Counsel John Doar disclosed that some of the transcripts released by Nixon "are not accurate," though they were apparently not intentionally altered. He explained that the committee staff had made transcripts of the seven tapes that had been given to it by Special Prosecutor Jaworski. When comparing them with the White House documents, they found that the Administration's tran-

scribers had dropped out certain words and identified as "unintelligible" some segments that the committee staff found intelligible. Doar blamed other differences on the White House's inferior playback equipment and inattention by the people who operated it. Jaworski's staff found similar discrepancies between tapes and transcripts.

Indeed, so many notations of "unintelligible" occur at critical points on the transcripts that suspicions inevitably arose that some of the missing portions were intentionally left out. For example, in discussing the possibility of offering clemency to Howard Hunt, Nixon apparently had a precedent in mind, but the transcript for that meeting on March 21, 1973, quotes the President as telling Dean: "The only thing we could do with him would be to parole him like the [unintelligible] situation." Again, the transcript for an April 17, 1973, meeting has Nixon saying to Haldeman, John Ehrlichman and Ronald Ziegler: "Damn it, John Dean's highly sensitive information was on only one count. Believe me guys, we all know—well—the [unintelligible] stuff regarding Bob." ("Bob" is Haldeman.)

The gaps and discrepancies were one reason why investigators insisted that they needed the tapes. Only a study by experts of the tapes themselves can set to rest any suspicions that they have been cut, erased or otherwise violated. There were other reasons as well. Explained one expert who has heard the tapes that are in the Special Prosecutor's possession: "The tapes themselves give the mood, the anxiety, the attitudes. Some of them reflect people banging on the tables, moving from here to there, raising voices. On that March 21 tape, Dean sounds as if he's pleading with the President. That doesn't come through at all on the transcript."

Once out, several newspapers published all the transcripts; most others ran extensive excerpts (see THE PRESS). Broadcast journalists read lengthy passages. The transcripts, sold by the Government Printing Office at \$12.25 a copy, moved briskly. In Washington, the GPO at first had only 792 copies, which it sold in less than four hours, but thousands more were being printed. In addition, three publishers planned to have paperback books containing the complete transcripts on sale this week.

The initial favorable reaction to Nixon's gambit quickly dissipated as the transcripts became available. A case in point was the Los Angeles Times. On Tuesday morning, it felt that Nixon had "taken a giant step toward resolving the controversy over his relationship to the Watergate crimes." By Thursday, its editors had studied the transcripts and found that "the President and his chief aides seem, time and again, more concerned with self-serving manipulation and control of evidence than with the open and full pursuit of justice."

**Changed Mood.** There was a similar evolution of opinion among Congressmen, particularly Republicans. On Tuesday, they lined up to praise Nixon from the floor of the House. After a day of reading, however, the Republican mood began to change. As Democratic Leader Thomas P. ("Tip") O'Neill of Massachusetts noted, on Wednesday "not one man took the floor" to laud Nixon. In fact, many Republicans were

profoundly shaken by what they learned. Conservative Republican Congressman H.R. Gross of Iowa concluded that the documents "do prove conclusively that Mr. Nixon made many misleading statements to the American people on his knowledge of the Watergate cover-up." Gross also found "an amazing lack of ethical sensitivity in the office of the presidency." Similarly, Republican Senator Robert W. Packwood of Oregon said that he considered Nixon's view of Government "rather frightening" because "there are not even any token clichés about what is good for the people." Senator Robert Dole of Kansas, former head of the Republican National Committee, was asked by a reporter if he would want the President in his state during his campaign for reelection. Replied Dole: "Sure. Let him fly over any time."

On the Democratic side, Party Chairman Robert S. Strauss said: "I've seen just about everything. But this reading of these tapes has upset me more than anything else in my life. I told my wife over the third martini last night, I'm embarrassed to have our kids read this and think it's part of the life I'm in." Democratic Congressman Morris K. Udall of Arizona made a pitch for politicians in general, saying: "They deserve better than to be branded with the cynical iron that has marked the burglars, buggers and influence peddlers of this Administration."

Both Nixon and St. Clair regarded the transcripts as seriously compromising John Dean, the President's chief accuser at the Senate Watergate Committee hearings. Earlier, White House aides had welcomed the not guilty verdicts for Mitchell and Stans as evidence that Dean was no longer credible. Dean was one of 59 witnesses at the trial of the former Cabinet members. Both had been charged with nine counts of perjury, obstruction of justice and conspiracy to hinder an investigation of financier Robert Vesco's tangled affairs in exchange for a secret \$200,000 cash contribution to Nixon's 1972 campaign. But the jury found them not guilty on all counts.

**Dean Under Fire.** Some jurors found Dean to be an impressive witness during his testimony, which bore on three of the perjury counts against Mitchell. But they were put off by his admission that he was awaiting sentencing for his confession of guilt on conspiracy to obstruct justice in the Watergate cover-up. Moreover, they were unsettled by the fact that he admitted under cross-examination that he hoped his performance at the Mitchell-Stans trial would be noted by the judge who would mete out his punishment. Clarence Brown, a postal employee, expressed his fellow jurors' feelings: "I liked John Dean. I didn't fully believe him, though. He was a man trying to save his own skin."

Both Nixon in his TV address and St. Clair in his brief took dead aim at Dean, attempting to discredit him. As the week went on, the White House, having put together what in the transcripts is called a "PR team," increased the firing on Dean. Administration aides prepared a summary of contradictions in his statements and gave it to South Carolina Republican Senator Strom Thurmond, who had it published in the Congressional Record. When president-

gone largely unnoticed, Communications Director Ken Clawson gave another detailed list of the alleged Dean contradictions to the press. At the same time, Press Secretary Ziegler declared: "Anyone who says the transcripts support John Dean hasn't worked at his reading or is looking at it with a totally partisan or biased eye."

The White House assault made no mention of the fact that Dean's testimony was corroborated, in most respects, by other witnesses. A close comparison of his testimony with the President's transcripts showed that while he was self-serving before the Watergate Committee, he was remarkably accurate. His occasional errors were relatively minor and can perhaps be explained by the Administration's refusal to let him have access to his White House files in preparing his testimony. Both Committee Chairman Sam Ervin and Vice Chairman Howard Baker, a Republican, said that they have faith in Dean's credibility. Special Prosecutor Jaworski continues to count Dean a key witness in the Watergate trials. In a way, the White House blitz on Dean seemed either a diversionary tactic or mere vindictiveness. Now that the evidence of the tapes is available, Dean's testimony is far less vital or relevant.

**Court Battle?** Nixon's decision, in another transcript phrase, to "stone-wall" his opposition, also applied to Jaworski's subpoena of tapes. Lawyer St. Clair presented a brief to Federal Judge John J. Sirica, arguing that Jaworski's subpoena for 64 additional tapes should be quashed because he had not shown that the material was relevant to the trial of the seven Nixon associates charged in the cover-up.\* St. Clair also argued that all portions of the subpoenaed materials that had not been made public were protected by Executive privilege and could be kept confidential by the President. Sirica scheduled a hearing on the argument for this Wednesday. Aides to both Nixon and Jaworski said that they were willing to carry the fight to the Supreme Court, thus raising the prospect of another lengthy court battle reminiscent of the one the White House lost last fall. That fight led to Nixon's firing of Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox and the resignations of Attorney General Elliot Richardson and his assistant William French Smith.

As a further part of the Nixon strategy, General Alexander M. Haig Jr., the White House chief of staff, refused to answer questions before the Senate Watergate committee last week. He presented a letter from Nixon ordering him not to testify on grounds that it would be "wholly inappropriate for the committee to examine you about your activities as chief of staff."

The White House also gave no sign that it would comply with the Judiciary Committee's request for tapes of 142 additional conversations between Nixon and aides. The tapes bear on the Watergate cover-up, the Administration's 1971 decision to increase milk-price supports and its antitrust settlement with ITT that year. St. Clair urged the committee to study the transcripts before demanding more evidence. He declined to say how the White House would respond if the committee pressed on.

At week's end Nixon took to the road to sell his side of the transcript sto-

\* Mitchell, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Charles Colson, Felt, Gale, Rosen, Sullivan, Tavel, Trotter, Tele. Room, Holmes, Gandy, Kenneth Parkinson and Gordon Strachan.



ry to the public. His first stop was Phoenix, Ariz., where his audience of 13,000 at a Republican fund raiser was mostly friendly. But shouts of "Hail to the thief" and rhythmic clapping from a handful of hecklers in the balcony rattled Nixon. His voice quavered, his hands tightly gripped the flower-bedeked lectern, and he occasionally mispronounced words. Still, cheers drowned out the boos when he said that he had furnished "all the relevant evidence" needed "to get Watergate behind us" and promised "to stay on this job." On Saturday, Nixon opened Expo '74 in Spokane, Wash., where he was welcomed with a few impeachment signs.

Of the eleven additional presidential conversations subpoenaed by the committee, White House aides claimed that the tapes of those exchanges, which all took place in 1973, either were missing or were not made through failures in the recording equipment. Thus there are no accounts of:

- A Feb. 20 meeting with Haldeman to discuss finding a suitable job for Jeb Stuart Magruder, the former deputy director of Nixon's re-election campaign committee. Magruder had made clear to Haldeman that he wanted a high Government job in recognition of his efforts for Nixon.

- A Feb. 27 session with Haldeman and Ehrlichman concerning the need for Dean to report directly to Nixon, rather than through them, on matters relating to Watergate. In the ensuing six weeks, Dean met with the President more than 70 times.

- An April 15 telephone conversation with then-Attorney General Richard Kleindienst in which they discussed Watergate problems.

- Four meetings on April 15, when the White House cover-up on Watergate was clearly crumbling. The meetings were with Ehrlichman, Dean, Kleindienst and Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen, who was then heading the investigation into the break-in at the Democratic National Committee offices. The White House says that the tape ran out in midafternoon of April 15.

- Three meetings on April 16 with Haldeman and Ehrlichman to discuss their resignations and Dean's request for immunity from prosecution in exchange for testimony about Watergate before the grand jury.

- An April 18 phone conversation with Petersen in which Nixon reportedly told him to stay out of the investigation of the break-in at the offices of Ellsberg's psychiatrist because it involved national security.

The transcripts that the White House provided offer fresh details about the origin of the plan to bug the Democratic national headquarters, as well as precisely what the undercover team was after. At their March 21, 1973 meeting, Dean told Nixon that the operation originated with an order from Haldeman to "set up a perfectly legitimate campaign intelligence operation" within the Nixon re-election committee. In January 1972, White House "Plumber" G. Gordon Liddy came up with an incredible scheme that he said would cost \$1 million. According to Dean, it involved "black-bag operations, kidnaping, providing prostitutes to weaken the opposition, bugging, mugging teams."

Liddy's plans were twice vetoed by

John Mitchell, then Attorney General, who was later to head the re-election campaign. But in February, Dean said, Strachan began stepping up efforts "to get some information." Dean said that he believed Haldeman, who was Strachan's boss, had assumed that Liddy's operation was "proper." In any case, Dean said, Jeb Magruder took Strachan's message "as a signal to probably go to Mitchell and to say, 'They are pushing us like crazy for this from the White House.' And so Mitchell probably puffed on his pipe and said, 'Go ahead,' and never really reflected on what it was all about."

Dean told Nixon that the bugging team "might have been looking for information about the Democratic conventions." Liddy had earlier informed him that there was a plan—never carried out—to bug Democratic Chairman Lawrence O'Brien's hotel suite in Miami. The Liddy operation was a failure from the beginning. The team first tapped the telephone of Democratic Committee Official R. Spencer Oliver. Ehrlichman told Nixon on April 14, 1973, that "what they were getting was mostly this fellow Oliver phoning his girl friends all over the country, lining up assignments." Ehrlichman said that "Liddy was badly embarrassed by the chewing out he got" from Mitchell for providing such weak "intelligence" and promised: "Mr. Mitchell, I'll take care of it." Ehrlichman added: "The next break-in was entirely on Liddy's own notion." During that operation on June 17, the bugging team got caught.

The transcripts provided new insights into Nixon's former top associates and his working relationships with them. Some of the revelations:

**JOHN DEAN.** Before the Senate Watergate committee, he seemed to be only a minor functionary, a modest clerk. Now he emerges as having played a key White House role, first in making sure the cover-up held through the election, then in advising Nixon on how to cope as it fell apart in early 1973.

**JOHN EHRLICHMAN.** Always considered one of the staff heavyweights, he often demonstrates a better perception of the law than the President. Early on, as the Watergate revelations began to threaten the White House itself, he offered Nixon the best advice of all. He suggested that the Administration take the "hang-out road" and tell the truth about its role in the break-in and cover-up, letting the chips—and men—fall where they might.

**H.R. ("BOB") HALDEMAN.** The most formidable guardian of Nixon's Oval Office, the chief of staff was considered the most powerful man in the White House after Nixon. Indeed, it appears that in private he often dominated the President, as well as the rest of the staff.

**JOHN MITCHELL.** He was one of Nixon's closest friends and political confidants. But the President was willing to let Mitchell take the rap for overseeing Watergate, drawing the heat away from the White House—if a way could be found to get him to agree. The disclosure bore out Martha Mitchell's celebrated telephone call on March 31, 1973, which seemed wildly improbable at the time. She complained to a reporter: "I think this Administration has turned completely against my husband."

Among those who surrounded Nixon,

one man whose reputation was particularly damaged by the transcripts was Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen. Nixon picked him to run the investigation into the cover-up in April 1973 when Richard Kleindienst removed himself from the case because of his close ties to John Mitchell. Petersen's gravel-voiced testimony before the Ervin committee last summer was considered by many to be a virtuoso display of candor and integrity. The transcripts, however, reveal that Petersen was callously manipulated by the President, who even went so far as to boast to Ehrlichman and Ziegler, "I've got Petersen on a short leash."

Perhaps from an excess of loyalty, zeal and awe of the presidency, Petersen appeared eager to give the White House every break he could. He was used to undermine his own investigation. On March 21, Nixon asked John Dean why the Assistant Attorney General had "played the game so straight with us." Said Dean: "Petersen is a soldier. He kept me informed. He told me when we had problems, where we had problems and the like. I don't think he has done anything improper, but he did make sure that the investigation was narrowed down to the very, very fine criminal thing, which was a break for us."

Even with the hundreds of "inaudible" and excised passages, the transcripts provided an extraordinary look at Nixon in private. His conversations were often bizarre, involving hours of foggy and imprecise musing. Instead of a tough, calculating, incisive Nixon, the transcripts revealed a lonely, aloof President who could not remember dates, could not recall Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt's name, and who forgot that another of the convicted conspirators, G. Gordon Liddy, was in prison. In the transcripts, Nixon made few decisions, issued few orders and almost never exhibited the quick, encyclopedic mind that associates claim he has.

From time to time the President did exhibit odd grace notes. He expressed deeply felt concern for Hunt, whose wife Dorothy was killed in a plane crash in Chicago. He worried about "poor Bob" Haldeman, who was "totally selfless and honest and decent" but because of Watergate was "going through the tortures of the damned." There were even attempts at humor, albeit rather heavy-handed. For example, Nixon joined in the merriment on March 22, 1973, when Haldeman joked that "John says he is sorry he sent those burglars in there" and that he was glad "the others didn't get caught." "Yeah," said Nixon, "the ones he sent to Muskie and all the rest; Jackson; and Hubert, etc."

For the most part, however, Nixon came across in the transcripts as a coarse and cynical President, chiefly bent on manipulating associates and plotting strategies to keep himself isolated and insulated from Watergate. The transcripts showed a President creating an environment of deceit and dishonesty, of evasion and cover-up. In public, Nixon was pictured as detached, too busy with affairs of state to probe Watergate. In private, the transcripts showed that he wanted to know every detail of the scandal's effect on the press and public. Stratagems were devised; "scenarios" were roughed out and rehearsed. Answers were shaped for questions sure to

be asked.

**For the Record.** Nixon's aides sometimes included imaginary press reaction as part of their scenarios. On April 14, 1973, Ehrlichman sketched what he thought might be "the news-magazine story for next Monday" if he were to present Nixon with a report naming John Mitchell and Jeb Stuart Magruder as ringleaders in the Watergate break-in. Ehrlichman suggested that the story might say: "The President then dispatched so and so to do this and that ... Charges of cover-up by the White House were materially dispelled by the diligent efforts of the President and his aides." The story obviously pleased Nixon. "I'll buy that," he said.

At times, Nixon sounded in the transcripts like a man speaking for the taped record, rather than spontaneously. During a discussion on April 14, 1973, with Haldeman and Ehrlichman, Nixon said of the Watergate cover-up: "Well, I knew it. I knew it. I must say, though, I didn't know it, but I must have assumed it though." On April 16, 1973, in the middle of a period in which Nixon and his top aides were concocting "scenarios" to isolate the President from Watergate, he told Dean: "John, tell the truth. That is the thing I've told everybody around here." A day later, the President and Haldeman were trying to recollect what happened when Dean told Nixon that Hunt was demanding

hush money.

*Nixon:* I didn't tell him to get the money, did I?

*Haldeman:* No.

*Nixon:* You didn't either did you?

*Haldeman:* Absolutely not!

In one of the many war games and scenarios on how to handle the deteriorating situation, Attorney General Richard Kleindienst on April 15, 1973, advised Nixon: "One aspect of this thing which you can always take and that is, as the President of the United States, your job is to enforce the law." Whether as a public relations tactic, as Nixon and his men seemed to view most things, or as his sworn duty, it was surely advice that he ought to have taken.

## The Most Critical Nixon Conversations

The portions of the transcripts that appear to bear most directly on the President's guilt or innocence are excerpted in chronological order, with comment and annotation, on these and the following pages. As Nixon said, many of these words are ambiguous, but many of them are less so than the White House has tried to depict them. How they are judged by the Congress and the American people may well determine Nixon's survival in office. The White House transcripts, often unpunctuated and containing spelling and other errors, are reproduced here as they were issued, in a distinctive typeface for ready recognition. Where a part of a spoken sentence has been omitted for space reasons, the omission is indicated by three dots ... and where whole sequences of dialogue have been deleted for compression purposes, the gap is indicated by a square ■.

SEPTEMBER 15, 1972, 5:27 P.M.

The Oval Office. Present: the President (P), H.R. Haldeman (H) and John Dean (D).

In the morning, a federal grand jury had indicted the five Watergate burglars along with Nixon Re-Election Committee Lawyer G. Gordon Liddy and White House Consultant E. Howard Hunt Jr.

*P:* Hi, how are you? You had quite a day today didn't you. You got Watergate on the way didn't you?

*D:* We tried.

*H:* How did it all end up?

*D:* Ah, I think we can say well at this point. The press is playing it just as we expect.

*H:* Whitewash?

*D:* No, not yet—the story right now—

*P:* It is a big story.

*H:* Five indicted plus the WH former guy and all that.

*D:* Plus two White House fellows [Liddy and Hunt].

*H:* That is good, that takes the edge off whitewash really, that was the thing Mitchell kept saying that to people in the country Liddy and Hunt were big men. Maybe that is good.

*P:* Just remember, all the trouble we're taking, we'll have a chance to get back one day ...

The talk is interrupted by a call to the President from John Mitchell in New York. Nixon tells his former Attorney General that "this thing is just one of those side issues and a month later everybody looks back and wonders what all the shooting was about." Then the discussion resumes.

*D:* Three months ago I would have had trouble predicting there would be a day when this would be forgotten, but I think I can say that 54 days from now [Election Day], nothing is going to come crashing down to our surprise.

This assurance contrasts with Dean's later testimony before the Senate Watergate committee when he said that he had warned the President at the Sept. 15 meeting that "there was a long way to go before this matter would end."

*P:* Oh well, this is a can of worms as you know a

lot of this stuff that went on. And the people who worked this way are awfully embarrassed. But the way you have handled all this seems to me has been very skillful putting your fingers in the leaks that have sprung here and there ...

It is one of the "ambiguities" that could be misconstrued. Dean has testified that he assumed that Nixon was congratulating him on succeeding in "containing" the case to the seven through the illegal cover-up.

*P:* We are all in it together. This is a war. We take a few shots and it will be over. Don't worry. I wouldn't want to be on the other side right now. Would you?

*D:* Along that line, one of the things I've tried to do, I have begun to keep notes on a lot of people who are emerging as less than our friends because this will be over some day and we shouldn't forget the way some of them have treated us.

*P:* I want the most comprehensive notes on all those who tried to do us in. They didn't have to do it. They are asking for it and they are going to get it. We have not used the power in this first four years as you know. We have not used the Bureau [FBI] and we have not used Justice, but things are going to change now. And they are either going to do it right or go.

*D:* What an exciting prospect.

*P:* Thanks. It has to be done ...

They discuss how to head off pending hearings by the House Banking and Currency Committee on improper campaign practices. The President agrees that "heal" should be put on Speaker of the House Carl Albert. The hearings, in fact, were called off.

*P:* You really can't sit and worry about it all the time. The worst may happen but it may not. So you just try to button it up as well as you can and hope for the best, and remember basically the damn business is unfortunately trying to cut our losses.

*D:* Certainly that is right and certainly it has had no effect on you. That's the good thing.

*H:* No, it has been kept away from the White House and of course completely from the President. The only tie to the White House is the Colson effort they keep trying to pull in [Charles Colson, former special counsel to Nixon].

*D:* And, of course, the two White House people of lower level—indicted ... That is not much of a tie.

FEBRUARY 28, 1973, 9:12 A.M.

The Oval Office. Present: the President and Dean.

By late January, the Watergate seven had either pleaded guilty or been convicted. At the end of the trial, Judge John Sirica had warned that he was not satisfied that all the guilty persons had been brought to justice. In early February, the Senate voted to set up the Watergate committee to investigate 1972 presidential campaign practices. L. Patrick Gray was making his first appearance before the Senate Judiciary Commit-

tee, which was holding hearings for his confirmation as permanent FBI director. The President is concerned about the leaks on Watergate from the FBI.

P: The Bureau is leaking like a sieve to Baker [Senator Howard Baker, vice chairman of the Senate Watergate committee]. It isn't coming from Henry Petersen [chief of the Criminal Division of the Justice Department] is it?

D: No. I would just not believe that.

The problem of the sentencing of the Watergate conspirators comes up.

P: You know when they talk about a 35-year sentence, here is something to think about. There were no weapons! Right? There were no injuries! Right? There was no success! Why does that sort of thing happen? It is just ridiculous! [Characterization deleted]

P: Well, you can follow these characters to their Gethsemane. I feel for those poor guys in jail, particularly for Hunt with his wife dead. [She had been killed in a plane crash while delivering \$10,000 in hush money for Watergate defendants.]

D: Well, there is every indication they are hanging in tough right now.

P: What the hell do they expect though? Do they expect clemency in a reasonable time? What would you advise on that?

D: I think it is one of those things we will have to watch very closely.

P: You couldn't do it, say, in six months.

D: No ... This thing may become ... a vendetta. This judge [Sirica] may go off the deep end in sentencing.

Nixon declares that the people most disturbed about Watergate are "the [adjective deleted]" Republicans, who are "highly moral. The Democrats are just sort of saying [expletive deleted] fun and games." Dean mentions Donald Segretti, practitioner of dirty tricks on behalf of Nixon's campaign.

P: [Expletive deleted] He was such a dumb figure, I don't see how our boys could have gone for him. But nevertheless, they did. It was really juvenile! But, nevertheless, what the hell did he do? Shouldn't we be trying to get intelligence? Weren't they? ...

D: Absolutely!

P: Don't you try to disrupt their meetings? Didn't they try to disrupt ours? [Expletive deleted] They threw rocks, ran demonstrations, shouted, cut the sound system, and let the tear gas in at night.

Dean continues to assure the President that Watergate is not getting out of control.

D: I had thought it was an impossible task to hold together ... but we have made it thus far, and I am convinced we are going to make it the whole road and put this thing in the funny pages of the history books rather than anything serious because actually—

P: It will be somewhat serious but the main thing, of course, is also the isolation of the President.

D: Absolutely! Totally true!

P: [Expletive deleted] Of course, I am not dumb and I will never forget when I heard about this [adjective deleted] forced entry and bugging. I thought, what in the hell is this? What is the matter with these people? Are they crazy? A prank! But it wasn't! It wasn't very funny. I think our Democratic friends know that, too. They know what the hell it was ... They don't think I would be involved in such stuff ... They think I have people capable of it. And they are correct, in that Colson would do anything.

The President worries that John Mitchell might be in trouble if he is called upon to testify before the Watergate committee.

P: Mitchell won't allow himself to be ruined. He will put on his big stone face. But I hope he does and he will. There is no question what they are after. What the committee is after somebody at the White House ... Hal-

deman or Colson, Ehrlichman.

D: Or possibly, Dean. You know, I am a small fish.

P: Anybody at the White House they would—but in your case I think they realize you are the lawyer and they know you didn't have a [adjective deleted] thing to do with the campaign.

MARCH 13, 1973, 12:42 P.M.

The Oval Office. Present: the President, Haldeman and Dean.

In the second week of his confirmation hearings, Gray has revealed that he regularly gave Dean FBI reports on the Watergate burglary investigation. Nixon has just issued a statement prohibiting any of his White House aides, past or present, from appearing before the Watergate committee on grounds of Executive privilege. In the discussion he makes clear that information is to be given the committee, but only on his terms.

P: My feeling, John, is that I better hit it now rather than just let it build up where we are afraid of these questions and everybody ...

D: These questions are just not going to go away. Now the other thing we have talked about in the past, and I still have the same problem, is to have a "here it all is" approach. If we do that ...

P: And let it all hang out.

D: And let it all hang out. Let's with a Segretti—etc.

P: We have passed that point.

D: Plus the fact, they are not going to believe the truth! That is the incredible thing!

P: They hope one will say one day, 'Haldeman did it,' and one day one will say I did it. They might question his political savvy, but not mine! Not on a matter like that!

Nixon says he noticed in his news summary that there is a crisis of confidence in the President.

D: I think it will pass ... I don't think that the thing will get out of hand ...

P: Oh yes, there would be new revelations.

D: They would want to find out who knew ...

P: Is there a higher up?

D: Is there a higher up? ...

P: I think they are really after Haldeman.

D: Haldeman and Mitchell.

P: Colson is not big enough name for them ...

P: In any event, Haldeman's problem is Chapin isn't it? [Dwight Chapin, Nixon's former appointments secretary under Haldeman]

P: Now where the hell, or how much Chapin knew I will be [expletive deleted] if I know.

Assured that Chapin did not know about Watergate, the President asks if Gordon Strachan (a Haldeman aide) was aware. Dean admits that Strachan knew early on, but has twice denied to Federal investigators having any knowledge. Dean says that Strachan is ready to deny it again before the Ervin committee. Nixon thus knows that before March 21 at least one White House man is involved in the cover-up.

D: Strachan is as tough as nails. He can go in and stonewall ...

P: I guess he should, shouldn't he? I suppose we can't call that justice, can we?

D: Well, it is a personal loyalty to him. He doesn't want it any other way. He didn't have to be told ...

The President reflects that the Watergate espionage must have been unproductive since he received no report on it.

P: What was the matter? Did they never get anything out of the damn thing?

D: I don't think they ever got anything, sir.

P: A dry hole?

D: That's right.

P: [Expletive deleted]

D: Well, they were just really getting started ...

P: That was such a stupid thing! ... To think Mitch-

ell and Bob would have allowed this kind of operation to be in the campaign committee.

P: Is it too late to go the hang-out road?

D: Yes, I think it is. The hang-out road—

P: The hang-out road [inaudible]

D: It was kicked around Bob and I and...

P: Ehrlichman always felt it should be hang-out.

D: Well, I think I convinced him why he would not want to hang-out either. There is a certain domino situation here. If some things start going, a lot of other things are going to start going...

MARCH 17, 1973, 1:25 P.M.

The Oval Office. Present: the President and Dean.

For the first time, the President learns of the break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding.

P: What in the world—what in the name of God was Ehrlichman having something [unintelligible] in the Ellsberg [unintelligible]?

D: They were... they wanted to get Ellsberg's psychiatric records for some reason. I don't know.

P: This is the first I ever heard of this...

D: Well, anyway, [unintelligible] it was under an Ehrlichman structure, maybe John didn't ever know. I've never asked him if he knew. I didn't want to know.

P: I can't see that getting into this hearing [the Watergate committee investigation].

MARCH 21, 1973, 10:12 A.M.

The Oval Office. Present: the President, Haldeman and Dean.

This is the most crucial meeting covered by the Watergate transcripts. In his televised speech last week, the President concentrated on this 103-minute conversation, trying to strengthen the weakest link in his defense. At issue is his seeming authorization of hush money to buy Hunt's continued silence. He argued that he considered paying only because a national security problem—which he did not further identify—was involved. In the end, he said, he "did not intend the further payment to Hunt or anyone else be made," but he conceded that his words on the tapes were ambiguous.

In the published transcript, Dean warns that a "cancer within the presidency" is "growing geometrically." He spells out most of the Watergate operation for the President, including the attempted cover-up that involved the White House staff. He omits, however, some of his own actions in the scandal. The President appears not to have prior information, he asks more than 150 questions. Dean says that he could tell that Nixon did not know what had been going on. Dean says that after the burglars were caught, Gordon Liddy said that he had attempted the break-in because Jeb Magruder, re-election committee deputy director, wanted better information about the Democrats. Magruder had complained: "The White House is not happy with what we are getting." Dean tells Nixon that both Magruder and Herbert Porter, an assistant to Magruder, had perjured themselves in the trial of the Watergate burglars.

D: I honestly believe that no one over here knew that [the burglary was planned]. I know that, as God is my maker, I had no knowledge...

P: Bob [Haldeman] didn't either, or wouldn't have known that either. You are not the issue involved. Had Bob known, he would be.

D: I was under pretty clear instructions not to investigate this, but this could have been disastrous on the electorate if all hell had broken loose. I worked on a theory of containment.

P: Sure.

D: To try to hold it right where it was.

P: Right.

D: There is no doubt that I was totally aware of what the Bureau [FBI] was doing at all times. I was totally aware of what the Grand Jury was doing. I knew that witnesses were going to be called. I knew what they were asked, and I had to.

When Dean tells how the President's personal attorney Herbert Kalmbach raised money to pay the at-

torneys' fees for the Watergate defendants, Nixon speculates that the "cover of a Cuban committee" must have been used. (Some of the burglars were Cuban exiles.)

P: [Unintelligible], but I would certainly keep that cover for whatever it is worth.

D: That's the most troublesome thing because 1) Bob [Haldeman] is involved in that; 2) John [Ehrlichman] is involved in that; 3) I am involved in that; 4) Mitchell is involved in that. And that is an obstruction of justice.

Dean goes on to describe the "continual blackmail operation" by the Watergate defendants: their requests for money to keep them from talking.

D: It will cost money. It is dangerous. People around here are not pros at this sort of thing. This is the sort of thing Mafia people can do: washing money, getting clean money and things like that. We just don't know about those things, because we are not criminals and not used to dealing in that business.

P: That's right.

D: It is a tough thing to know how to do.

P: Maybe it takes a gang to do that.

D: That's right. There is a real problem as to whether we could even do it. Plus there is a real problem in raising money... But there is no denying the fact that the White House, in Ehrlichman, Haldeman and Dean are involved in some of the early money decisions.

P: How much money do you need?

D: I would say that these people are going to cost a million dollars over the next two years.

P: We could get that... You could get a million dollars. You could get it in cash. I know where it could be gotten. It is not easy but it could be done. But the question is who the hell would handle it? Any ideas on that?

D: That's right. Well, I think that is something that Mitchell ought to be charged with.

P: I would think so too.

D: And get some pros to help him.

P: Let me say there shouldn't be a lot of people running around getting money—

D: Well, he's got one person doing it who I am not sure is—

P: Who is that?

D: He has Fred LaRue [a former Mitchell aide] doing it. Now Fred started out going out trying to solicit money from all kinds of people.

P: No!

P: You need it in cash don't you? ... Would you put that through the Cuban Committee.

D: No.

P: How if that ever comes out are you going to handle it? Is the Cuban Committee an obstruction of justice, if they want to help?

D: Well, they have priests in it.

P: Would that give a little bit of a cover?...

D: Some for the Cubans and possibly Hunt.

P: Don't you think you have to handle Hunt's financial problem damn soon?

D: I think that is—I talked with Mitchell about that last night and—

P: It seems to me we have to keep the cap on the bottle that much, or we don't have any options.

D: That's right.

P: Either that or it all blows right now?

D: That's the question. What really bothers me is this growing situation. As I say, it is growing because of the continued need to provide support for the Watergate people who are going to hold us up for everything we've got, and the need for some people to perjure themselves as they go down the road here. If this thing ever blows, then we are in a cover-up situation. I think it would be extremely damaging to you and the—

P: Sure. The whole concept of Administration justice. Which we cannot have!

D: That is what really troubles me. For example, what happens, if it starts breaking, and they do find a criminal case against a Haldeman, a Dean or Ehrlichman? That is—

P: If it really comes to that, we would have to [unintelligible] some of the men.

D: That's right. I am coming down to what I really think, is that Bob and John and John Mitchell and I can

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sit down and spend the money, to figure out one, how this can be carved away from you, so that it does not damage you or the Presidency. It just can't! You are not involved in it and it is something you shouldn't—

P: That is true!

D: I know ... I can just tell from our conversation that these are things that you can have no knowledge of.

P: You certainly can! Buggings, etc! Let me say I am keenly aware of the fact that Colson, et al, were doing their best to get information as we went along. But they all knew very well they were supposed to comply with the law. There was no question about that!

Even if the money were given to Hunt and the others, the President wonders if he would not have to offer clemency as well.

D: I am not sure that you will ever be able to deliver on the clemency. It may just be too hot.

P: You can't do it politically until after the '74 elections, that's for sure. Your point is that even then you couldn't do it.

D: That's right.

P: No—it is wrong, that's for sure.

The President has insisted that his use of the word wrong applied to the whole question of delivering hush money and then providing clemency. In context, however, the word quite clearly refers only to clemency. Even then, it seems to be less a moral judgment of the impropriety of offering clemency than an assessment that the President would be open to political attack if he pardoned the conspirators before the 1974 elections.

When Haldeman arrives, the conversation turns to the Ellsberg break-in. For the first time, national security is mentioned as a possible defense.

D: You might put it on a national security grounds basis.

H: It absolutely was.

P: National security. We had to get information for national security grounds.

D: Then the question was, why didn't the CIA do it or why didn't the FBI do it?

P: Because we had to do it on a confidential basis.

H: Because we were checking them.

P: Neither could be trusted.

H: It has basically never been proven ...

P: With the bombing thing coming out [the secret bombing of Cambodia] and everything coming out, the whole thing was national security.

D: I think we could get by on that.

Later the President returns to the problem of the hush money.

P: Let's say, frankly, on the assumption that if we continue to cut our losses, we are not going to win. But in the end, we are going to be bled to death. And in the end, it's all going to come out anyway. Then you get the worst of both worlds. We are going to lose, and people are going to ...

H: And look like dopes.

P: And, in effect, look like a cover-up.

P: Another way to do it then, Bob, and John realizes this, is to continue to try to cut our losses. Now we have to take a look at that course of action. First it is going to require approximately a million dollars to take care of the jackasses who are in jail. That can be arranged. That could be arranged. But you realize that after we are gone, and assuming we can expend this money, then they are going to crack and it would be an unseemly story. Frankly, all the people aren't going to care that much.

D: That's right.

P: People won't care, but people are going to be talking about it ... The second thing is, we are not going to be able to deliver on ... clemency.

The President considers convening a new grand jury to investigate Watergate as preferable to the Watergate committee. The sessions would be private, and rules of evidence would apply.

D: You can take the Fifth Amendment.  
P: That's right.  
H: You can say you have forgotten too, can't you?  
P: You can say I don't remember. You can say I don't recall.

The conversation returns to Hunt; Dean fears that he is the most likely of the convicted Watergate conspirators to give the true story unless he is paid.

P: That's why for your immediate things you have no choice but to come up with the \$120,000, or whatever it is. Right?

D: That's right.

P: Would you agree that that's the prime thing that you damn well better get that done?

D: Obviously, he ought to be given some signal ...

P: [Expletive deleted] Get it.

In view of this curt command, it would be hard to argue, as the President has, that he did not approve of the hush money. This simple order, allowing no misinterpretation by Dean, may constitute the single most impeachable offense in the entire transcript.

Nixon asks how the money would get to Hunt.

D: You have to wash the money. You can get \$100,000 out of a bank, and it all comes in serialized bills.

P: I understand.

D: And that means you have to go to Vegas with it or a bookmaker in New York City. I have learned all these things after the fact. I will be in great shape for the next time around.

H: [Expletive deleted]

P: Well, of course you have a surplus from the campaign. Is there any other money hanging around?

The reply: there is none. Nixon tells his aides that "delaying is the great danger to the White House area."

A few hours later, according to grand jury testimony, Hunt's attorney received \$75,000. Next day John Mitchell flew down from New York. He told Ehrlichman that Hunt was no longer a "problem."

**MARCH 22, 1973, 1:57 P.M.**

The Presidential office in the Executive Office Building [E.O.B.]. Present: The President, Haldeman, Dean, Ehrlichman (E) and John Mitchell (M).

During a strategy session on Watergate options The President is concerned that Dean should finish a report on the scandal to be used as a public relations position paper. Nixon tells Dean not to get into specifics.

D: I am talking about something we can spread as facts. You see you could even write a novel with the facts.

E: I am looking to the future, assuming that some corner of this thing comes unstuck, you are then in a position to say: "Look, that document I published is the document I relied on."

P: This is all we knew.

H: This is all the stuff we could find out.

E: And now this new development is a surprise to me—I am going to fire A, B, C and D now.

P: At the President's direction you have never done anything operational, you have always acted as counsel. We've got to keep our eye on the Dean thing—just give them some of it—not all of it.

P: Do you think we want to go this route now? Let it hang out, so to speak?

D: Well, it isn't really that.

H: It's a limited hang-out.

D: It's a limited hang-out ... What it is doing, Mr. President, is getting you up above and away from it. That is the most important thing.

P: I feel that at a very minimum we've got to have this statement [on the Dean report] ... If it opens up doors, it opens up doors.

**MARCH 27, 1973, 11:10 A.M.**

The Oval Office. Present: The President, Halde-



man, Ehrlichman and Ziegler (Z).

Another strategy session is in order now that Watergate Burglar James McCord has sent his letter to Judge Sirica implicating higher-ups and charging that perjury was committed at his trial. The group ponders how to handle Jeb Magruder if he decides to change his perjured testimony and reveal that White House staff was involved in Watergate.

P: What stroke have you got with Magruder? ...

E: I think the stroke Bob [Haldeman] has with him is in the confrontation to say, "Jeb, you know that just plain isn't so," and just stare him down on some of this stuff and it is a golden opportunity to do this ... I am sure he will rationalize himself into a fable that hangs together. But if he knows that you are going to righteously and indignantly deny it, ah ...

P: Say that he is trying to lie to save his own skin.

E: It'll bend him.

H: But I can make a personal point of view in the other direction, and say, "Jeb, for God's sake don't get yourself screwed up by solving one lie with a second. You've got a problem. You ain't going to make it better by making it worse."

Ehrlichman suggests that Magruder be instructed to seek immunity and take the rap for the Watergate break-in without implicating anyone else. Magruder did not take this advice. He confessed to the prosecutors that he had committed perjury and disclosed the roles of Mitchell and Dean in Watergate and is awaiting sentencing.

APRIL 14, 1973, 8:55 A.M.

E.O.B. office. Present: The President, Haldeman and Ehrlichman.

With indictments thought to be pending against Magruder and Mitchell and more people preparing to talk, plans to contain the scandal are breaking down. In a conversation laced with incriminating confessions, the President and his top aides discuss how the Justice Department investigation might be cut off at the level of the Nixon re-election committee officials—notably Mitchell and Magruder—rather than reaching into the White House. Their aim is to persuade the former Attorney General and close friend of the President to assume total responsibility for Watergate.

E: If Mitchell went in, that might knock that whole week into a cocked hat.

P: Why?

H: Well, I'm not sure then they care about the cover-up any more.

P: Well, they might.

E: If Mitchell gave them a complete statement—

P: I wish they wouldn't, but I think they would, Bob. The cover-up, he said that—well, basically, it's a second crime. Isn't that right, John? ... Do you think they would keep going on the cover-up even if Mitchell went in?

E: Well, I would certainly assume so.

Nixon instructs Ehrlichman to talk to both Mitchell and Magruder. Ehrlichman proposes a cautious, roundabout way of telling them that the President wants them to testify honestly about their roles. (Nixon here refers to himself in the third person.)

P: Well, you could say to Mitchell, I think you've got to say that this is the toughest decision he's made and it's tougher than Cambodia—May 8 [the mining of Haiphong harbor] and Dec. 18 [bombing of Hanoi] put together. And that he can't bring himself to talk to you about it. Just can't do it ... But John Mitchell, let me say, will never go to prison. I think that what will happen is that he will put on the damndest defense.

APRIL 14, 1973, 5:15 P.M.

E.O.B. office. Present: the President, Haldeman and Ehrlichman.

Magruder has told his revised story, implicating Dean and Mitchell, to the prosecutors. Mitchell has rejected Ehrlichman's subtle pitch that he consider shouldering the blame. The scenario is falling apart. Dean has started telling federal prosecutors what he knew

about the break-in and cover-up. He has implicated Mitchell, Ehrlichman and Haldeman. That leaves the President a solitary, frustrated figure trying to hold the remaining pieces together.

P: Let me tell you, John, the thing about all this that has concerned me is dragging the damn thing out. And having it to be the only issue in town. Now the thing to do now, have done. Indict Mitchell and the rest and there'll be a horrible two weeks—a horrible, terrible scandal, worse than Teapot Dome and so forth. And it doesn't have anything to do with Teapot.

E: Yeah.

P: I mean there is no venality involved in the damn thing, no thievery or anything. Nobody got any papers. You know what I mean?

E: Yeah. That's true.

H: Glad to hear it.

P: The bad part of it is the fact that the Attorney General and the obstruction of justice thing which it appears to be. And yet, they ought to go up fighting. I think they all ought to fight.

APRIL 14, 1973, 11:02 P.M.

The Oval Office. A telephone conversation between the President and Haldeman.

P: I just don't know how it is going to come out. That is the whole point, and I just don't know. And I was serious when I said to John [Ehrlichman] at the end there, damn it all, these guys that participated in raising money, etc., have got to stick to their line—that they did not raise this money to obstruct justice.

H: Well, I sure didn't think they were.

P: At least I think now, we pretty much know what the worst is. I don't know what the hell else they could have that is any worse. Unless there is something that I don't know, unless somebody's got a piece of paper that somebody signed or some damn thing ...

H: It doesn't appear that there is such a thing. What you hear is all stuff that has been hinted at.

APRIL 14, 1973, 11:22 P.M.

The Oval Office. A telephone conversation between the President and Ehrlichman.

P: [Haldeman] is a guy that has just given his life, hours and hours and hours you know, totally selfless and honest and decent ... You know you get the argument of some ... you should fire them. I mean you can't do that. Or am I wrong?

E: No, you are right.

P: Well, maybe I am not right. I am asking. They say, clean the boards. Well, is that our system?

E: I think you have to show ... some heart on this thing.

P: Well, the point is, whatever we say about Harry Truman, while it hurt him, a lot of people admired the old bastard for standing by people ... who were guilty as hell.

E: Yep.

P: And damn it, I am that kind of person. I am not one who is going to say, look, while this guy is under attack, I drop him.

The President then turns the conversation to how Dean could be kept from telling the prosecutors too much. In a potentially damaging portion of the transcript, the President suggests that Ehrlichman hint to Dean that only Nixon can pardon him. For his part, Ehrlichman implies that a plan is needed to ensure that the testimony of Dean and others does not involve the President. The crucial segments:

P: What are you going to say to [Dean]?

E: I am going to try to get him around a bit. It is going to be delicate.

P: Get him around in what way?

E: Well to get off this passing the buck business.

P: John, that's—

E: It is a little touchy and I don't know how far I can go.

P: John, that is not going to help you. Look, he has to look down the road to one point that there is only one man who could restore him to the ability to prac-

tice law in case things go wrong. He's got to have that in the back of his mind.

E: Uh, huh.

P: He's got to know that will happen. You don't tell him, but you know and I know that with him and Mitchell there isn't going to be any damn question, because they got a bad rap...

P: Well, with Dean I think you can talk to him in confidence about a thing like that, don't you? He isn't going to—

E: I am not sure—I just don't know how much to lean on that reed at the moment.

P: I see.

E: But I will sound it out.

P: Well, you start with the proposition, Dean, the President thinks you have carried a tremendous load, and his affection and loyalty to you is just undiminished.

E: Alright.

P: And now, let's see where the hell we go.

E: Uh, huh.

P: We can't get the President involved in this, his people, that is one thing. We don't want to cover-up, but there are ways... Look, John, we need a plan here. And so that LaRue, Mardian and the others—I mean—

E: Well, I am not sure I can go that far with him.

P: No. He can make the plan up.

E: I will sound it out.

P: Right. Get a good night's sleep.

#### APRIL 15, 1973, 1:12 P.M.

E.O.B. Present: the President and Attorney General Richard Kleindienst (K).

Ushered into the President's hideaway in the Executive Office Building, Kleindienst, who has been up all night being briefed by the Watergate prosecutors, promptly discloses that Nixon's highest advisers are now being tied into the cover-up.

K: There is a possible suggestion that Haldeman and Ehrlichman ah, as yet—it looks that way—whether there is legal proof of it so far as that—that they... well, [had] knowledge in this respect, or knowledge or conduct either before or after the event [the June 17, 1972 break-in at the Watergate]...

P: Both Haldeman and Ehrlichman?

K: Yes... That is my primary reason for talking to you...

P: Who told you this? Silbert? [Assistant U.S. Attorney Earl J. Silbert, chief prosecutor of Watergate trial].

K: Yeah.

P: I have asked both Haldeman and Ehrlichman.

K: I know you have.

P: And they have given me absolute—you know what I mean... I don't believe Haldeman or Ehrlichman could ever—you know...

K:... It will be circumstantial, an association, an involvement, and it's going to be—

P: Why don't you do something about it?

Kleindienst avoids a direct answer to what many would interpret as a highly improper question. But he does say that the evidence is "going to come out," and might involve charges of obstructing justice. Then Kleindienst warns Nixon that a sheaf of indictments would soon be handed up and that the whole story is "likely to be all over town" in a day or two.

P: Involving Haldeman and Ehrlichman, too?

K: Yeah...

P: Do they tell you flatly Mitchell will be indicted?

K: Yes. They do—so will Dean.

P: Will be indicted?

K: Yeah.

P: What is your recommendation, then?

K:... It seems to me that so long as I do anything at the Department of Justice I cannot hereafter be with Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell, LaRue. They won't be lieve that we didn't talk about the Watergate case.

P: Who can you have contacts with? Me?

K:... I don't know whether I need contact anyone.

Incidentally, there's a—there's a weak possible case on Colson... He knew about and was involved in a conversation pertaining to money for Liddy's projects...

P: They consider there's a weak case on him...

K: Yes—and a very, very peripheral, weak case—probably not an indictable case with respect to Ehrlichman and Haldeman.

P: You know, it's embarrassing and all the rest, but it'll pass. We've got to—we've got to just ride it through Dick... Do the best we can. Right?

K: Yes sir.

P: We don't run to the hills on this and so forth. The main thing is to handle it right.

P: And naturally because of your association with John Mitchell you would have to disqualify yourself.

K: Mardian, LaRue.

P: Oh—you know them all. Right—right—right. Now the difficulty with the special prosecutor—it gets a guy into the [expletive removed] thing... It's a reflection—it's sort of an admitting *mea culpa* for our whole system of justice.

One concern of Nixon's—unmentioned here but evident in other conversations—is that a special prosecutor, who would coordinate the entire investigation, could not be counted on to keep the President from being involved. Later the President and Kleindienst muse on how things could have gone so awry.

P: They thought there was an election—you know—let's face it... But after the election, I couldn't think what in the name of [expletive removed] reason did they play around then? Do you?

K: No.

P: You didn't know that they were doing this? I didn't know.

K: No sir—I didn't know.

P: I didn't—you know—as I was—one of the problems here—I have always run my campaigns. I didn't run this one I must say. I was pretty busy. Or—maybe—handling the Russian Summit. And you know, after the election—we were right in the middle of the Dec. 8th bombing—and holding meetings...

At the end of this 70-minute dialogue the two agreed, in Kleindienst's words, "to delegate the responsibility for the entire matter to [Henry] Petersen, Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division."

#### APRIL 15, 1973, 3:27 P.M.

Telephone conversation between the President and Haldeman. The White House claims that its taping system broke down toward the end of the Nixon-Kleindienst meeting. As a result, 4 hours and 35 minutes of talks variously involving the President, Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Dean, Kleindienst and Petersen—all on that crucial Sunday in April—are lost. But the telephone records remain intact, and in this exchange, after telling Haldeman, "We are so low now we can't go any lower," Nixon says he favors the idea of a special prosecutor after all.

P: He is just in there for the purpose of examining all this to see that the indictments cover everybody.

H: Uh, huh. Well that does protect you a lot, because if they don't indict some of us then you have a cover-up problem...

P: Then he goes out and says, "I have examined all of this, and now let's stop all this. These men are not guilty and these men are not indictable and these are."

Nixon returns to the notion that John Mitchell might serve well as a sacrificial lamb.

P: Look, if they get a hell of a big fish, that is going to take a lot of the fire out of this thing on the cover-up and all that sort. If they get the President's former law partner and Attorney General, you know...

H: Yeah. What I feel is people want something to be done to explain what to them is now a phony-looking thing. This will explain it.

H: It seems to me that... public reaction is going

to be, well, thank God that is settled; now let's get away from it. Rather than the reaction of, "Ho, ho, ho, here is something pretty bad; let's spend a lot more time looking into it."

P: That's right.

**APRIL 15, 1973, 11:45 P.M.**

Telephone conversation between the President and Petersen (HP). There are four short calls from the President to Petersen between 8:14 p.m. and 11:45 p.m. After discussing Dean's demand for immunity, Nixon asks Petersen about Haldeman and Ehrlichman.

HP: It is not going to come out neat and clean ... with respect to either one of them.

HP: I think with respect to the obstruction of justice thing is concerned, it is easy for me to see how they fell into that, if you like.

P: Yeah. Uh, huh. Rather than being directly conspirators?

HP: That's right. That's right.

P: And there is a difference in that respect ...

HP: A difference, at least, in moral culpability ... In plain terms of ultimate embarrassment ...

P: The embarrassment is there, but in terms—basically in terms of motive which might be the legal culpability, they might be off but in terms of embarrassment they would have to be out of the Government?

HP: Yes, Sir.

P: I get your point and, frankly, either one is enough.

**APRIL 16, 1973, 9:50 A.M.**

The Oval Office. Present: the President, Haldeman and Ehrlichman.

The three assemble to discuss Dean, who is due in ten minutes; apparently they have agreed that he has to go, but the question is how. Two letters have been prepared for Dean to sign, one offering his resignation and the other requesting a leave. Then the President and his two closest aides discuss "scenarios" for explaining their way out of a difficult situation.

P: I would like also a scenario with regard to the President's role, in other words, the President—

E: Ziegler has just left my office. He feels we have no more than twelve hours. He's got some input from the Post and he estimates unless we take an initiative by 9 o'clock tonight it will be too late.

Apparently worrying about what revelations might be forthcoming, the three discuss whether the White House should take the initiative by issuing a statement detailing what is being done to further the investigation. No firm decision is made.

**APRIL 16, 1973, 10 A.M.**

The Oval Office. Present: the President and Dean.

P: You will remember we talked about resignations, etc., etc. that I should have in hand. Not to be released.

D: Uh, huh.

P: But that I should have in hand something or otherwise they will say, "What the hell. After Dean told you all of this, what did you do?" You see?

D: Uh, huh.

P: But what is your feeling on that? ...

D: Well, I think it ought to be Dean, Ehrlichman and Haldeman (leaving together).

P: Well, I thought Dean at this moment.

D: Alright.

P: Dean at this moment because you are going to be going and I will have to handle them also. But the point is, what is your advice? You see the point is, we just typed up a couple just to have here which I would be willing to put out. You know ... In the event that certain things occur.

D: Uh, huh.

P: First, what I would suggest is that you sign both.

Supremely wary, Dean avoids signing the letters, but volunteers to draft one of his own "putting in both options." Later he soothingly assures Nixon, "You are

still five steps ahead of what will ever emerge publicly," and the President, quoting Petersen, says hopefully that "the obstruction of justice thing is a [expletive omitted] hard thing to prove in court."

D: Well, my lawyer tells me, you know, that, "legally you are in damn good shape."

P: Is that right? Because you're not—you were simply helping the defendants get their fees and their—what does he say?

D: In that position, I am merely a conduit ... I am a conduit to other people. That is the problem.

P: What was the situation, John? The only time I ever heard any discussion of support for the [Watergate burglars] defense fund was [inaudible]. I guess I should have assumed somebody was helping them. I must have assumed it. But I must say people were good in a way because I was busy.

P: What did you report to me on, though? It was rather fragmentary, as I recall it. You said Hunt had a problem ... I said, "Why, John, how much is it going to cost to do this?"

D: That's right.

P: And you said it could cost a million dollars.

D: I said it conceivably could. I said, "If we don't cut this thing ...

P: Who handled the money?

D: Well, let me tell you the rest of what Hunt said. He said, "You tell Dean that I need \$72,000 for my personal expenses, \$50,000 for my legal fees and if I don't get it I am going to have some things to say about the seamy things I did at the White House for John Ehrlichman." All right, I took that to John Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman said, "Have you talked to Mitchell about it?" I said, "No, I have not."

D: I talked to Mitchell ... A few days later ... Ehrlichman said ... "Well, is that problem with Hunt straightened out?" He said it to me and I said "Well, ask the man who may know: Mitchell." Mitchell said, "I think that problem is solved."

Looking toward his defenses, Nixon constructs a scenario for Dean to follow.

P: I just wanted to be sure that it jives with the facts. I can say that you did tell me that nobody in the White House was involved and I can say that you then came in, at your request, and said, "I think the President needs to hear more about this case."

D: That's right.

P: Then it was that night that I started my investigation.

P: That is when I frankly became interested in the case and I said, "Now [expletive omitted] I want to find out the score."

Under Nixon's questioning, Dean describes how Magruder and Mitchell have tried to get him to perjure himself.

P: What got Magruder to talk? I would like to take the credit ...

D: The situation there is that he and Mitchell were continuing to talk. Proceeding along the same course they had been proceeding to locking their story, but my story did not fit with their story. And I just told them I refused to change, to alter my testimony ...

P: Oh yes, I remember. You told me that. I guess everybody told me that. Dean said, "I am not going down there and lie," because your hand will shake and your emotions. Remember you told me that.

D: Yes, I said that. I am incapable of it.

P: Thank God. Don't ever do it, John. Tell the truth. That is the thing I have told everybody around here ... If you are going to lie, you go to jail for the lie rather than the crime. So believe me, don't ever lie.

D: The truth always emerges. It always does.

**APRIL 16, 1973, 10:50 A.M.**

The Oval Office. Present: the President, Haldeman and Ehrlichman.

Scarcely has Dean departed than Haldeman and Ehrlichman return and almost immediately the Pres-

ident says: "Well, John, let me say this [Dean] is quite the operator." Soon the talk turns again to the question of scenarios.

P: How has the scenario worked out?...

H: Well, it works out very good. You became aware sometime ago that this thing did not parse out the way it was supposed to and that there were some discrepancies between what you had been told by Dean in the report that there was nobody in the White House involved, which may still be true...

P: I would say I was not satisfied that the Dean report was complete and also I thought it was my obligation to go beyond that to people other than the White House.

E: Ron [Ziegler] has an interesting point. Remember you had John Dean go to Camp David to write it up. He came down and said, "I can't."...

P: Right.

E: That is the tip-off and right then you started to move.

P: That's right. He said he could not write it.

H: Then you realized that there was more to this than you had been led to believe. [unintelligible]

E: And so then we started digging into it... You began to move... And then it culminated last week... in your decision that Mitchell should be brought down here; Magruder should be brought in; Strachan should be brought in.

P: Shall I say that we brought them all in?

E: I don't think you can. I don't think you can.

E: But you should say, "I heard enough that I was satisfied that it was time to precipitously move. I called the Attorney General over, in turn Petersen."

#### APRIL 16, 1973, 12 NOON

The Oval Office. Present: the President and Haldeman.

Once again, Nixon reviews "how we stage this damn thing." Haldeman discusses with him "the Garment plan," drawn up by White House Counsel Leonard Garment and calling for the jettisoning of not only Mitchell and Dean but also Haldeman and Ehrlichman to protect the President.

P: What does Ron think about this, leaving out the PR: does he think we should try to tough it through?...

H: I am not sure. I think Ron would say just wait and see. You see his point is that there is no question that I will be tarnished.

H: Then I go out. Garment's statement is that then I go out and hit this, use the position that I have established that way from the outside to—

P: To fight?

H: Yeah... Len is the panic button type. If we had reacted in Garment's way in other things, we wouldn't be where we are. That doesn't mean he isn't right this time, incidentally.

P: I know.

H: Len's view is that what you need is... some kind of a dramatic move. Henry [Kissinger] feels that, but Henry feels that you should go on television... which is his solution to any problem.

#### APRIL 16, 1973, 1:39 P.M.

E.O.B. Present: the President and Petersen.

For a prosecutor, Petersen seems inordinately eager to downplay the merits of the Justice Department's case—and to impart whatever information and advice he can to his boss. During an afternoon meeting that lasts for nearly two hours, Nixon seems deeply concerned about his image, emphasizing "the need... to show that the President takes the initiative" and that "once I find something out—I say—ACT!" He also is worried about Dean.

P: How does Dean come out on this thing?

HP: His counsel says we want a deal. This man was an agent. This man didn't do anything but what Halde—

P: Haldeman and Ehrlichman told him to do.

HP: And Mitchell, and if you insist on trying him we, in defense, are going to try Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Nixon and this Administration...

P: He'd try it—the President too?

HP: It's a goddamned poker game. Yes sir.

Summoning Ziegler to join the conversation, the President resumes his musings over what sort of public statement he could issue that would "knock true."

P: I want them [the press] to know that since the 21st [of March] I've been working my tail off, which I have—I'm so sick of this thing. I want to get it done with and over, and I don't want to hear about it again.

#### APRIL 16, 1973, 3:27 P.M.

E.O.B. Present: the President, Ehrlichman and Ziegler.

Second thoughts begin to surface about how necessary it is, after all, to issue a statement.

P: We just won't try to get out in front... We've gotten into enough trouble by saying nothing so we'll say nothing today. You know, actually, thank God we haven't, thank God we haven't had a Haldeman statement. Believe me. [Unintelligible] Thank God we didn't get out a Dean report. Right? Thank God. So, we've done a few things right. Don't say anything.

E: I'd sure like to see us come out sometime, and I suppose it has to be at a time that Magruder makes his deal.

P: Well, let me say, I'll—I've got Petersen on a short leash.

Ehrlichman continues to argue for a statement, preferably on April 17; eventually he prevails.

#### APRIL 17, 1973, 9:47 A.M.

The Oval Office. Present: the President and Haldeman.

Nixon discusses the need to issue a Watergate statement because "they keep banging around and banging around. The prosecution gets out the damn stuff." There is a note of fatalism.

P: [Dean] basically is the one who surprises me and disappoints... because he is trying to save his neck and doing so easily. He is not, to hear him tell it, when I have talked to him, he is not telling things that will, you know—

H: That is not really true though. He is.

H: That is the real problem we've got. It had to break and it should break but what you've got is people within it... who said things and said them, too, exactly as Dean told them.

#### APRIL 17, 1973, 12:35 P.M.

The Oval Office. Present: the President, Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Ziegler.

For nearly two hours, the threat from Dean dominates the conversation.

P: You see Dean—let's see, what the hell—what's he got with regard to the President? He came and talked to me, as you will recall, about the need for \$120,000 for clemencies—

E: You told me that the other day, I didn't know that before.

H: But so what?

P: I said, what in the world John, I mean, I said John you can't [unintelligible] on this short notice. What's it cost [unintelligible] I sort of laughed and said, "Well, I guess you could get that."

E: Now is he holding that over your head? Saying—

P: No, no, no, I don't think Dean would go so far as to get into any conversation he had with the President—even Dean I don't think.

The discussion turns to the constant pressure and unceasing disclosures.

P: The point is can we survive it? Can Haldeman and Ehrlichman survive it? The point that I... I know that as far as you're concerned, you'll go out and throw yourselves on a damned sword... Damn it, you're the two most valuable members on the staff. I know that.

On the basis of his talks with Petersen, the President knows that the prosecutors are paying a great deal of attention to the \$350,000 that was raised for the convicted burglars, and to the roles played by Ehrlichman and Haldeman in that effort.

P: Have you given any thought to what the line ought to be—I don't mean a lie—but a line, on raising the money for these defendants? Because both of you were aware of what was going on you see—the raising of the money—you were aware of it, right?

E: Well, Mr. President, when the truth and fact of this is known, that building next door is full of people who knew that money was being raised for these people.

P: E.O.B.?

E: Yes, sir, just full of them.

P: Many who know but there were not so many actors. In other words, there's a difference between actors and noticees.

E: I want you to think very critically about the difference here between knowledge of the general transactions going on, on the one hand, and being an affirmative actor on the other, because that's the difference between Dean and me. Now on this business on whether Dean should have immunity, I think you have to ask yourself really, the basic question, whether anybody in the White House who does wrong, ought to get immunity, no matter how many... he implicates.

The President agrees that Dean should not be given immunity and notes that Chuck Colson feels the same way.

P: I can call Petersen in and say he [Dean] cannot be given immunity... Whether he'll carry that order out—that's going to be an indicator that that's Dean and [unintelligible]. And then what do I say about Dean. Do I tell him that he goes?

E: Well, you see, the thing that precipitated Colson's coming over is that he found that Dean was still here... Colson called and says you've got an ass at your bosom over there, and so, today he checked again... and discovered that Dean was still here... He came in and he says, "You guys are just out-of-your-minds"... He was fit to be tied.

P: But you see if I say, "Dean, you leave today," he'd go out and say, "Well the President's covering up for Ehrlichman and Haldeman."

P: We've got to remember... he's going to do anything to save his ass.

Nonetheless the decision is made to keep Dean away from the White House without actually firing him ("Pass the word to everybody in this place that he's a piranha," Ehrlichman suggests). Nixon needs no urging. He emphatically makes the point that Dean never saw him alone until March, and then only at Ehrlichman's suggestion. He declines responsibility for Dean's conduct.

It is finally decided that Nixon will make a statement on television announcing that he has ordered a full investigation and will automatically suspend any White House staffers who are indicted by the grand jury and fire any who are convicted.

**APRIL 17, 1973, 2:46 P.M.**

The Oval Office. Present: the President and Petersen.

Nixon bears down hard on Petersen not to grant immunity to Dean. With immunity, Dean can get off scot-free or escape with prosecution for a minor offense in exchange for talking freely. Petersen tries to resist Nixon, but the pressure is intense.

HP: I don't want to immunize John Dean; I think he is too high in the echelon but—it's a—

P: The prosecutor's got the right to make that decision?

HP: Yes, sir.

P: I think it would—look—because your close relationship with Dean—which has been very close—it would look like a straight deal.

HP: The thing that scares the hell out of me is this—suppose Dean is the only key to Haldeman and Ehrlichman and the refusal to immunize Dean means that Haldeman and Ehrlichman go free.

P: ... I cannot... in good conscience and you can't in good conscience say that you are going to send Haldeman and Ehrlichman—or anybody for that matter—or Colson—down the tube on the uncorroborated evidence of John Dean

Later, reviewing how the whole mess began, Nixon says, "Mitchell wasn't minding the store and Magruder is a weak fellow... and then afterwards they compounded it... basically they were trying to protect Mitchell—let's face it." Then there is this exchange.

P: What would you do if you were Mitchell?

HP: I think I would probably go to Saudi Arabia to tell you the truth.

P: Poison.

As Nixon's TV date draws near, Petersen begins advising the President on what should be said. At one point, he comments: "Damn, I admire your strength. I tell you." And Nixon replies: "Well, that's what we are here for." At another, Petersen recounts how he has told Silbert: "Now dammit, Silbert, keep your eye on the mark—we are investigating Watergate—we are not investigating the whole damn realm of politics."

**APRIL 17, 1973, 3:50 P.M.**

The Oval Office. Present: the President, Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Ziegler. By this time, the group is resigned to Dean's blasting the Administration. Still, Ehrlichman finds cause for optimism.

E: The more battles the President wins, like the economical stabilization performance, the more urgent the Ervin hearings become. It's the only thing they have left now. You're winning all the big ones.

**APRIL 17, 1973, 5:20 P.M.**

E.O.B. Present: the President, Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Secretary of State William Rogers (R).

Waiting for his two aides to return from a first meeting with their lawyer, John J. Wilson, Nixon chats with Rogers. "Dammit," he says of Dean, "why didn't he come in earlier and tell me these things, Bill?" Nonetheless, he seems confident.

P: This'll be in better perspective in a year, I think.

R: I think so. I think... well, the first blush will be...

P: Terrible.

R: But when it's all over—finished...

P: I'll be here, all along, Bill.

When Haldeman and Ehrlichman return from their meeting with Wilson, Nixon offers a suggestion.

P: Both of you, and Bob particularly, you ought to get yourself a libel lawyer, Bob, and use the most vicious libel lawyer there is. I'd sue every [expletive deleted]... that also helps with public opinion.

P: John, this libel thing. You may as well get at the libel thing and have yourself a little fun.

E: Might make expenses.

**APRIL 19, 1973, 8:26 P.M.**

E.O.B. Present: the President, Wilson (W) and Frank Strickler (S), attorneys for Haldeman and Ehrlichman.

This is basically a mutual get-acquainted session. Says Wilson: "We admire you so much—we both are



dyed-in-the-wool Republicans." Strickler notes that he was at the Shoreham on election night.

P: You were there? Oh boy. That was a great night? Well, that was what it was all about.

S: Yes, it sure was.

P: Well, we'll survive this. You know—people say this destroys the Administration and the rest—but what was this? What was Watergate? A little bugging! I mean a terrible thing—it shouldn't have been done—shouldn't have been covered up... and the rest, but we've got to beat it. Right.

**APRIL 27, 1973, 5:37 P.M.**

The Oval Office. Present: the President and Petersen.

HP: We had a kind of crisis of confidence night before last. I left to come over here and I left my two principal assistants to discourse with Silbert and the other three. And in effect it concerned me—whether or not they were at ease with my reporting to you...

P: Yes...

HP: There is a very suspicious atmosphere. They are concerned and scared.

Nixon himself is concerned—and possibly scared—about another matter. He has heard rumors that the New York Times has information linking him directly to the cover-up.

P: We have gotten a report that, ah, that really we've got to head them off at the pass. Because it's so damned—so damn dangerous to the Presidency, in a sense.

P: Information indicating that Dean has made statements to the prosecuting team implicating the President. And whether... the (Washington) Post has heard similar rumors. Now, Henry, this I've got to know.

**APRIL 27, 1973, 6:04 P.M.**

The Oval Office. Present: the President, Petersen and Ziegler.

Only minutes after Nixon has expressed his fears to Petersen, the prosecutor returns for yet another meeting and assures the President that there are no specifics to the Dean charges. Nixon tells Ziegler to kill

any budding newspaper story on the subject and "kill it hard."

P: Take a hard line... Anything on that they better watch their damned cotton picking faces. Because boy, if there's one thing in this case as Henry will tell you, since March 21st when I had that conversation with Dean, I have broken my ass to try to get the facts of this case.

P: If there's one thing you have got to do, you have got to maintain the Presidency out of this. I have got things to do for this country and I'm not going to have—now this is personal. I sometimes feel like I'd like to resign. Let Agnew be President for a while. He'd love it.

Toward the end of the 44-minute session, Petersen decides to get something bothering him off his chest. Citing a personal example, he brings up the growing public doubt that the President is telling all that he knows about the Watergate cover-up.

HP: Mr. President, my wife is not a politically sophisticated woman... But she asked me at breakfast—she, now I don't want you to hold this against her if you ever meet her, because she's a charming lady—

P: Of course.

HP: She said...

P: "Why the hell doesn't the President do something?"

HP: She said, "Do you think the President knows?" And I looked at her and said, "If I thought the President knew, I would have to resign."... Well, when that type of question comes through in my home—

P: We've got to get it out.

Three days later, what gets out is Nixon's announcement that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean and Kleindienst have resigned, that Elliot Richardson is being appointed Attorney General with authority to name a special prosecutor and that he, the President, takes full responsibility for what has happened. Nixon also recalls that at his second inaugural he gave each Cabinet member and senior White House staffer a special four-year calendar marked to show how many days remained in his Administration. It began with 1,461, and on the day he delivers the speech, he says, "It showed exactly 1,361 days remaining in my term." More than a year has passed, Watergate is far from over, and the figure on the President's special calendar is now down to just under 1,000.

## An Intimate Glimpse of a Private President

Apart from the evidence it provides about the President's critical conversations, the edited transcript furnishes a potpourri of marginalia that limn the style and character of the Nixon White House. A representative sampler:

### NIXON ON OTHERS

The President's confidential assessments of other men in talks with trusted aides were tough, candid, and often brutal:

Senator Howard Baker. "A smoothy—impressive" but also possessed of a "thick skull."

Senator Sam Ervin. "[Expletive deleted] He's got Baker totally toppled over to him. Ervin works harder than most of our Southern gentlemen."

L. Patrick Gray III. "Oh, he's dumb... he is just quite stubborn and also he isn't very smart."

Jeb Stuart Magruder. "Not a very bright fellow. I mean he is bright, but he doesn't think through to the end... a very facile liar. Magruder's a sort of lightweight in a very heavy job."

Charles Colson. "Talks too much... is also a name-dropper."

J. Edgar Hoover. "Well, Hoover performed. He would have fought. That was the point. He would have defied a few people. He would have scared them to death. He has a file on everybody."

Robert Kennedy. "Bobby was a ruthless [characterization omitted]."

### WISFUL THINKING

For a man proud of his political shrewdness, the President as revealed in the transcript was frequently slow to grasp the full seriousness of the Watergate matter, and he gravely misread the public mood on several important points.

"[Expletive deleted] it is a terrible lousy thing—it will remain a crisis among the upper intellectual types, the soft heads, our own, too—Republicans—and the Democrats and the rest. Average people won't think it is much of a crisis unless it affects them [unintelligible]." (March 13, 1973)

Nixon was strangely sanguine even though the Senate Watergate Committee planned to hold hearings:

"Well, it must be a big show. Public hearings. I wouldn't think though, I know from experience, my guess is that I think they could get through about three weeks of those and then I think it would begin to peter out somewhat." (March 13, 1973)

### AS DECISION MAKER

Contrary to the President's carefully nurtured image as a cool and dispassionate leader accustomed to tough going, the transcript reveals an indecisive man often dazed by a confusion of conflicting data.

Haldeman's judgment easily prevailed over the President's in this discussion about whether or not to reveal the contents of Jeb Stuart Magruder's grand jury testimony:

P: And I think you should tell [John Connally]—would you tell him about Magruder?

H: Nope.

P: No, I guess not.

P: I think with Bill [Rogers], though, you could tell him, don't you think?

H: Nope. I don't think I should. In the first place, I am not supposed to know.

P: This isn't from the grand jury, Bob.

H: No, I know. But Kleindienst is worried about John [Ehrlichman's] giving the information to anybody, and that—

P: I see. You're right. (April 14, 1973)

#### ASSESSING THE BLAME

While the President's conversations reveal a complete absence of outrage at his own subordinates for the Watergate imbroglio, he was quick to place the blame on people outside his circle:

"No, I tell you this it is the last gasp of our hardest opponents. They've just got to have something to squeal about." (March 13, 1973)

"They [the Democrats] are having a hard time now. They got the hell kicked out of them in the election... But the basic thing is the establishment. The establishment is dying and so they've got to show that despite the successes we have had in foreign policy and in the election, they've got to show that it is just wrong just because of this." (March 13, 1973)

#### THE KENNEDY SPECTER

In the view of Nixon and his men, Teddy Kennedy loomed large as the individual who might have the most to gain from the entire Watergate affair.

D: I am convinced that he [Senator Ervin] has shown that he is merely a puppet for Kennedy in this whole thing. The fine hand of the Kennedys' is behind this whole hearing. There is no doubt about it...

P: Yes, I guess the Kennedy crowd is just laying in the bushes waiting to make their move. (Feb 28, 1973)

On one occasion, Dean brought up an FBI agent's idea for collecting information on the Democrats. The President's reply:

"If he would get Kennedy into it, too, I would be a bit more pleased." (March 13, 1973)

The President and his immediate circle of advisers were also worried that Kennedy would exploit the Ervin hearings for his own advantage, going on television to give his version of the events.

#### AS A LAWYER

Though an attorney himself, the President was often vague and uninformed on various questions of law

raised by Watergate. At one point Nixon misunderstood the legal niceties involved in preparing the original Watergate defendants for their testimony:

P: Did Mardian coach them?

E: In some cases Mardian, I guess, was very heavy-handed about it, and—

P: Well, is there anything wrong with that?

E: Yeah, well there's something wrong with—

P: He was not their attorney is the problem?

E: Well, no, the problem—the problem is he asked them to say things that weren't true.

P: Oh. (April 15, 1973)

P: What did he [Egil Krogh, deputy assistant to the President for domestic affairs] perjure himself on, John?

D: Did he know the Cubans. He did.

P: He said he didn't?

D: That is right. They didn't press him hard.

P: He might be able to—I am just trying to think. Perjury is an awful hard rap to prove. If he could just say that I—Well, go ahead. (March 21, 1973)

#### SPEAKING IN CODE:

In the Oval Office, Nixon and his closest aides often employed a kind of verbal code, a jargon clearly familiar to everyone present. It was a mixture of Madison Avenue, locker room and pop psych—the shorthand of the club:

"Stonewall, with lots of noises that we are always willing to cooperate, but no one is asking us for anything." (Dean, on how to reply to embarrassing questions, March 20, 1973)

P: The reason I raise the question of Magruder is what stroke have you got with Magruder? I guess we've got none. (March 27, 1973)

D: If we go that route, sir, I can give a show we can sell them just like we were selling Wheaties on our position. (March 21, 1973)

P: All right, let's leave it this way—you will handle Baker now—you will babysit him starting like in about ten minutes? Alright? (March 22, 1973)

#### NIXON ON NIXON:

Occasionally in the transcripts, the President lapses into a personal assessment, a revealing aside on how he views himself:

"I believe in playing politics hard, but I am also smart." (March 27, 1973)

"I mean, after all, it is my job and I don't want the presidency tarnished, but I am also a law enforcement man." (April 14, 1973)

"And damn it I am that kind of person. I am not one who is going to say, look, while this guy is under attack, I drop him. Is there something to be said for that, or not?" (April 14, 1973)

"Nobody is a friend of ours. Let's face it! Don't worry about that." (March 13, 1973)

TIME, MAY 20, 1974

# Richard Nixon's Collapsing Presidency

*The full impact of the transcripts is just beginning to seep in. The reaction of the public is now making itself felt on the members of Congress, and the public is dismayed, shocked and appalled.*

That assessment by Illinois Congressman John Anderson, chairman of the House Republican conference, accurately summed up the deteriorating situation confronting President Nixon last week. Before releasing transcripts of 46 private conversations with aides, he had somehow deluded himself into thinking that the American people would conclude that the text proved him innocent of wrongdoing in the Watergate scandal. Moreover, he had reckoned that the portrait of a foul-mouthed, conniving, amoral President revealed by the transcripts would soon fade from public memory. Instead, publication of the transcripts produced a floodtide of outrage and indignation as ever-growing numbers of Nixon supporters abandoned him in Congress and the nation. Resignation rumors were spawned faster than the White House could deny them, and a mood of crisis gripped Washington. Nixon's moral authority and ability to govern seemed shattered beyond repair. By all the usual political omens, Nixon had lost the most audacious gamble in his political career and with it, in all likelihood, his chance of serving out his term of office.

The Nixon crisis was most pressing on three fronts:

► In Congress, a consensus was gathering that the situation was intolerable. Some of Nixon's hitherto stoutest Republican supporters were falling. Senate Republican Leader Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania declared that the transcripts revealed a "deplorable, disgusting, shabby and immoral" performance on the part of the President and his former aides. House Republican Leader John Rhodes of Arizona seconded that description. He recommended that Nixon, if his position continued to deteriorate, "ought to consider resigning as a possible option." One liberal Republican, Senator Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania, broke completely with the President and became the third G.O.P. Senator to call for Nixon's resignation, joining Edward Brooke of Massachusetts and James Buckley of New York. (See story page 24.)

► Newspaper editors and publishers in the Republican heartland studied the transcripts with sinking hearts and mounting dismay. One after another, they reversed their previous positions and wrote, in sorrow and in anger, editorials calling for Nixon's resignation or impeachment. In a column published by all of the Hearst newspapers, Editor in Chief William Randolph Hearst Jr. said that the President "seems to have a moral blind spot." The Omaha World-Herald saw him "as a man incapable of providing the moral leadership which the United States is entitled to expect from its President." The Chicago Tribune deplored his "lack of concern for high principles" and "lack of commitment to the high ideals of public office."

► The House Judiciary Committee in a solemn televised ceremony began formally to consider "whether sufficient

grounds exist for the House of Representatives to exercise its constitutional power to impeach Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States of America." Given the reaction to the President's transcripts, the committee's hearings on the evidence against Nixon may well be outrun by events. But if Nixon refuses to yield to the rising clamor for his resignation, the months-long constitutional process seemed more likely than ever before to lead to his removal. Even staunch Nixon supporters found it hard to name 34 U.S. Senators who would surely acquit him of impeachment charges and thus keep him in office.

The pressure for Nixon to resign drove the White House to denial after denial of reports of imminent presidential action. An exasperated Ronald Ziegler, the President's press secretary, finally tried to still the rumor tongues by declaring of Nixon: "His attitude is one of determination that he will not be driven out of office by rumor, speculation, excessive charges or hypocrisy. He is up to the battle, he intends to fight it, and he feels he has a personal and constitutional responsibility to do so." White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig was a little more cautious. In what seemed to be a slight crack in the stone wall against resignation, he said: "I think the only thing that would tempt resignation on the part of the President would be if he thought that served the best interests of the people." That, of course, was exactly the rationale being offered by many in the capital and the rest of the country.

One conservative Senator, Republican Milton R. Young of North Dakota, pointed out that Nixon need not resign to leave voluntarily. Young, who is running for re-election this November, said: "He's getting in deeper trouble all the time. It's a question of whether he can continue as President. It would be a whole lot easier for members of Congress and myself if he used the 25th Amendment and stepped aside until this thing is cleared up." This amendment permits the President to let the Vice President take over temporarily if the President is "unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office." But White House spokesmen denied that Nixon had any idea of doing this.

Nixon himself inadvertently contributed to the national jitters by suddenly calling Vice President Gerald Ford to his Executive Office Building hideaway for an hour-long chat on Friday. The summons perhaps was intended to show that Nixon was still in control of the Administration. A day earlier, Ford had reflected the deepening national anxiety by voicing his sharpest criticism of the Administration since taking office. He deplored the "crisis of confidence" that Watergate has created and—in a pointed reference to the transcripts—said: "And while it may be easy

\*The amendment also provides an alternative to the impeachment process for removing a President. It states that if the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet inform Congress that the President is unable to perform his duties, the Vice President shall immediately take over. If the President objects and claims that "no inability exists," the Congress must decide the issue by a two-thirds vote. The amendment was originally passed, in 1967, to cover cases of physical and mental disability.

to delete characterization from the printed page, we cannot delete characterization from people's minds with a wave of the hand."

Deputy Presidential Press Secretary Gerald Warren said that Nixon's discussion with Ford was dominated by foreign and domestic policy. Warren acknowledged that impeachment and Ford's impressions of public sentiment "may have come up in a peripheral way." But Warren insisted that the conversation did not include any talk of Nixon's resigning. Afterward Ford told reporters that Nixon suggested "perhaps I was working too hard" in his strenuous speaking tours—which was construed by some as an oblique reproach by Nixon for Ford's critical comments. Ford did indeed emphasize the positive in subsequent speeches.

There seemed small chance that Nixon could stem the massive outpouring of public and congressional dismay as he finally did after the firing of Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox last October and the resignations of Attorney General Elliot Richardson and his chief assistant, William French Smith. Nixon, after days of disastrous erosion in his support, appeased some of his critics that time by promising Cox's successor, Leon Jaworski, virtually complete independence and by eventually surrendering seven of his Watergate tapes to a grand jury. Since then the President's room for maneuver has been greatly narrowed by the various Watergate investigations and his unwillingness to release more tapes.

Even the toughest presidential aides conceded that the blows from Republican leaders and conservative newspapers had been staggering for the President. But they clung to the hope that, as one put it, "some of this suffocating moral outrage will diminish" with time. The presidential advisers seemed to miss the point of much of the criticism. They preferred to think that Nixon was being condemned for his foul language, not for the sleazy, devious and possibly criminal conduct exposed by the transcripts.

Throughout the week, the presidential public relations machinery operated in high gear. Haig and Presidential Special Counsel James St. Clair appeared on TV talk shows to defend Nixon's decision not to turn over any more tapes to the House Judiciary Committee or Special Prosecutor Jaworski. St. Clair contended that Nixon "feels that he has been in more than full compliance" with the Judiciary Committee and Jaworski subpoenas by yielding the edited transcripts.

In that atmosphere of presidential intransigence, the House Judiciary Committee opened its historic impeachment hearings with an 18-minute pub-

lic ceremony at 1:08 p.m. on a gray and rainy Thursday. Chairman Peter Rodino declared that "the real security of this nation lies in the integrity of its institutions and the trust and informed confidence of its people. We conduct our deliberations in that spirit." Ranking Republican Edward Hutchinson outlined the view that impeachment will require "finding criminal culpability on the part of the President himself, measured according to criminal law." This view is held by some—but not all—Republicans on the committee. Then the committee went into secret session to begin its deliberations, which were expected to last for six weeks.

**Black Binders.** The sober spirit of the hearings was embodied in two thick black binders placed on each of the 38 committee members' desks. One was an annotated index of the documentary or taped evidence accumulated by the committee staff in the six months that it has probed 41 allegations of wrongdoing—including obstruction of justice and complicity in the Watergate cover-up—by Nixon. The other binder held the material that Majority Counsel John Doar's staff presented to the committee during its first three-hour session. It amounted to a recitation of the events that led up to the break-in at the Democratic National Committee offices in the Watergate complex on June 17, 1972. More binders would follow as Doar's staff outlined its evidence of the Watergate cover-up and other presidential scandals. The initial secret phase was expected to take four days. That meant, since the committee planned to meet only three days a week, that the first public, televised session would not take place before Tuesday, May 21.

During its first session, the committee agreed not to issue a blanket subpoena for the 107 tape recordings and documents that President Nixon has refused to give it. Instead, the committee will vote individual subpoenas throughout the hearings as gaps appear in the evidence already received from the White House, a Watergate grand jury and other sources. One of the first subpoenas is likely to include a request for the tape of a meeting between Nixon, former Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman and then-Attorney General John Mitchell on April 4, 1972. According to testimony given to the Senate Watergate committee, that was just four days after officials of Nixon's re-election committee approved the scheme to bug the Democratic headquarters. The committee needs the tape to determine whether Nixon—despite his denials—had advance knowledge of the plan.

An audio system has been installed in the committee room so that members can listen to tapes over earphones. In addition, they will see evidence from other congressional committees and federal agencies, as well as the briefcase of material turned over by a Watergate grand jury that indicted seven of Nixon's former White House and re-election campaign associates on March 1.

Meanwhile, a 170-page draft of the Senate Watergate committee's final report was made available. The deadline for its being approved by the committee and issued is May 28, the date on which the committee is scheduled to disband. The report asserts that John Mitchell, despite his denials before the

Ervin committee, did approve the intelligence-gathering scheme that led to the Watergate break-in on June 17, 1972. The draft says that the money clandestinely paid by White House officials to the original seven Watergate defendants was intended to buy their silence, not simply as legitimate support for their families and to cover their legal fees. The report declares that the committee found no national security justification for the break-in of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. The staff is also preparing a chapter on presidential involvement in Watergate.

The committee continued its investigation into Billionaire Howard R. Hughes' \$100,000 contribution to Nixon's re-election campaign. Committee investigators suspect that the cash was given in exchange for a bending of antitrust guidelines to permit Hughes to add the Dunes to his string of Las Vegas hotels and gambling casinos. The investigators further believe that the purpose of the Watergate bugging was to find out if Democrats knew about the deal. Democratic National Chairman Lawrence O'Brien had done some public relations work for the Hughes organization, and it was feared, according to investigators, that O'Brien might know about the Hughes donation.

**Periods of Silence.** The \$100,000 was handed to Charles G. ("Bebe") Rebozo, Nixon's close pal, who last week agreed to give the committee some of his personal financial records. The committee is trying to determine whether the money remained in Rebozo's safe-deposit box for three years, as he claims. Herbert W. Kalmbach, Nixon's former personal attorney, has testified that Rebozo told him some of the money was disbursed to Presidential Secretary Rose Mary Woods and Nixon's brothers. Investigators suspect that Rebozo later used different bills to repay Hughes.

As Nixon's transcripts underwent a second week of close study, more questions were raised about their completeness. Reporters found that some of the transcripts contain unexplained periods of silence. An April 16, 1973, meeting lasted 14 minutes and covers eleven pages of edited transcript. Another meeting that day lasted 28 minutes but fills only nine pages of transcript. Again, the White House logs recorded a March 22, 1973, meeting as beginning at 1:37 p.m. and ending at 3:43 p.m. Yet the transcript ends with John Ehrlichman, then the President's chief domestic counselor, telling Nixon: "It is 3:16." Moreover, of the approximately 1,700 portions of conversations that the transcribers omitted as "inaudible" or "unintelligible," most were from statements by a single speaker—President Nixon.

Deputy Presidential Press Secretary Gerald Warren insisted, however, that "there are not gaps on those tapes." He said that the White House taping system was so unsophisticated that its sound-activated recorders were sometimes turned on by the noise of air conditioners, rattling of coffee cups or rustling of papers. Furthermore, Special Counsel J. Fred Buzhardt Jr., who supervised the bugging, said that many of the "inaudible" segments were caused by a "swerving" noise the recorders made when they turned on.

More questions about the tapes seemed inevitable unless Nixon changed his mind and permitted them to be ex-

amined by outside electronics experts. So far, they have studied eight tapes, a cassette and a dictabelt, including the tape with the 18½-minute gap in Nixon's conversation with Haldeman. They concluded that the gap could not have been caused accidentally. According to other tape experts, a period of "silence" with background noises might not be suspicious on the tape, but a dead silence might be an indication of tampering.

There was a flurry of other activity in Congress as well. The Senate Judiciary Committee decided to begin full-scale hearings this week into why the Justice Department failed to unravel the Watergate cover-up in the summer and fall of 1972. One of its first witnesses will be Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen. Nixon put him in full charge of the Watergate investigation last spring after Richard Kleindienst, then Attorney General, withdrew because the probe's targets included some of his close friends and former associates.

As both foes and former friends rejected the latest Watergate maneuverings, many White House aides appeared grim and gloomy. The President, however, showed no visible strain. At the East Room swearing-in ceremony of William E. Simon as Secretary of the Treasury, Nixon looked relaxed and controlled. Nor was there any sign of obvious strain the following day, when he discussed the economy for two hours with Republican congressional leaders, including some who had severely criticized him earlier in the week.

Watergate was not brought up during that meeting, but it doubtless was uppermost in the President's mind. For a large part of the week, he secluded himself in the Executive Office Building, pondering his next move. One night, accompanied by a White House doctor and a military aide, he cruised the Potomac for an hour and a half aboard the presidential yacht *Sequoia*. On another night he dined aboard the *Sequoia* with Wife Pat, Daughter Julie and her husband David Eisenhower. As Julie later recalled in a press conference with David, the President "said he would take this constitutionally down to the wire. If there is only one Senator who supports him, that's the way it is going to be." Julie said that the transcripts portrayed "a human being reacting to a difficult situation." But David acknowledged that the documents revealed a new side of his father-in-law. Said David: "It is not the same guy at the family dinner table." Saturday evening, Nixon delivered the commencement address at Oklahoma State University. To the crowd that greeted him at the airport he declared: "I have that old Okie spirit, and we never give up." Then he flew to Camp David to spend Mother's Day with Pat.

Even measured by what has happened over the tumultuous year of Watergate, it was the worst week of Nixon's presidency. And there was no immediate prospect that things would get better. The public outcry seemed likely to con-

tinue building, adding to the pressures already on the President. So far, he seemed determined to stay the course. But all the returns were far from in.

## The Public: Disillusioned

From almost every region of the country last week, the message for Richard Nixon was ominous. Now it was not the outcry of his traditional liberal opponents that threatened him. Instead, it was a swelling disillusionment and outrage among many of his sturdiest supporters, his natural Republican and Middle American constituency. In surprisingly large numbers Americans were making their way through the long White House transcripts—at least four soft-backed versions were selling fast—and what they learned from those complex, intimate conversations was beginning to crystallize.

In interviews throughout the nation, TIME correspondents found some willingness to defend Nixon. But across the board, among Democrats, independents and Republicans, the transcripts appeared to have accomplished a decisive shift in public opinion.

Nixon was badly damaged by a stunning series of defections among newspapers that had previously supported him. The *Chicago Tribune*, the most influential voice of conservative Republicanism in the Midwest, came out with a long scathing editorial demanding Nixon's resignation. Ironically, two weeks ago the White House had slipped an advance copy of the transcripts to the *Tribune* because the paper's publishers intended to run the full text, which they did. Shortly before the *Tribune's* presses started running with its editorial, Presidential Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler called *Tribune* Editor Clayton Kirkpatrick, long a supporter of Nixon policies, and urged him to reconsider. The record, Ziegler argued, was incomplete. "You made it so," Kirkpatrick shot back. Ziegler finally said he was very sorry that the *Tribune* was moved to take such a position. "I'm kind of sorry about it myself," said Kirkpatrick.

Even more startling was the apostasy of the Omaha *World-Herald*, a highly conservative paper whose support for Nixon was evident for years in its news columns as well as on its editorial page. Those views reflected the thinking not only of its owner Peter Kiewit, a construction multimillionaire and Nixon contributor, but also of the people of the state that it blankets. Nixon got his best voter percentages in Nebraska in 1960 and 1968, and only a few other states did better for him in 1972. Yet the *World-Herald* concluded last week that Nixon should resign. A remarkable number of other major newspapers that had previously supported Nixon—including the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, the *Kansas City Times* and the *Los Angeles Times*—urged his removal from office. The nation's largest newspaper, the normally pro-Nixon *New York Daily News*, stopped short of demanding impeachment, but said the President's failure to co-operate with the House Judiciary Committee "demonstrates an appalling insensitivity to his

moral obligations."

**Felon's Lair.** "I know America," Richard Nixon said in 1970, "and the American heart is good." Now he must contend with millions of Americans who believe that they have at last peered into Richard Nixon's heart. The outrage expressed at the tapes is above all a moral anger, and Nixon, who has so often appealed to American morality in the past, is feeling the fury of a nation that is still extraordinarily idealistic about its Government, especially the presidency. "It is a fundamental law of American politics," writes Political Analyst Michael Novak, "that whoever speaks with the power of morality on his side gains enormous practical power." With the publication of the transcripts, Nixon may have lost that power.

Said William P. Thompson, chief executive of the United Presbyterian Church: "It is almost as if the public has been admitted to the most private plotting within a felon's lair." To Rabbi Alexander Schindler, president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the presidential conversations "reek with the stench of moral decay." The Rev. Foy Valentine, head of the Southern Baptist Christian Life Commission, described the tone of the conversations as "utterly reprehensible, made worse by the fact that there had been such a pretense of piety." Nixon's friend, the Rev. Billy Graham, refrained from criticism, but remarked, "I think he will put what's best for the country above everything else." Graham added his homily: "The Lord is listening all the time. The Lord has got his tape recorder going from the time you're born until you die."

Nixon still seemed to enjoy his greatest continuing support among Southern conservatives and Wallaceites, with their abiding distrust of the Eastern press and television networks. Politics aside, John D. Tollerson, a management psychologist in Atlanta, said: "There is nothing immoral in his conversation as far as I know. I resent the furor and moral indignations raised by his opportunistic opponents. [Expletive deleted], lots of people swear." In Vicksburg, Miss., Mrs. Ronnie Forsythe argued that "the media acts as judges and won't let people think for themselves."

**Too Tough.** Such charges were echoed by Nixon supporters elsewhere. Said George A. Vössler, chairman of the Erie County, N.Y., Conservative Party: "So far, Nixon has been judged by television and the news media." Frank DiGennaro, a Baltimore photographer, insisted flatly: "I still consider Nixon this country's greatest President. His enemies never cease trying to tear him down, but you watch. He'll be too tough for them."

A nationwide TIME-Yankelovich survey conducted by telephone last Wednesday and Thursday found that Nixon has lost an important weapon in his fight against impeachment: the previously prevailing fear felt by a majority of Americans that impeachment would mean disaster for the country. While 61% of the people polled shared that fear last November, only 38% expressed such concern last week. According to the survey, only 38% of the American people wanted Nixon to remain in office. A majority, 53%, wanted him either to resign or be impeached. A Louis

Harris poll, also conducted last week, found that 49% wanted Nixon impeached and removed from office, while

41% did not. In April, Harris showed a 42-42 standoff on that question.

TIME correspondents assessed reaction in various regions:

### NEW ENGLAND

So strong has been their disillusionment with Nixon that New Englanders were probably less affected by the transcripts than were other Americans. In Massachusetts, bitterness over the closing of military bases and the energy shortages had already eroded much of the 45% of the vote that Nixon received there in 1972. A *Boston Globe* survey in the solidly Republican towns of Needham and Reading, which Nixon carried by 57 to 43 in 1972, found a remarkable 67% of the voters in favor of resignation or impeachment. Said Pollster Tubby Harrison: "It's really astounding. Only 30% want him to stay in office, and this is real Nixon territory."

In Maine, the jointly owned *Portland Express* and *Press Herald* swiveled around 180° from their previous support and called for impeachment. The small *Central Maine Morning Sentinel* in Waterville declared it was impossible to read the transcripts "without feeling like an embarrassed and unwitting voyeur."

Some New Englanders, of course, spoke up for the President. Bruce Callahan, an engineer from Lee, Mass., declared: "Nixon acted wisely in keeping the lid on the whole thing. If he had shot off his mouth when he first learned of it, he might have impaired the cases of a lot of people who were going to stand trial." But negative sentiment was stronger. Said Morgan James, a telephone worker in Boston: "If he was concerned with the country, he would do what Willy Brandt did in Germany and resign for the good of the U.S."

### THE MID-ATLANTIC

Here, as elsewhere, a majority believes the President is guilty, perhaps impeachably so. But a battered, steadfast minority refuses to budge from its conviction that Nixon has done nothing wrong, and each side reads the tapes to buttress its view. Typical of the supporters is Bernard Shanley, a G.O.P. national committeeman from New Jersey. Said he: "The tapes have proved Nixon is not responsible for a crime, and no matter what people think of the transcripts, they do not have evidence that he committed a crime." Some Nixon supporters, Republicans, independents and even Democrats, fear the possibly cataclysmic effect of an impeachment trial. Attorney Samuel Fallk, of Scranton, Pa., was never "a Nixon fan," but he wants the President to stay in office because, in the words of Brutus after Caesar's death: "Not that I loved Caesar less, but that I loved Rome more."

Many Republican professionals, however, were bewildered or outraged or both. Said Harry Sayen, G.O.P. chairman in Mercer County, N.J.: "If this is an indication of coming clean, I'd hate to think of what is left behind." According to New York Republican Assemblyman Fred Field: "On the basis of the transcripts, there is a total breakdown of the moral attitude of those at the leadership level in the White House."

Rolfe Neill, editor of the *Philadelphia Daily News*, wrote in a column:



"Those who wish to package lies and call it truth are tampering with the nation's soul. The President must be impeached, and these are not high crimes, they are the highest crimes." Said Francis Laping, the Hungarian-born owner of a publishing firm in Philadelphia: "As an immigrant, it hurts me to see America humiliated like this. The President thinks he is God, but he is guilty as hell." The normally staid *Baltimore Evening Sun* editorialized: "Richard Nixon is making God-damn patsies of us all."

#### THE SOUTH

There seem three discernible groups in the South: 1) those who want Nixon out, no matter what, 2) the conservatives and Wallace voters who want Nixon to survive, and 3) those who, as the *Atlanta Journal* said last week, are "saturated, nay, satiated with Watergate" and wish it would simply go away. James Bryson, a buyer for a Nashville shoe store, said: "This has carried on long enough—impeachment proceedings should get under way to settle it once and for all." Ann Waldron, book editor of the *Houston Chronicle*, believes that Nixon has become "despicable—beyond the pale. He may have been ill-used by his subordinates, but anyone who would hire such people must answer for it. They were all without ideals, without compassion and with no loyalty to each other or the country." Harriet Arbuckle, headmistress of a Houston nursery school, sighed: "The whole thing is so sad. I feel we should keep a cool head and not burn our house down now with impeachment, but find out about the next person we select as president [in 1976]."

#### THE MIDWEST

The transcripts are changing attitudes in the Midwest more rapidly than anything the President has ever done. For years, Midwesterners tended to consider Nixon one of their own, a decent, law-abiding and hard-working man. But the character revealed by his own words seems to many Midwesterners even worse than his enemies had described. An Illinois Republican Party professional reported that about half the downstate county chairmen are shaking their heads: "A lot of them knew Nixon was a rough guy, and they figured he was involved in some way [in the cover-up]; but they never figured he was in so deep, or that he was so amoral." The other half of the G.O.P. county chairmen, he added, are just suffering in silence.

Next to Nebraska, Oklahoma was Nixon's best state in the Midwest. Until a few weeks ago, people were writing letters to the editors of local newspapers comparing the President to Jesus Christ, a man persecuted for his purity. But the mood changed just after the transcripts were released. Said the Rev. John Wolf, of Tulsa's All Souls Unitarian Church: "People have seen the meanness and the ugliness behind the whole thing. Nothing could be more antithetical to our system. [The President and his men] seem to have no sense of what law and order really means. They don't seem to understand what America is."

In Kansas, the *Topeka Capital-Journal* broke ranks with Nixon. Wrote Publisher Oscar S. Stauffer, an activist Republican for nearly 50 years: "It's time to hand President Nixon his hat. The transcript of the tapes dips to sor-

## Further Tales from the Transcripts

**THE PRESIDENT:** The announcement—what I had in mind would be [inaudible] announcement—still to the [inaudible] going to name several other people who were involved ... [inaudible] because of the people named [inaudible] language used. [Inaudible] some people [inaudible] judgment [inaudible] matter for the President [inaudible] special, I'm going to call him special counsel [inaudible] this case [inaudible] possibility before he walks into that open court [inaudible] can't get to that today [inaudible] meeting with [inaudible]?

**HENRY PETERSEN:** [Inaudible] question. [Inaudible] I told him ... I would be willing to go [inaudible]...

**THE PRESIDENT:** [Inaudible]

That kind of dialogue might be a hit in the theater of the absurd, but it hardly seems the stuff of popular success. Yet even though the White House transcripts of taped presidential conver-

sations are shot through with such passages as that one between the President and the Assistant Attorney General on April 16, 1973, they have become the nation's newest bestseller and biggest conversation piece. With good reason.

To be sure, these 33 hours or so of recorded talks are a minuscule fraction of Richard Nixon's presidential conversations—and, one can only hope, the grubbiest fraction. The transcripts might not necessarily be representative of the way he always conducts business; the language and tone may be loftier and more dignified when he confers with, say, Henry Kissinger or other officials. Despite the indecipherable passages and inelegant language, however, the transcripts yield an absorbing insight into the inner workings of Nixon's White House and of the President's mind. Some noteworthy examples follow.

### I: THE MAIN THING IS [INAUDIBLE] AND [UNINTELLIGIBLE]

The version issued by the Government Printing Office runs to 1,308 pages and contains some 1,700 notations of "unintelligible" or "inaudible." They are not, however, randomly distributed. An extraordinary number occur at crucial points in conversations; a remarkable total, perhaps two-thirds, are gaps in the President's conversation. In a meeting with then White House Counsel John Dean III in the Oval Office on Feb. 28, 1973, for example, the President (P) is discussing how to handle the newly established Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities—the Watergate committee.

**P:** Make a deal—that is the point. Baker [Senator Howard Baker], as I said, is going to keep at arm's length and you've got to be very firm with these guys or you may not end up with many things. Now as I said the only back-up position I can possibly see is one of a [inaudible] if Kleindienst [Richard Kleindienst, then Attorney General] wants to back [inaudible] for [inaudible].

In a March 13, 1973, meeting, Dean (D) talks about using William Sullivan, former assistant director of the FBI, to disclose how other Presidents had used the bureau for political purposes.

**D:** If I have one liability in Sullivan here, it is his knowledge of the earlier [unintelligible] that occurred here.

**P:** That we did?

**D:** That we did.

In an April 14, 1973, meeting among the President, John Ehrlichman (E) and H.R. ("Bob") Haldeman (H) at the Executive Office Building to discuss the spreading stain of Watergate, Nixon makes a truly Delphic utterance.

**P:** Let's suppose they get Mitchell [John Mitchell, former Attorney General]. They're going to say now what about Haldeman, what about ... the rest? ... I want somebody to say, now look, here are the facts. Of the White House people [unintelligible]. There are no other higher-up. The White House [unintelligible]. Put a cap on it.

Still another key passage occurs during the April 17, 1973, meeting between

Nixon and Henry Petersen, then heading the Watergate investigation.

P: Now—this brings us to a basic command decision with regard—with regard to what you do about White House people. The main thing is [inaudible] and you can look at it in terms of the fact that anybody who this touches should go out—without [inaudible] ... Let's suppose—just take Ehrlichman is a case in point—that this thing brought in by [inaudible] that proves to be [inaudible] don't get anything else on Ehrlichman then the question is that nevertheless that in itself would raise a cloud over Ehrlichman.

When the House Judiciary Committee was debating two weeks ago whether to accept the transcripts or insist on getting the original tapes, Majority Counsel John Doar said flatly, "The transcripts are not accurate." Doar hastened to explain that certain words might have been dropped by the White House transcribers because of inattention and that some "unintelligible" segments might be attributable to inferior listening equipment. But some committee members thought Doar was being unduly generous and that some tapes had in fact been tampered with.

One unexplained discrepancy was detected by CBS last week. In the March 13, 1973, transcript, Dean talks about Federal District Judge John J. Sirica.

D: Sirica is a strange man. He is known as a hanging judge.

P: [Unintelligible]

Yet last June, when White House Special Counsel Fred Buzhardt prepared a report on the same tape, his summary included this passage: "Dean said Sirica was a hanging judge. The President said he liked hanging judges."

## II: EXCISING THE EXPLETIVES

In addition to the words and passages marked unintelligible, nearly 150 expletives, adjectives or personal characterizations have been deleted from the transcripts. Again, most occur when the President is talking. Many of the excisions were made by Buzhardt, a lay Southern Baptist minister from South Carolina who neither smokes, drinks nor cusses. But while Buzhardt saw fit to delete every "goddam," "Jesus Christ" and other examples of presidential irreverence, he left intact a good many four-, five-, ten- and twelve-letter specimens of Anglo-Saxon earthiness. These fell before Nixon's own blue pencil. So too did some ethnic slurs used by Nixon. According to the New York Times, the President referred to Judge Sirica as "that wop," spoke of "those Jewboys" in the Securities and Exchange Commission, and described L. Patrick Gray III, then acting FBI chief, as a "thick-necked mick." According to CBS, Nixon used the word "Jewboy" in referring to Daniel Ellsberg. The White House denies that Nixon used any of those terms.

Even in its expurgated form, there is much in the transcript that is vulgar and contemptible. Perhaps the low point occurs in this scatological exchange among the President, Haldeman and Ehrlichman about Dean's possible testimony before the Watergate committee.

E: Well, as a matter of fact, you might have turned the set up some day and watched your White House Counsel crap—for glorious television. It would at least be surprising.

H: That's right.

P: Oh, it's done up there?

H: Sure, he pulls it up there.

## III: THE PRESIDENT AND THE [ADJECTIVE DELETED] PRESS

Nixon and the White House have long cultivated the myth that the President is too busy to read newspapers or watch television. An adjunct to the myth is that Nixon gets the news better and straighter from the 20- to 50-page press summary delivered to him before 8 a.m. each day by White House Special Consultant Patrick Buchanan. The transcripts should thoroughly dispel the myth. In his Feb. 28 meeting with Dean, the President discusses in impressive detail what the newspapers are saying about the woes of Campaign Finance Chairman Maurice Stans.

P: Somebody is after him about Vesco [Fugitive Financier Robert Vesco]. I first read the story briefly in the [Washington] Post. I read, naturally, the first page and I turned to the [New York] Times to read it. The Times had in the second paragraph that the money had been returned, but the Post didn't have it.

D: That is correct.

P: The Post didn't have it until after you continued to the back section. It is the [adjective deleted] thing I ever saw.

D: Typical.

P: My guess is the [Washington] Star pointed out [inaudible].

Not that the President is exactly pleased by what he sees in the press. During the same meeting there is this exchange.

P: Well, one hell of a lot of people don't give one damn about this issue of the suppression of the press, etc. We know that we aren't trying to do it. They all squeal about it... [White House Special Counsel Charles] Colson sure making them move it around, saying we don't like this or that and [inaudible].

D: Well, you know Colson's threat of a law suit... had a very sobering effect on several of the national magazines. They are now checking before printing a lot of this Watergate junk they print. They check the press office trying to get a confirmation or denial, or call the individuals involved. And they have said they are doing it because they are afraid of a libel suit on them. So it did have a sobering effect. We will keep them honest if we can remind them that they can't print anything and get away with it.

Nor does Nixon think much of the motives of the press. Still conferring with Dean, he makes the point that Senator Sam Ervin's Watergate committee ought to conduct itself as if it were a court of law.

P: There will be no hearsay, no innuendo. This will be a model of a Congressional hearing. That will disappoint the [adjective deleted] press. No hearsay! No innuendo! No leaks!

## IV: THE BIG ENCHILADA

The transcripts are sprinkled with

subplots: the increasingly sinister aura surrounding the absent and feared Chuck Colson; the bizarre conduct of Convicted Watergate Burglar G. Gordon Liddy, who never broke his silence and who deliberately burned his arms while in prison to prove that he could endure anything; the delicate compromising of Henry Petersen. Perhaps most striking is the story of how Nixon progresses from disbelief that John Mitchell is involved in the scandal to an unseemly eagerness to turn his longtime friend, confidant, law partner and campaign manager into the chief scapegoat, and how, through it all, the President is unable to confront Mitchell directly.

As late as Feb. 28, 1973, Nixon tells Dean, during a conversation on Senator Baker's role on the Ervin committee: "Baker's got to realize... that if he allows this thing to get out of hand he is going to potentially ruin John Mitchell. He won't. Mitchell won't allow himself to be ruined. He will put on his big stone face." By March 27, Nixon and his chief aides have become aware that Mitchell is in deep trouble over Watergate. This exchange takes place among Nixon, Haldeman and Ehrlichman.

P: Mitchell, you see, is never never going to go in and admit perjury...

H: They won't give him that convenience, I wouldn't think, unless they figure they are going to get you. He is as high up as they've got.

E: He's the big enchilada.

H: And he's the one the magazines zeroed in on this weekend.

P: They did? What grounds?

H: Yeah. [unintelligible] has a quote that they maybe have a big fish on the hook.

P: I think Mitchell should come down.

As of April 14, however, Mitchell has not yet been summoned to Washington from New York City. Nixon, Ehrlichman and Haldeman agree that somebody had better talk with him.

E: The purpose of the mission is to go up and bring him to a focus on this: The jig is up. And the President strongly feels that the only way that this thing can end up being even a little net plus for the Administration and for the Presidency and preserve some thread is for you to go in and voluntarily make a statement.

P: A statement [unintelligible]

E: A statement that basically says... "I am both morally and legally responsible."

P: Yeah.

Later during the meeting Ehrlichman suggests that the President summon Mitchell to the Oval Office "as the provable wrong-doer" and tell him: "My God, I've got a report here. And it's clear from this report that you are guilty as hell. Now, John, for [expletive deleted] sake go on in there and do what you should. And let's get this thing cleared up and get it off the country's back and move

on." Haldeman is enthusiastic about that scenario. "That's the only way to beat it now," he says. By then Nixon is in agreement, but he does not want to give Mitchell the word himself. "Mitchell—this is going to break him up," he says. "You know it's a pain for me to do it." He delegates the job to Ehrlichman and, referring to himself in the third person, gives him these instructions: "You could say to Mitchell . . . that he just can't bring himself to talk to you about it. Just can't do it."

It soon becomes clear that Mitchell is not about to shoulder the blame and is, in fact, as adept at shifting it as are his quondam colleagues.

E: Well, let me tell you what Mitchell said. It was another gigging of the White House. He said, "You know, . . . [Deputy Director of Nixon's Re-election Campaign Jeb] Magruder said that Haldeman had cooked this whole thing up over here at the White House and—

P: Had he said that?

E: Well that is what he said . . . Mitchell's theory—

P: Whatever his theory is, let me say, one footnote—is that throwing off on the White House won't help him one damn bit.

Before the week is out, Kleindienst is advising the President that Mitchell is certain to be indicted. The "big fish" has been hooked, and Nixon, Ehrlichman and Haldeman mistakenly assume that the Watergate probers will be satisfied and will quit casting for even bigger ones.

## V: THE TOUCHIEST TAPES

The two tapes that may figure most heavily in any effort to impeach the President are those of March 21 and 27, 1973. TIME has learned that it was the March 21 tape of an Oval Office meeting of Nixon, Dean and Haldeman that prompted the Watergate grand jury to recommend the President's indictment for conspiracy. Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski dissuaded the jurors, arguing that it was questionable whether an incumbent President can in fact be indicted, that the recourse against a President is impeachment. Jaworski also warned that if the Supreme Court were to rule that the grand jury had exceeded its authority in going after the President, indictments of seven other officials might be jeopardized. The 23 jurors were particularly impressed by the President's apparent failure to rule out the payment of hush money to the Watergate burglars. At one point Nixon told Dean, "Get it," and investigators later confirmed that \$75,000 was delivered that very night to the lawyer for E. Howard Hunt Jr., one of those convicted of staging the break-in. Also, the jurors were convinced that the President's statement, "It would be wrong, that's for sure," did not refer to the payment of bribes. In context, the statement appears to refer to the granting of clemency—and to have been made out of political, not moral, considerations.

Moreover, tape experts hope to determine whether portions of the March 13 tape of a meeting between Nixon and Dean were cut out and spliced into the

March 21 tape. The investigators are aware that what Dean said was discussed on March 13 actually came up on the March 21 tape; Dean later conceded that he had probably got the two conversations mixed up. A few—but not all—of the Watergate investigators wonder whether the tapes were doctored in order to establish a later date for the President's learning of the Watergate cover-up. One reason for their suspicion: all through the Watergate hearings, it was believed that the final payment of hush money was made on March 20; had the President not learned of the cover-up until March 21, he could not possibly have approved the final payment. Not until recently was it established that the last installment was actually paid on March 21.

The March 27 transcript raises questions about Haldeman's role in the campaign intelligence setup run by Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy. Haldeman tells the President on that date that one of his aides "believes . . . that the whole Liddy plan, the whole super-security operation, super-intelligence operation was put together by the White House, by Haldeman, Dean and others. Liddy, Dean cooked the whole thing up at Haldeman's instructions . . . Now there is some semblance of some validity to the point, that I did talk, not with Dean but with Mitchell, about the need for intelligence activity." Haldeman concedes that the plan was put into action only after Haldeman Aide Gordon Strachan relayed word to Mitchell that "the President wants it done and there is to be no more arguing about it." Mitchell's response was, "O.K., if they say to do it, go ahead."

## VI: KEEPING HENRY CURRENT

The name Henry Kissinger surfaced only rarely and obliquely during the entire Watergate affair. Yet Kissinger did not operate in isolation from the rest of the White House. On April 16, 1973, there is this exchange between the President and Haldeman:

P: Have you filled Henry in, Bob?

H: Nope.

P: You haven't? He's got enough problems in Laos. I haven't. Somebody else—he seems to know of it.

H: Well, Garment [then White House Special Consultant Leonard Garment] took it upon himself to go meet with Henry and Al Haig [then Kissinger's assistant, later Haldeman's successor as White House chief of staff] to discuss his [Garment's] concern about the whole situation, apparently.

P: What the hell did he do that for?

H: On the basis that he thought there was a real danger and threat to the Presidency.

Aware that the Watergate scandal was becoming a threat to the presiden-

cy itself as well as to Nixon, Garment sought the support of Haig and Kissinger in his attempt to persuade the President that Haldeman and Ehrlichman would have to leave the Administration to save the President. It is not clear whether Kissinger supported the proposal. His global perspective and his concern that a weakened President would lead to international difficulties, however, led him to agree with Garment on another matter:

H: I think Len's view is that what you need is a bold, new, you know, really some kind of a dramatic move. Henry feels that, but Henry feels that you should go on television.

P: I know, 9 o'clock.

H: Which is his solution to any problem.

P: Do you believe I should do the 9 o'clock news?

H: On this, no.

P: I don't think so either.

H: I said, we are all steeped in this, but look at the newspaper. Where is Watergate today?

P: Well in the country it is not that big.

## VII: ALL THE KING'S HORSES

The White House transcripts show that Richard Nixon displayed a proprietary attitude toward the many agencies and bureaus of the U.S. Government. They were his to use as he saw fit. Items:

► In a discussion with Dean on September 15, 1972, about Democratic Nominee George McGovern's presidential campaign finances, this exchange took place:

P: I don't think he is getting a hell of a lot of small money . . . Have you had the P.O. [Post Office] checked yet?

D: That is John's [Ehrlichman's] area. I don't know.

P: Well, let's have it checked.

► Talking on the same day with Dean about "all those who tried to do us in," Nixon said: "They are asking for it and they are going to get it. We have not used the power in this first four years as you know . . . We have not used the Bureau [FBI] and we have not used the Justice Department but things are going to change now."

► In a March 13, 1973, talk with Dean, the topic turned again to alleged irregularities in McGovern's campaign finances.

P: Do you need any IRS stuff?

D: There is no need at this hour for anything from IRS and we have a couple of sources over there that I can go to . . . We can get right in and get what we need.

# In His Defense

The transcripts had set off a storm, but the White House stood firm. Here The Times presents the case for Mr. Nixon's innocence by citing

six key Watergate questions and the public answers given by his aides. For crucial points that remain dangling, please turn to Page 3.

The answers to basic Watergate questions, as given below, are drawn from a variety of Administration sources, each clearly identified. The material has been organized by The Times to enhance the clarity and thrust of the President's case.

## 1 Did the President have knowledge of a cover-up before March 21?

Of all the witnesses who have testified publicly with respect to allegations of an illegal cover-up of the Watergate break-in prior to March 21, 1973, only (John) Dean, former counsel to Mr. Nixon has accused the President of participation in such a cover-up. In his testimony before the Senate Select Committee, Dean stated that he was "certain after the Sept. 15 meeting that the President was fully aware of the cover-up." However, in answering questions of Senator (Howard) Baker (before the Ervin committee), he modified this by stating it "is an inference of mine." Later he admitted he had no personal knowledge that the President knew on Sept. 15 about a cover-up of Watergate.

In fact it was not until after April 30, 1973, when Dean was discharged that he for the first time charged the President with knowledge of a cover-up as early as Sept. 15, 1972.

It is equally clear from the recorded conversations between Dean and the President that he did not keep the President fully informed until March 21, 1973. Indeed, on April 16, 1973, Dean so acknowledged that fact to the President, when he said:

I have tried all along to make sure that anything I passed to you didn't cause you any personal problem.

(On March 21, Dean remarked:) The reason that I thought we ought to talk this morning is

because our conversations I have the impression that you don't know everything I know and it makes it very difficult for you to make judgments that only you can make on some of these things... (emphasis supplied)

—James D. St. Clair, special counsel to President Nixon, in his legal argument accompanying the edited

transcripts of Watergate conversations as submitted to the House Judiciary Committee on April 30.

## 2 Did the President at any time authorize payments of hush money to, or offers of clemency for, any Watergate defendants?

Mr. Nixon's defense is not dependent upon whether or not such a payment was made. His defense is dependent upon whether he authorized it or even knew of its payment and the tapes, in my judgment, make it clear that he neither authorized it nor knew that it had been paid.

—St. Clair, NBC-TV's *Meet the Press*, May 5.

As the President has stated, the transcript of the meeting on the morning of March 21, 1973, contains certain ambiguities and statements which taken out of context could be construed to have a variety of meanings. The conversation was wide ranging, consideration was given to a number of different possibilities, but several things clearly stand out:

1. The President had not previously been aware of any payments made allegedly to purchase silence on the part of the Watergate defendants.

2. The President rejected the payment of \$120,000 or any other sum to (E. Howard) Hunt or other Watergate defendants.

Dean's testimony to the Senate may have been simply an error, of course, or it may have been an effort to have his disclosures to the President predate what was then at least thought to be the date of the last payment to Hunt's attorney for his fees, namely March 20, 1973. As far as the President is concerned, however, it makes no difference when this payment was made; he not only opposed the payment, but never even knew that it had been made until mid-April when the facts were finally disclosed to him.

The President expressed the belief that the money could be raised, and perhaps, even, a way could be found to deliver it. However, he recognized and pointed out that blackmail would continue endlessly, and in the final analysis would not be successful unless the Watergate defendants were given executive clemency, which he said adamantly, could not be done. The President stated:

No, it is wrong that's for sure.

If Dean's disclosure to the President

on April 16, 1973, about the payment of Hunt's legal fees is to be believed, then it is clear that this fact was concealed from the President when he met with (former Atty. Gen. John N.) Mitchell and the others on the afternoon on March 22nd. The explanation for this concealment perhaps is contained in a significant statement made by Dean to the President at their meeting on the morning of April 16, 1973:

D. I have tried all along to make sure that anything I passed to you didn't cause you any personal problems.

Dean analyzed the situation (on March 21) as he saw it, pointing out that a number of people know about these events, including Mrs. Hunt who had died in a plane crash. At the mention of Mrs. Hunt, the President interjected that this was a "great sadness" and that he recalled a conversation with someone about Hunt's problem on account of his wife and the President said that "of course commutation could be considered on the basis of his wife's death, and that was the only conversation I ever had in that light." During their conversations, the President repeatedly and categorically rejected the idea of clemency.

—St. Clair's April 30 argument.

## 3 Did the President ever authorize, or consent to, perjury or obstruction of justice by his associates?

In all of the thousands of words spoken, even though they often are unclear and ambiguous, not once does it appear that the President of the United States was engaged in a criminal plot to obstruct justice.

Having received information of possible obstruction of justice having taken place following the break-in at (Democratic National Committee headquarters), the President promptly undertook an investigation into the facts. The record discloses that the President started his investigation the night of his meeting with Dean on March 21, as confirmed by Dean in his conversation with the President on April 16, 1973.

P. Then it was that night that I started my investigation.

D. That's right.

—St. Clair's April 30 argument.

Perjury as such actually is not a technical matter, but it is criminal conduct, but it was not conduct

charged against the President. You see, we have to keep in mind that it is the President that is being impeached, not [Jeb Stuart] Magruder, not [H.R.] Haldeman, not [John] Ehrlichman or the others. The first charge against the President is a complicity in a plot to obstruct justice made by Mr. Dean.

—*St. Clair, Meet the Press.*

Indeed, Dean did, in fact, communicate his intentions to Mitchell and Magruder not to support Magruder's previous testimony to the grand jury. This no doubt was the push, initially stimulated by the President, which got Magruder to go to the U.S. Attorneys on the following Saturday, April 14, and change his testimony.

P. And you tell Magruder, now Jeb, this evidence is coming in, you ought to go to the grand jury. Purge yourself if you're perjured and tell this whole story.

H. I think we have to.

P. Then, well Bob, you don't agree with that?

H. No. I do.

The President instructed Ehrlichman to see Magruder, also, and tell him that he did not serve the President by remaining silent.

The President told Ehrlichman that when he met with Mitchell to advise him that "the President has said let the chips fall where they may. He will not furnish cover for anybody."

The President reviewed with Dean the disclosure Dean made to the President on March 21st, and on the evening of April 15th.

The President had some more advice for John Dean on this occasion:

P. Thank God. Don't ever do it, John. Tell the truth. That is the thing I have told everybody around here—tell the truth! All they do, John, is compound it. That Hiss would be free today if he hadn't lied. If he had said "Yes, I knew Chambers and as a young man I was involved with some Communist activities but I broke off a number of years ago." And Chambers would have dropped it. If you are going to lie, you go to jail for the lie rather than the crime. So believe me, don't ever lie.

As to the President's actions, he told Dean:

P. No, I don't want, understand when I say don't lie. Don't lie about me either.

D. No, I won't sir . . .

—*St. Clair's argument, April 30.*

#### 4 What kind of investigation did the President launch after March 21, and what was the role of Asst. Atty. Gen. Henry E. Petersen?

The President, of course, is, as I have said earlier, and I have been criticized for it, I think, the chief law enforcement officer of the country. He was faced with a very difficult problem as is evident from these tapes. His two chief advisers [Haldeman and Ehrlichman] were being accused of criminal conduct and, as

he said at a number of places, "I really can't, in fairness to them and run the affairs of government, discharge everyone against whom charges are made," so it was important to him and I think to the Administration, to find out if there was anything to support these charges and only then, if there was an appearance there was enough to support the matter going before a grand jury, was he then prepared to, as he said, move on them.

—*St. Clair, Meet the Press.*

The next day Ehrlichman, pursuant to the President's direction given the previous day, called Atty. Gen. [Richard] Kleindienst and among other things advised him that he was to report directly to the President if any evidence turns up of any wrong doing on the part of anyone in the White House or about Mitchell. Kleindienst raised the question of a possibility of a conflict of interest and suggests that thought be given to appointing a special prosecutor.

Ehrlichman told the Attorney General that he had been conducting an investigation for about the past three-weeks for the President as a substitute for Dean on White House and broader involvement. He also

told him that he had reported his findings to the President the day before and that he had advised people not to be reticent on the President's behalf about coming forward. He informed the Attorney General that he had talked to Mitchell and had tried to reach Magruder, but that he had not been able to meet with Magruder until after Magruder had conferred with the U.S. Attorneys. He offered to make all of his information available if it would be in any way useful.

The President, on the afternoon of April 15, 1973, had every reason to believe that the judicial process was moving rapidly to complete the case. He continued to attempt to assist. He had four telephone conversations with Petersen after their meeting.

In the afternoon, having been told that [G. Gordon] Liddy would not talk unless authorized by "higher authority," who all assumed was Mitchell, the President directed Petersen to pass the word to Liddy through his counsel that the President wanted him to cooperate. Subsequently, the President told Petersen that Dean doubted Liddy would accept the word of Petersen, so Petersen was directed to tell Liddy's counsel that the President personally would confirm his urging of Liddy to cooperate.

On the afternoon of April 17, the President discussed the problem of granting immunity to White House officials with Henry Petersen. Petersen pointed out that he was opposed to immunity but he pointed out that they might need Dean's testimony in order to get Haldeman and Ehrlichman. The President agreed that under those circumstances he might have to move on Haldeman and Ehrlichman, provided Dean's testimony was corroborated. The President told Petersen:

P. That's the point. Well, I feel

it strongly—I mean—just understand—I am not trying to protect anybody—I just want the damn facts if you can get the facts from Dean and I don't care whether—

HP. Mr. President, if I thought you were trying to protect anybody—I would have walked out.

On April 27, Petersen reported to the President that Dean's lawyer was threatening that unless Dean got immunity, "We will bring the President in—not in this case but in other things."

On the question of immunity in the face of these threats, the President told Petersen:

P. All right. We have got the immunity problem resolved. Do it, Dean if you need to, but boy I am telling you—there ain't going to be any blackmail.

—*St. Clair's April 30 argument.*

#### 5 Is John Dean a credible witness?

Well, I think John Dean sort of epitomizes the Watergate story as far as the President is concerned. The first public impressions of the President's role in Watergate were testified to at length by Mr. Dean and he, as you know, is the only one that in any way implicated the President and I think that these tapes shed some light on what really did happen and I think the American people deserve to know what the facts are.

—*St. Clair, Meet the Press.*

In 16 separate areas—on dozens of occasions—Mr. Dean made substantive statements concerning the President that do not accord with the tapes; indeed they appear in direct contravention of what the tapes contain.

None of Mr. Dean's statements implying presidential knowledge on September 15th—the allegation that Mr. Dean said "it had been contained," the alleged presidential compliment, "Bob told me what a good job you have been doing," Dean's claim that he told the President he could not guarantee that the cover-up might not unravel, and others—is confirmed in the tape of September 15.

As for the tape of February 28th, there is no record whatsoever of Mr. Dean's having discussed his role in the cover-up, and his potential criminal liability as Mr. Dean testified.

Repeatedly, Mr. Dean testified that the President asked the questions and made the comments about the 1 million dollars on March 13th—not March 21, as the President had stated. In point of fact, there is no mention of the \$1 million demand or the fact that the money demands were coming from Mr. Hunt, on the tape of March 13th.

What makes this of significance is that—before the existence of White House tapes was known or made public—John Dean insisted, under oath, that this had transpired on the 13th of March not the twenty-first.

According to the transcript of the tape of March 21, Mr. Dean did not tell the President everything he



knew — especially concerning his own involvement.

1) He withheld the fact that he himself had directed John Caulfield (former aide to John Dean) to offer executive clemency to (Watergate burglar James W.J. McCord;

2) He failed to advise the President that he himself had shredded documents, destroyed evidence from Mr. Howard Hunt's safe.

The statement by Dean—denying twice that the President sent him to Camp David to write a written report—is untrue. The transcript of March 22 shows precisely when, and why, the President sent Dean to Camp David to write a report. Relevant passages from the conversation of March 22 are below:

D. I don't think I can do it until I sit down this evening and start drafting.

H. I think you ought to hole up for the weekend and do that and get it done.

P. Sure.

H. Give it your full attention and get it done.

P. I think you need—why don't you do this? Why don't you go up to Camp David?

D. I might do it, I might do it.

P. Completely away from the phone. Just go up there and (inaudible) I want a written report.

—White House rebuttal to John Dean's testimony before the Ervin committee, issued May 4.

6 Has the President's handling of physical evidence indicated a real willingness to cooperate with the House and Senate inquiries?

As the U.S. Court of Appeals in

Nixon v. Sirica has stated, "wholesale public access to Executive deliberations and documents would cripple the Executive as a co-equal branch," and as the President has repeatedly stated, he will not participate in the destruction of the office of the Presidency of the United States by permitting unlimited access to Presidential conversations and documents.

—St. Clair's April 30 argument.

I think the issue here is the facts. We are either after a determination of the facts, through which the Judiciary Committee can make a fair and honest, objective judgment, or we are interested in issues which lend themselves to political debate, and tests of manhood between one branch of government and the other.

—Gen. Alexander H. Haig Jr., White House chief of staff, on ABC-TV's *Issues and Answers*, May 5.

I think the President is hopeful that they will review this material carefully and come to the point of view that they can reach an informed judgment. Most of the comment that I have heard is that there is too much information contained in these tapes, not enough.

—St. Clair, *Meet the Press*.

What we have turned over in this public disclosure and in the material turned over to the Judiciary Committee did not limit itself to specific requests of the subpoena. It went beyond that.

In other words, there was an effort made to cover the full spectrum of the operative discussions in the President's office and in EOB (Executive Office Building) which would

give the American people, which would give the Judiciary Committee, and indeed give [Special Prosecutor Leon] Jaworski the full picture of the operative aspects of what the President knew about Watergate and what actions he directed with respect to Watergate.

I think from a layman's point of view that anyone who reads this material, this transcript material, knows without a shadow of a doubt that there has not been much tampering with the contents of them. They speak for themselves. But, with the transcript in hand, and having observed this process myself first-hand, I think I can tell you that with the transcript in hand, the two leaders can very, very quickly assure themselves—and I am confident they will, and I wish they would exercise that prerogative—that these are in fact bonafide representations of what is on the tape material.

I think we, as the American people, as a society, have got to understand that never in the history of this Republic has any subject been investigated so thoroughly, have so many thousands and indeed millions of words of testimony been taken, so much evidence scrutinized, both publicly and privately, by various forums, grand juries, special prosecutors, Senate committees, and now judiciary committees. The time has come, in my view, for the facts that have resulted from this excessive introspection, to be assessed by the House Committee, to make their judgments and to get on with the business of the American people.

—Gen. Haig, *Issues and Answers*.

## Some Unanswered Questions

The answers supplied to key Watergate questions in the accompanying article leave some crucial points hanging. The Times posed them in writing to Mr. Nixon's chief of staff, Gen. Alexander H. Haig Jr., but no response was forthcoming.

These are the questions:

1—One of the keys to the St. Clair argument is the contention the President knew nothing of a cover-up prior to March 21. How does this square with the transcripts of the Feb. 28 and March 13 meetings?

Dean: We have come a long road on this thing now. I had thought it was an impossible task to hold together until after the election until things started falling

out, but we have made it this far and I am convinced we are going to make it the whole road. (Feb. 28)

On March 13, Dean informed the president of Strachan's definite involvement and possibly, through his association with Strachan, that of Haldeman. A similar connection was made between Magruder and Mitchell.

President: Is it too late to go the hang-out road?

Dean: yeah, I think it is... There can be a lot of problems if everything starts falling. So there are dangers, Mr. President. I would be less candid if I didn't tell you there are.

2—Did the President author-

ize or was he aware of any payment of cash to Watergate defendants on the night of March 21?

3—If the President was aware that Haldeman and Ehrlichman were under suspicion of criminal misconduct, what was his intent in conveying to them details of Henry Petersen's investigation?

4—St. Clair has argued that the President functions as the chief law enforcement officer and that his actions constituted an investigation and not a cover-up. If this is so, why did he on April 27 tell Petersen he had "turned it off totally," when hush money was discussed? This appears to contradict both the March 21 transcript and the

transcript of the President's conversation with Haldeman on April 17, quoted here.

Haldeman: What you should have said is that blackmail is wrong, not that it's too costly...

President: Well, (inaudible), I suppose then we should have cut—shut it off, 'cause later on you met in your office and Mitchell said, "That was taken care of."

Haldeman: The next day.

5—What is the constitutional basis for the President's assumption that he has the authority to decide what evidence he will provide for an impeachment inquiry?

6—Short of expert and staff analysis of the tapes themselves, how can the Judiciary Committee be sure of the authenticity of the transcripts?

WASHINGTON POST

5 May 1974

Jack Anderson

# Some Light Breaks Through — But Not Enough

A controversial book about the Central Intelligence Agency has gone to press with several blank spaces, marking the passages that the CIA has managed at least temporarily to delete.

With the help of our own CIA sources, we have now filled in the blanks. The deletions, all fascinating, some explosive, are more likely to make people blush than to bring down governments.

The CIA, nevertheless, is still fighting in the courts to keep the embarrassing revelations out of the forthcoming book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," by Victor Marchetti and John Marks.

Marchetti is a bespectacled former intelligence analyst who has been forbidden by the CIA to mention that he played a crucial role in the celebrated Cuban missile crisis.

The Cuba-bound Soviet missiles, too large to stow below decks, were disguised in crates on deck. U.S. reconnaissance planes brought back photographs, which Marchetti examined. Through tedious, microscopic study, say our sources, he was able to distinguish between tractor crates and missile crates.

The passages that the CIA is still contesting in the courts — with a few exceptions which we voluntarily will omit — might mortify the CIA but couldn't possibly endanger the national security. The censored incidents make the CIA look like a covert circus, with the cloak-and-dagger crowd, getting involved in some unbelievable situations, sometimes hilarious, sometimes grim.

One episode that has been deleted from the book, for example, concerns a Soviet spy in Japan who was about to defect to the United States. The prospect exhilarated the head of the CIA's Soviet desk, who caught the first jet for Tokyo to get in on the action.

But the Russians became suspicious of their comrade and tailed him to the trysting spot. At the dramatic moment

of defection, the prospective turncoat found himself literally caught in a tug-of-war, with the Americans pulling on one arm and the Russians clinging to the other. In the middle of the struggle, the Japanese gendarmes intruded upon the unlikely scene and carted the whole group off to the pokey for disturbing the peace.

This doesn't compare to the high drama in the Himalayas, however, when the United States needed information on the Chinese nuclear tests in remote Sinkiang province. The CIA recruited a mountain climbing crew and trained them for weeks in the Colorado mountains. Then in the late 1960s, the CIA climbers were dispatched to scale one of the loftiest peaks in the Himalayas to install a nuclear-powered listening device aimed at the Chinese test sites.

The climb was so hazardous that a couple packers fell to their deaths. But the device, at last, was triumphantly implanted. Unhappily, the first mountain blizzard swept the listening device over. When spring came, the melting mountain snow was polluted with radiation, which seeped into the watershed. The abashed CIA had to send another mountain-climbing team up the peak to find the wreckage and remove it.

The Marchetti-Marks manuscript also contains some big names, among them that of West Germany's Chancellor Willy Brandt. Like many other world leaders, he received money from the CIA when he was an aspiring young politician.

At a White House state dinner for Brandt in 1971, the high and mighty were puzzled about one nondescript guest whom no one recognized.

The manuscript originally identified the mystery man as Brandt's old CIA contact, whom the chancellor had asked the White House to invite for sentimental reasons. The CIA got this reference censored out of the book, ostensibly to spare Brandt's sensibilities.

The manuscript also tells of a 1967 trip that President Lyndon Johnson took to Punta del Este, Uruguay, for a meeting of the Organization of American States. In his expansive Texas style, LBJ dispensed gifts and souvenirs, wine and dined dignitaries and put on a lavish performance. To his embarrassment, he considerably exceeded the budget allowed for the trip by the State Department.

Because of economies LBJ himself had imposed, the State Department simply was unable to cover the tab. So the President was obliged to turn to the CIA, which paid the bill out of a secret slush fund called "The Directors Contingency Fund."

This fund had to be tapped in 1967, too, by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara whose Pentagon budget couldn't meet a verbal commitment he had made to a European ally for arms aid. The funds were secretly transferred from the CIA to the Defense Department without the knowledge of Congress.

The CIA also used money from the secret fund to invest in stocks, which presumably were plowed back into CIA retirement, escrow and credit union funds. The revelation that the CIA was playing the stock market, our sources report, was cut out of the Marchetti-Marks book.

However humorous some of the CIA's escapades may have been, the authors are deadly serious about the issues their book raises. For the American people have only the haziest of views into the shadowy, subterranean world of espionage.

Now and then, a light breaks through the murky darkness. It may shine briefly on a love nest, the confession of a refugee, a softening of will or skill. But at best, the public catches only an occasional, fleeting glimpse into the CIA's dramatic and deadly operations. A little more light is needed.

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PUBLISHERS WEEKLY

6 MAY 1974

THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. Knopf, \$8.95

This *cause célèbre* among the season's books (see *The Week*, *PW*, April 22, March 18, January 28) is a powerfully documented assault on the CIA's far-flung "clandestine operations" in Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia (where an attempt to overthrow Sukarno in 1958 is alleged), Guatemala and elsewhere, including most importantly the Chile of the Allende years. Marchetti ("The Rope-Dancer") and ex-State Department intelligence analyst Marks demonstrate with chilling conviction their view that the CIA, in its secret role at the heart of

the \$6-billion-a-year U. S. intelligence community, has been the *covert* foreign policy instrument of every president since Truman—and is now a grave moral and practical threat to our democracy. The book names names, teems with disclosures of secret high-level meetings, "dirty tricks" and political sabotage (not only abroad) justified by dubious "national security" claims. Its court-ordered gaps (marked DELETED) and boldface passages indicating what the CIA originally tried to censor provide a minefield for the reader who wants to speculate on what the CIA's "clandestine mentality" is up to. Documentary appendix.

[June 24]

# RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4435 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016, 244-3540

PROGRAM News at Noon

STATION WTTG TV

DATE May 10, 1974 12:00 Noon

CITY Washington, D.C.

## ANDERSON'S COMMENTARY

MAURY POVICH: Syndicated columnist and Metromedia commentator Jack Anderson says that the Central Intelligence Agency is moving to block publication of a new book by a former CIA employee that reportedly turns a highly critical spotlight on several cloak-and-dagger operations. Here is Anderson's commentary.

JACK ANDERSON: We've now learned that the Central Intelligence Agency wants to censor an explosive new book. The CIA spooks are more worried about the publication of this book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," than they are about Chinese missiles or Russian spies. They have managed to censor key portions of the book prior to publication. However, through our own CIA sources, we've learned what the secret agents want to hide.

For the most part, the censored material is more likely to cause embarrassment than the toppling of government. The book, written by former CIA man Victor Marchetti, tears away the fearsome curtain of secrecy surrounding the CIA to reveal a covert circus. For example, we've learned that the CIA censored a story about an Agency desk man who flew to Japan in hopes of getting involved in some cloak-and-dagger adventures. A Russian spy, it seems, was supposed to defect to U.S. agents. But Russian operatives followed their turncoat comrade. A tug-of-war ensued with each side pulling at the defector's arms. The Japanese police arrived and threw the whole crew in jail for disturbing the peace.

The CIA also blue-penciled its attempts to bug a diplomat's pet cat, and they have censored information about their abortive efforts to place a listening device in range of Chinese missile sites.

Well, unfortunately, the CIA may win its fight to censor Marchetti's book. If it does, the First Amendment will once again be subverted in the name of national security.

WASHINGTON STAR  
10 May 1974

### ***Spy Freed***

Russian spy John W. Butenko, 48, is free after spending more than 10 years in prison for passing Strategic Air Command secrets to the Soviet Union. "I want to put the whole thing behind me and live my life," he said after leaving a Newark, N.J., courtroom. His 30-year sentence was reduced to time-served after he dropped a legal challenge to his conviction.

# GENERAL

WASHINGTON POST

7 MAY 1974

Victor Zorza

## Kissinger's Latest News Leaks

Eyewitnesses who claim to have seen medical experiments performed on children to "extract their blood, gouge their eyes, cut out their intestines, and boil them in oil" recently addressed a mass meeting in Paoshan, in China.

The grisly details, as broadcast by the local radio, were intended to drive home the lesson that the "imperialists" who had in this way "slaughtered" 2,000 Chinese children before China's liberation were no better now than they had been then. The nationality of the "imperialists" was not specified, but the broadcast left the strong impression that they were Americans.

The U.S.-Chinese honeymoon arranged by Dr. Henry Kissinger, during which anti-U.S. propaganda had virtually disappeared from the Chinese press and radio, is obviously in danger. On the Sino-Soviet front, too, the Kremlin threat about the "inevitable consequences" that will follow if China fails to release the recently detained Soviet helicopter crew provides a new danger signal.

Why should Peking seem to invite trouble with both Moscow and Washington at the same time? It does not make political sense, especially in the light of Kissinger's privately expressed concern about the possibility of war

between Russia and China. He believes that the next three years will determine whether there will be war or peace between Russia and China. He thinks that the most dangerous time is now, because three years from now China's nuclear arsenal will be too powerful to be attacked by Russia without risk of retaliation.

Some of Kissinger's critics suspect that he had an ulterior political motive in leaking this estimate to a Washington columnist. Was he implying that this was too dangerous a time to impeach President Nixon? It certainly seems so.

Kissinger's argument is that we are now entering a crucial period which will decide not only the question of war and peace between Russia and China. It will also determine, he believes, whether the nuclear arms race will get out of control, whether peace or war could prevail in the Mideast, whether Europe will resume its partnership with the United States or provoke a U.S. retreat into isolation.

The rules of the Washington game—which have to be understood in order to appreciate the political role of leaks—would normally prevent a columnist from attributing a leak directly to Kissinger, and from discussing his motives. Happily, Kissinger's latest leak appeared in a New York column by James Reston, the most respected of Washington's columnists. This makes it possible to apply to it a yardstick which, as Kissinger once confided to this writer, he uses himself when reading Washington columnists. He reads them, he says, not for the information they contain, but to find out who in Washington is leaking what to whom, and why.

It must be left to the analyst of American domestic politics to measure, in keeping with Kissinger's own yardstick, the extent—if any—which his leak was intended to help Mr. Nixon. What the foreign policy analyst must do is point out that Kissinger's

periodic outbursts of alarm about a Soviet attack on China pre-date Mr. Nixon's troubles.

Moscow's own response to such leaks, in the past must not be ignored. The Kremlin sees them as attempts to perpetuate the Sino-Soviet rift by convincing Peking that it is in serious danger from Russia. This in turn makes it possible for Kissinger to play the China card in his dealings with Moscow—as he did, with considerable effect, during the SALT I negotiations.

But Peking is not now moving closer to Washington. The gory broadcast from Paoshan is only the most dramatic sign of moves in the opposite direction. They first became evident last summer—but when they were put to Kissinger, he dismissed them as of no consequence. He insisted that the Peking leadership debate was concerned with domestic issues, and that anyway it had been "essentially terminated" by September.

When it became obvious recently that the quarrel, far from having ended, was becoming increasingly bitter, he asked the CIA for a special estimate of the impact the debate might have on U.S.-Chinese relations. The CIA could no longer maintain that the debate had been "terminated," but it again concluded that foreign policy played no major role in it. But, as a later column will argue, the CIA is, wrong again.

The West has repeatedly made major blunders in its view of Sino-Soviet relations. The refusal of most government and academic analysts to accept, 15 years ago the evidence which pointed to the existence of the then secret Moscow-Peking quarrel is now acknowledged to have been an error of historic proportions. The present refusal to abandon the new conventional wisdom could have equally far-reaching repercussions on the whole future of East-West relations.

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THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, MAY 16, 1974

## Turkish Amnesty Reduces Terms of Americans

ANKARA, Turkey, May 15 (UPI)—The National Assembly passed a disputed amnesty bill today that reduced the life sentences of three Americans and freed a British teenager. All had been convicted on drug charges.

However, the bill excluded Government-backed provisions to include political prisoners and Premier Bulent Ecevit said his cabinet might resign over it.

The amnesty, which is expected to affect over 50,000 Turks, cut by a third the sentences handed down against the Americans. They are Catherine

Zenz, 28 years old, of Lancaster, Wis.; Joann M. McDaniel, 29, of Coos Bay, Ore., and Robert E. Hubbard, 23, of San Antonio, Tex., all accused of smuggling hashish. Mr. Hubbard has testified that the women were unaware of the narcotics.

All three had been sentenced to death but the court commuted the sentences to life.

Under Turkish law life terms are remissable after 36 years. The Americans can have a third remitted; the amnesty cuts another third making them eligible for freedom after 12 years.

Legal sources said Timothy

Davey, a 16-year-old Briton who was sentenced to six years in 1971 for selling hashish, would be freed.

Twenty deputies of the National Salvation party, the right-wing coalition partner of Mr. Ecevit's Republican People's party, voted against clauses extending the amnesty to anarchists and Communists convicted of anticonstitutional crimes.

The amnesty must be signed by President Fahri Koruturk, an action that was expected.

WASHINGTON POST

15 MAY 1974

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

# The Pentagon's New 'Stand-Off Option'

Operating under secret but intense White House pressure, the Pentagon is now moving cautiously into a new strategic weapons system that may prove to be a lever against Moscow's menacing drive to MIRV its entire long-range missile force.

The contemplated new system is called the stand-off option: a fleet of U.S. bombers or wide-bodied commercial aircraft armed with long-range missiles and capable of circling the Soviet Union at a distance of 1,500 to 3,000 miles.

Since Moscow could not begin to match this new system in the foreseeable future, it hopefully would be compelled to agree to the real aim of President Nixon's quest for a new Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) agreement with Moscow. That goal: Soviet agreement to limit MIRVing its missiles—that is putting from 3 to 8 independently-targeted warheads on a single missile.

What makes this so important is the vastly superior thrust or power (throw-weight) of Soviet missile launchers. Once Moscow catches up with U.S. MIRVing technology, this throw-weight advantage could make the land-based Soviet long-range missile force far superior to the U.S. force—a dangerous new element in super-power politics.

BALTIMORE SUN  
10 May 1974

There is today no arms expert in the administration, including Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's closest advisers, still nourishing the illusion that Moscow will agree to any meaningful MIRV limitation without something new added to U.S. bargaining power. That something new is the stand-off option.

When Elliot Richardson was ending his brief stint as Secretary of Defense one year ago, he ordered Air Force studies on converting the wide-bodied Lockheed 1011, the Douglas DC-10 and the Boeing 747 into flying launching platforms, each armed with a single ballistic missile. But intense resistance from the Air Force and the civilian high command, including Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements Jr. prevailed. In the words of one high-level presidential adviser, the Air Force was "scared to death this might doom their new B-1 bomber program."

This impasse is now being broken. Clements and the Pentagon's civilian command have persuaded Air Force and Navy brass to ask Congress for \$125 million in research funds to begin studies of a revised stand-off system: bombers armed with strategic, nuclear-tipped "cruise" missiles containing their own power supply, which would drop from high altitudes, then start

their attack at extremely low levels. The same system could also be used for launching from submarines.

The Air Force generals who rejected the commercial-carrier system feel differently about the cruise missile. Instead of raising questions about the need for the vastly more expensive new B-1 bomber, it might well strengthen the B-1 case in Congress, which is now more suspicious about defense spending than at any time in the past 20 years.

Some Pentagon strategists now foresee a real possibility of flight-testing a strategic cruise missile within the next two years. Yet, the Soviet Union is believed to be more than 10 years away from developing even the fuel technology needed to propel the cruise missile. Thus, Moscow would be unable to respond to this significant upset in the present balance of nuclear power.

The situation might then be roughly comparable to 1972 when the Russians finally agreed to limit their own anti-missile defense system when convinced that the U.S. was ready to build its own, far superior anti-missile missile. Fearing the U.S. stand-off option, the Kremlin could be induced to do what it will not consider today—agree to a mutual limitation on dangerous, unlimited MIRVing of long-range missiles.

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## Brezhnev's Diplomacy in Trouble

Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev has guided Soviet diplomacy along detente paths for half a decade by establishing close personal ties with three Western leaders: Georges Pompidou, Willy Brandt and Richard Nixon. Now Pompidou is dead, Brandt has quit under a fire lit by East German agents and Mr. Nixon's hold on office is deteriorating rapidly. As a Marxist-Leninist, Brezhnev may get some comfort from the theory that policy must be based on political and economic forces rather than personalities. But until he can show substantively that his policy line can endure, this theory will be small comfort indeed.

Consider France. For years Moscow catered to the whims of Gaullism, reaping benefit from its anti-Americanism and its distrust of a politically united Europe. But Pompidou has passed along, just weeks after a cozy rendezvous with Brezhnev near the Black Sea, and his likely successor is Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, a conservative with friendlier attitudes toward France's Atlantic connections.

Consider West Germany. Brandt's zeal for rapprochement with the East fit nicely with Brezhnev's need for technology and credits from the West. The Soviet leader seized upon Brandt's coming to power in 1969 as his first real opening to the West. He concluded the Bonn-Moscow treaty and forced East Germany to accept the Four-Power Berlin accord. Throughout, Brandt

and Brezhnev made no effort to disguise their willingness to help one another politically. Brandt's successor, Helmut Schmidt, has much closer ties to the German military establishment and can be expected to adopt a far more cautious approach to the Soviet bloc.

Consider the United States. President Nixon's willingness to forgo his old anti-Communist posture in order to work for detente is treated in Moscow as one of Brezhnev's major accomplishments. Striving to help Mr. Nixon through his Watergate ordeal, the Kremlin has not wrecked U.S. peace initiatives in the Middle East or plans for a June summit. While Soviet officials express hope that Gerald Ford will follow Mr. Nixon's policy directions if he takes over the White House, they do not seem to have a clear fix on the Vice President. It is realized that a Brezhnev-Ford personal relationship would have to start almost from scratch, and this at a time when increasing U.S. skepticism toward detente is worrying the Soviet Union.

So these must be troubling days for Leonid Brezhnev, belying the old, unreal assumptions that what is bad for the capitalists must be good for the Communists. When Western leadership is in disarray, so, too, is Brezhnev's personal diplomacy. It is to be hoped this will not lead the Soviet leader back toward confrontation but will make him more eager to seek accommodation with the West.



# Western Europe

WASHINGTON POST

9 May 1974

Victor Zorza

## Detente Promoters: Falling Dominoes?

Could the fall of Willy Brandt herald the fall of Richard Nixon? The question has to be asked, because the openings to the East which they both made have been cited as their main achievements in office.

The partisans of both men have claimed that if they go, the delicate web of mutual interest they have been weaving between East and West would be torn to shreds. The Kremlin has exalted them as men of history who have turned their countries back on their tracks, to begin a new era in world affairs, and has sometimes created the impression that if they go, then the cold war glacier would begin its inexorable progress across the continents until it again covers most of the globe.

First went de Gaulle, who really began the process of detente with Moscow as part of his reversal of alliances. Then Pompidou was struck down, after he had made the Russian connection the main element of his foreign policy. Then Brandt, who reversed the main thrust of a thousand years of German pressure toward the East. And then there was one.

In all those cases, the intimacies of summitry, the personal chemistry, of the world's leaders interacting in the privacy of palatial drawing rooms and running for election, in the welcome glare of television lights, in each other's capitals, were important parts of the process. They all had one eye on their place in history — and another on the main chance. The personal element did count—but for how much?

Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin was asked by a reporter last year whether the top individuals had not played too big a role in each country's buildup of detente links, whether the policy built in interpersonal dealings would remain stable. His answer was characteristically double-edged. The role of the summit actors was "eminently important," he said, and proceeded to list the summit meetings with Nixon—held by Brezhnev; the negotiations with Pompidou—conducted by Brezhnev; and the exchanges of visits with Brandt—also conducted by Brezhnev.

Was he perhaps saying that the element of stability, in a world where the leaders of the democracies were many and impermanent, was provided by the solid rock of the Kremlin?

But, he added, while the role of these people "can never be ignored," there was also a steady trend, a policy line which, for instance, in our country is determined by the party.

But that was for the birds. The policy line is determined by "the party" even less than in most Western countries—far less. Brezhnev explained last year that it was not so easy for the Soviet people—"as well as their leaders"—to open up this new page in relations with Germany. He was hinting at the opposition he had found among hard-line politicians in the Kremlin, and

among the military brass, to his own West-politik, not unlike the opposition with which Brandt and Nixon have had to contend in their own Ost-politik.

Even today there are rumblings in Moscow against Brezhnev's European policy, particularly from the military to whom the troop cuts now being negotiated present a greater threat than strategic arms limitation ever did. Russia's top military commanders, the generation which earned its spurs in the war with Germany, cannot shed the vested interests of the world's greatest land army, or unload a lifetime's emotional baggage, at the drop of a hat, by Brezhnev or anyone else.

The Soviet military press showed distinct signs of uneasiness when he first negotiated the treaty with West Germany, and in the past year it has made virtually no comment of its own on the unending progression of European troop cut talks, at a time when other Moscow papers have paid close attention to them. The silence, as so often in Moscow, speaks louder than words.

But all this was to be expected. Of course Brezhnev's personal drive and commitment have played a major role in overcoming the opposition, as have Brandt's and Nixon's. In recent months, the malaise which has infected the democracies has caused the Kremlin to slow down the bargaining, to extract political advantage from weaker Western governments, and to raise the price of the Soviet concessions which must be made if Western concessions are to be forthcoming.

One major reason why Brandt had drifted into a state of mind in which he was ready to resign was the apparent—if temporary—failure of his Ost-politik, for which his own opponents and the Kremlin's foot-dragging were responsible. The immediate cause, the discovery of the East German spy in his inner office, must also be laid at the Kremlin's door.

No knowledgeable Western intelligence official would assume that the Kremlin was unaware of the spy's role, and of the information he provided.

Indeed, what is known of the links between East German and Soviet intelligence—and a great deal is known from a whole string of defectors to West Germany—there is every reason to believe that Guenter Guillaume would have been controlled by the KGB's spy-masters in Moscow, not by the smaller fry in East Berlin. So are all the other major spies who must be presumed to be lodged close to the West's centers of power.

Let there be no mistake about this. Just as the West had Oleg Penkovsky on the Kremlin's doorstep, until he was discovered—by accident—in the early 1960s, so Moscow may be assumed to have made every effort to have planted long-term spies in Western government structures, and to have promoted their rise in the hierarchy until they came close to the top—as

Britain's trio of Kim Philby, Donald Maclean and Guy Burges did. And they too were discovered by chance, after Britain's Intelligence Service had been trying for years to plug the leak of whose existence it was well aware.

In the case of Mr. Nixon, there has long been a dispute in the Kremlin about putting all Moscow's money on him. The faction which has argued that Nixon alone had the power and the will to deliver on his promises to Moscow has had to change its tune when it became evident that the next President of the United States could reverse course.

Elaborate socio-political studies in the Soviet academic journals, which reflect the work done on contract for the Kremlin by its foreign policy think-tanks, have increasingly soft-pedaled Nixon's personal contribution while stressing the role of historical forces which in their view make detente virtually irreversible.

The Marxist dialectical materialism on which such analyses are based is no more a guide to Kremlin's action—and no less—than Mr. Nixon's public obeisance to the God of the Christians, or his more profane invocation of the deity in private discourse. What it does indicate is that, while Brezhnev has found Nixon as useful as Nixon has found Brezhnev, personal chemistry is only one aspect of Great Power relations.

When Brandt's political troubles at home made it difficult for him to engage in the give and take without which Great Power negotiations must become bogged down, the Kremlin's own internal politics prevented Brezhnev from helping him out with timely concessions. The world leaders' trade union is too informal a structure, the relationships are too tenuous, the other forces working on the world stage have always proved too powerful in the end, to allow the influence of individuals to remain decisive for long.

Statesmen like to think that they determine the course of history, but they only affect its individual segments. The world's admiration for what Willy Brandt did to change Germany's relationship with Russia was unbounded, but it did nothing to help keep him in power. What Mr. Nixon had done for the U.S.-Soviet relationship can never be forgotten, but what will determine the duration of his presidency is the irresistible pressure of social and political forces, as inexorable as the march of fate in a Greek tragedy.

This is what creates the climate of public opinion, and the state of a leader's mind, in which an irrevocable decision is finally taken. So it was in Brandt's case. So it will be, for better or for worse, in the case of Richard Nixon. "I sometimes feel I'd like to resign," he says in the tape transcripts. "Let Agnew be President for a while. He'd love it." And Jerry Ford wouldn't?



CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
10 May 1974

## Moscow talks up threats to detente

By Leo Grullow  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

### Moscow

If detente crumbles under the impact of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's resignation, Moscow has a ready explanation — the machinations of anti-Communist "foes of detente."

The Bonn Chancellor, a leading champion of East-West reconciliation, resigned to clear the air after a scandal broke involving an East German spy that had been a close aide of Mr. Brandt's. Soviet propaganda faced the dilemma of explaining his resignation without mentioning espionage by Moscow's ally, East Germany.

Media here have suppressed news of the spy charges. A statement by the West German Communist Party provided Tass with an alternative explanation of the resignation: "A sinister alliance of reactionary circles"

conducting an offensive against detente.

### Detente threat cited

Over recent months the Soviet media have steadily elaborated on the charge that "reactionary circles" in many countries were trying to undermine East-West relations.

Last week Pravda commentator Yuri Zhukov reiterated the claim that "a well-orchestrated campaign" was being conducted against detente generally and President Nixon's expected visit here next month in particular. Mr. Zhukov named "the American military-industrial complex, West German revenge-seekers, NATO generals, Zionists, and adventurers of all kinds" as plotting against detente.

At one time Soviet media explained the hue and cry for impeachment of President Nixon as backed by enemies of better relations with the Soviet Union.

Foreign observers here interpreted the buildup of stories about "reaction-

ary plots" against detente as designed to prepare the public for delays for difficulties in improving East-West ties.

Throughout 1973 the press was aglow with reports of party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev's visits to French President Pompidou, President Nixon, and Chancellor Brandt. Moscow repeatedly called for swift conclusion of the European security talks and a 35-nation summit to approve the expected European pact.

Now France is in the throes of electing a successor to President Pompidou, President Nixon faces the threat of impeachment, and Chancellor Brandt has resigned. The European security negotiations are temporarily mired over the issue of wider human contacts, at which Moscow balks. And the charges of Communist East Germany's espionage in Bonn may turn West German opinion against detente and even influence the French elections. Publicity about "sinister plots against detente" helps to explain it all away.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, MAY 4, 1974

## U.S. Inquiry Reported in Bonn Spy Case

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY  
Special to The New York Times

BONN, May 3—President Nixon has ordered the United States Embassy here to provide a "full report" on what Atlantic alliance secrets may have been passed on to East Germany by the official on Chancellor Willy Brandt's staff who confessed last week to being a spy, according to American and German officials.

Mr. Nixon ordered the report as soon as the spy's existence became known last Thursday, according to a diplomatic source.

The spy, Gunter Guillaume, was on the Chancellor's staff from early 1970 until April 24, when he was arrested and confessed. He had a top security clearance and his responsibilities were in the area of domestic political affairs.

A intelligence source, speaking privately, said the focus of Mr. Nixon's concern was apparently limited to whether Mr. Guillaume re-

vealed military or communications secrets shared by members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

And, he added, although speculation was rife, "nobody really knows what he knew; spies is, I think, generally overrated." He said that the discovery of Mr. Guillaume's spying had not prompted any large-scale rethinking of United States policy or changing of communications codes, since the admitted agent, apparently, was not competent in that field.

Today, a Government spokesman, Dr. Armin Grunewald, confirmed press reports that Mr. Guillaume had also had an intimate relationship with a woman who was private secretary to two of West Germany's foreign-policy officials.

The woman, Marie-Luise Mueller, has been working in the office of State Secretary Gunter Gaus, who is scheduled to assume office as Bonn's permanent representative in East Berlin at the end of this month. She had also been secretary to another Cabinet minister, Egon

Bahr, long involved with the Brandt policy of improving relations with the Communists of Eastern Europe.

Mr. Grunewald said that the secretary was not under suspicion of espionage himself, but had been detained and questioned by policemen last week after the discovery of a love letter from her in Mr. Guillaume's desk.

Mr. Gaus had originally been scheduled to take up his mission in East Berlin on May 15. His departure was postponed for two weeks as a sign of Bonn's displeasure over the spy incident. Miss Mueller will not be going with him, Mr. Grunewald said.

Any reports—American and German—on what Mr. Guillaume may have passed on to East Berlin would be, one intelligence source said, "really only guesses, as long as he keeps on refusing to talk." The source also discounted speculation that the Soviet Union might have deliberately exposed the East German agent to avoid sabotage on the Moscow-Bonn detente policies.

NEW YORK TIMES  
5 May 1974

## NATO LEADERSHIP IN AIR IS STUDIED

U.S. Is Concerned About  
Linkage of Commands  
on German Flanks

By JOHN FINNEY  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 4—High-ranking Defense Department and Air Force officials are convinced that the Western alliance has established air superiority over the Warsaw Pact nations, but they are increasingly concerned over a weak command link connecting allied air forces on the northern and southern flanks in West Germany.

Strengthening the link has become a principal objective of Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger as he tries to persuade the European allies to get over what he describes as their "inferiority complex" about their conventional military strength.

Mr. Schlesinger has told European military leaders and Pentagon associates that the single most important step the alliance could take to improve its conventional strength would be to unify command and procedures among allied air units in West Germany. Such a step, he believes, could save billions

of dollars and greatly enhance the air power of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

There are two principal allied air commands in West Germany. One is the Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force on the southern flank, commanded by an American and composed of American, West German and Canadian units. The other on the northern flank is the smaller Second Allied Tactical Air Force, commanded by a Briton and composed of British, Dutch, Belgian and West German units. In principle both forces are responsible to a German general commanding Allied Forces Central Europe. But in practice they have developed different operating procedures to the point that, according to American officials, it would be difficult in time of war for them to operate together. The same objection was raised by West German pilots in recent interviews. They said they encountered operational difficulties in shifting from the American-led Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force to the British commanded Second.

The differing operating procedures spring from contrasting American and British concepts of tactical air power.

The American concept calls for close control over fighter-bomber planes so that they can be diverted from arranged targets to direct support of ground troops.

The British believe such tight control is impractical. But American officials suspect the British take this stand partly because they are unwilling to invest heavily in radar and communications equipment. The British concept is that in time of war the planes would be turned loose to attack the rear support areas of the attacking forces, with little or no emphasis on close support of Allied ground troops.

The over-all result, according to American officials, is that in case of an attack on the northern front it would be tactically and operationally difficult to shift planes from the southern flank to assist on the battlefield.

One compromise proposal advanced by American Air Force

generals is the establishment of a new headquarters over the two tactical air forces to work out common tactics and procedures. This proposal is not completely acceptable to the British because the United States, with its larger contribution in air power, insists that the new headquarters be commanded by an American.

Nor is it clear that the compromise would be accepted by Mr. Schlesinger, who is trying to eliminate superfluous headquarters in the European command and questions the desirability of creating a new one. Ultimately, however, according to associates, Mr. Schlesinger may be forced to accept the proposal as the only politically acceptable way to achieve some allied air unity in West Germany.

Mr. Schlesinger is expected to press for resolution of the command issue when the NATO defense ministers gather in Bergen, Norway, in June for their semiannual meeting.

Despite concern over the weak command link, West German and American officials are

founding a new note of confidence in their belief that the NATO forces have developed a superiority on the central front.

In the past the emphasis was on the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact, which has about 4,250 planes on the northern and central fronts, compared with the West's 1,690. But in briefings here and in West Germany, the new emphasis is on the theme that the NATO forces have a qualitative superiority in pilot training and planes that gives them a fighting edge over the Eastern bloc. As a result, American Air Force officials feel that the NATO air forces could neutralize those of the Warsaw pact, which are cast in essentially a defensive posture, while making a significant contribution in close support in the ground battle.

This conclusion, in turn, leads back to the Schlesinger emphasis on the need for closer coordination so that the allied air forces would be prepared to support the ground battle.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
2 May 1974

## Bonn's spy laws too lenient?

By David R. Francis  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Bonn  
It is easy to find spies in Bonn. Just look them up in the telephone book.

At least three postwar Communist spies today live unmolested in West Germany.

West Germany's policy toward political spies has been relatively lenient. Exchanges with West German spies caught in East Germany are a frequent thing. Indeed, since 1968 most Communist spies caught in the country have been exchanged even before being brought to trial.

And many return to West Germany to live after the exchanges.

But with the discovery of a confessed East German spy, Guenter Guillaume, in the chancellery of Willy Brandt, this well-established practice has become once more a matter of controversy.

"This exchange practice of the federal government should not be continued in its present form," declared Karl Carstens, leader of the opposition faction in the Bundestag, the lower house of Parliament, April 26.

Dr. Carstens, a Christian Democrat, noted that he was aware of the humanitarian aspects of exchanging spies. But, he added, "the risk of being a spy in West Germany then becomes practically a condition which, in the interest of the security of our country, we cannot accept."

In reply, federal Interior Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher said that Mr.

Guillaume, the chancellery spy, and his people (East German authorities) should know that in connection with him that word "exchange" is certainly an unfounded hope.

However, the suspicion here is that Mr. Genscher's strong words will prove to be a bargaining ploy. After some months, it is suspected, Mr. Guillaume will rejoin the National People's Army in East Germany.

Although exchanges were settled without a trial earlier, both government and opposition parties agreed on a change in regulations in 1968 to make such a procedure legal.

Because of this procedure, Communist spies who are West Germans have been able after their exchange to return to West Germany to once more take up residence. There are no court sentences hanging over their heads.

It is thought even possible that they could receive East German pensions.

Besides challenging the established exchange practice, the opposition Christian Democrats accuse the government of trying to play down the importance of the Guillaume case.

One opposition member has called for Mr. Brandt's resignation on the ground that his naivete had rendered him unfit to hold office.

The Christian Democrats also charge the government with laxity and ineffectiveness in its security measures.

In reply, the government does not deny the seriousness of the case. It claims only to be putting the affair in the correct perspective when it notes that Mr. Guillaume dealt with party affairs, not foreign policy or military matters.

The government spokesman has also pointed out that Mr. Guillaume had security clearance to deal with secret documents, but not top secret papers. Further, he says, some suspicions were cast on Mr. Guillaume last

year. The implication is that his access to state secrets was even further reduced.

Nevertheless, the government does not deny that Mr. Guillaume might have picked up valuable information for his East German employees through conversation or even by unauthorized examination of secret documents.

The SPD itself has issued an argumentation aid for party members which, among other things, provides a two-page list of important spies who obtained various government jobs before 1969, when Chancellor Brandt came to power, and were discovered before that year or since then.

Mr. Guillaume himself is sometimes described as one of the new generation of East German spies. He came to West Germany in 1956, one of millions of refugees from East Germany.

Some 14 years of patient work within the party apparatus of Chancellor Brandt's Social Democratic Party paid off in 1970 with an appointment to the economic and financial area in the chancellery.

He took over the liaison office with the SPD in November, 1972, at the time of Mr. Brandt's re-election. That job ended a week ago with his arrest and that of his wife.

But news photographers, scanning their files for pictures of the accused, to their surprise, often spot the bespectacled spy hovering in the vicinity of the Chancellor, on vacation with Mr. Brandt in Norway, or even whispering in his ear. Perhaps as much as anything, those pictures are damaging Mr. Brandt and his party.

# Near East

NEW YORK TIMES  
12 May 1974

## ARMS RACE SEEN IN INDIAN OCEAN

U.N. Unit Says Diego Garcia  
Base Will Spur Soviet

UNITED NATIONS, May 11 (Reuters) — Plans to convert Britain's Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia into a full-fledged United States naval and air base will almost certainly prompt the Soviet Union to seek a similar installation in the area, a panel of United Nations appointed experts on military issues warned yesterday. It foresaw another arms race as a result.

In a report on big-power naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean, declared by the General Assembly in 1971 to be a "zone of peace," they said balance would not be a satisfactory solution. They sense the United States and the Soviet Union saw vital national and security interests in the reform.

"The instabilities inherent in the Indian Ocean area will not easily permit a mutual balance to be maintained successfully by the two great powers over a period of time," the experts said. "And the chances of great-power rivalry interacting with local conflicts, and then escalating, are high."

The report was requested by the General Assembly last December in view of the growing Soviet and United States naval presence in the region, which is close to the volatile Middle East, the oil fields of the Persian Gulf area, East Africa and the Indian subcontinent.

Participating in the study were Dr. Frank Barnby, director of the International Peace Research Institute in Stockholm; a retired Iranian Admiral, Shams Safavi, and K. Subrahmanyam, director of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi.

They noted that the United States and the Soviet Union, already naval rivals in the Indian Ocean, increased their presence in the wake of the Middle East war last October.

"Their naval presences, although still very limited, remain higher than their previous normal deployments in the area," the experts said.

"An additional factor which will further complicate this delicate situation is the current proposal to convert Diego Garcia into a full-fledged United States naval and air base.

"If this proposal is carried through, then one great power will have established a major strategic naval base from which it could deploy, conveniently and economically, its

NEW YORK TIMES  
13 May 1974

## A Considerable Speck

By Chester Bowles

NEW DELHI — I wonder how many people can identify Diego Garcia. An obscure Latin-American revolutionary maybe? A new Cuban cigar?

Guess again. Diego Garcia is an island of only 11 square miles in the Indian Ocean, 1,200 miles south of India. It has no indigenous population and its highest elevation is three and a half feet.

What makes Diego Garcia important? It does not sit astride any major trade routes. It is not a tourist paradise. Nor is it rich in manganese, oil or any other commodity in short supply. It is a British-controlled speck in a vast ocean, used by the United States military for minor communications and refueling.

But ask almost any literate Asian from Bombay to Melbourne about United States plans for Diego Garcia and the response will be quick and sharp: It is the island that is proposed as the site of a large new American naval and air base, with nuclear implications.

What purpose will this new base serve? Is it related to the re-opening of the Suez Canal, which the United States supports and is assisting? If so, how? Does it provide security should a major war break out? Hardly, since it could be obliterated by one small nuclear weapon. Would it be useful in the event of another so-called brush-fire war in the area? If it would, what kind of "limited" military participation does Washington have in mind? If, finally, through this move the United States expects to outflank the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean area, we must expect that any such activity would bring about a Soviet response, at least tit for tat.

Whatever America's rationalization, Diego Garcia has come to symbolize the most recent example of needless American interference in Asia. For Asians, Diego Garcia is not a minor upgrading of a remote military base for passive purposes. It is a new incursion by America into waters it does not need and cannot protect, a move whose cost-benefit ratio is negligible, in an area where its armed forces have become even more unwelcome.

Opposition to the move in Diego Garcia—action on a Nixon Administration request for \$29 million for the project has been delayed by a Senate committee—is not limited to unfriendly or neutral countries.

Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Indonesia have warned that it is a bad idea. In South Asia, Diego Garcia brings back memories of 1971, when the carrier Enterprise steamed up the Bay of Bengal to Chittagong at a critical moment in East Pakistan's struggle for independence from Pakistan, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. Visions of gunboat diplomacy die hard.

In India, the timing could not be worse. Just when it seemed Indian-American relations were at long last beginning to move off dead center, when friendly gestures were beginning to be made on both sides, along came Diego Garcia to provide a rallying point for those who would like to perpetuate the chill.

If we intend to frighten the Russians or others out of the Indian Ocean it is a laughable gesture. If we intend to demonstrate our continued interest in Asia by setting up shop on Asian "turf" we should think hard about our past experience in such Asian ventures.

Increasing Diego Garcia's importance was first discussed in the late nineteen-sixties. Undoubtedly somewhere in the arcane depths of our military Establishment the notion of an upgraded Diego Garcia never died. While such a move might appeal to those who receive satisfaction from a show of American power, the political and psychological consequences—if they were contemplated at all—were surely underestimated.

An expanded air and navy base on Diego Garcia is not likely to become a burning issue in the United States. But Diego Garcia is a burning issue in Asia. It should not be, and need not be, especially since there are so many valid reasons why improved United States relations with this part of the world are critically important both to us and to Asia. There is still time to re-evaluate our plans for Diego Garcia.

Chester Bowles has served as Ambassador to India.

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# Africa

THE WASHINGTON POST

Sunday, May 12, 1974

## South Africa Seeks U.S. Support

By David B. Ottaway  
Washington Post Staff Writer

South Africa has mounted a major behind-the-scenes campaign to convince the U.S. government of its strategic importance, provoking complaints of "back-door" diplomacy among black American political leaders and even some State Department officials.

Located on the southern tip of Africa, the white-ruled nation astride the Indian Ocean oil lanes from the Persian Gulf is inviting the U.S. Navy to use South African ports and to coordinate strategy to counter the growing Soviet presence in the area, knowledgeable diplomat's say.

The South African campaign is aimed at overturning an 11-year-old U.S. embargo on arms sales to South Africa and a prohibition on visits by American naval ships to its ports. But the South Africans apparently hope to get much more, namely U.S. support for its defense against nationalist movement seeking to overthrow the white governments of southern Africa.

The campaign, which already shows signs of considerable success, has far-reaching implications for U.S. policy in the Indian Ocean and toward black Africa. Its American supporters, with naval strategists and those concerned about Soviet expansionism in controlled Mozambique offer the forefront, argue that South Africa and Portuguese—some of the best air and naval bases available to the United States in the Indian Ocean.

But its opponents, black and church groups particularly, warn that overt U.S. support of South Africa would be disastrous to the American position in black Africa.

The intensive lobbying effort comes at a time when the independence of Portugal's African colonies, which have long served as buffers for South Africa against African guerrilla incursions, is openly being discussed in Lisbon following the recent coup there.

In the past few months, two ranking South African officials have come here on "private visits" and made numerous contacts with high-level U.S. government officials. Several others, including the foreign and finance minis-

ters, are making trips to the United States this month, speaking to private groups.

The Washington visit last week of Adm. Hugo H. Biermann, commander in chief of the South African defense forces, has resulted in a diplomatic and congressional flap about his visa and his subsequent visit Tuesday to the Pentagon office of Acting Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf.

Rep. Charles E. Diggs (D-Mich.), black America's pro-African lobby, the Washington Office on Africa; various church groups and a number of African diplomats stationed at the United Nations got wind of the low-key Biermann visit and have spoken out against it.

Biermann, who publicly has advocated a U.S.-South African military alliance, first was refused a visa by the State Department, according to Sen. Harry F. Byrd, Jr. (Ind.-Va.). The senator said Monday that only after he protested to the department was the visa finally issued.

State Department sources said the visa was granted after Biermann assured the U.S. embassy in South Africa that "he would make no official contacts" while in Washington and after officials "at the highest level" ordered it.

Tuesday, the South African admiral called at Middendorf's office for what a Pentagon official described as an "informal and personal visit."

"We sure didn't consider it an official visit," said a spokesman for Middendorf. He said that Biermann and the acting secretary had talked only about a mutual friend and that Middendorf was not aware of the conditions under which Biermann's visa was issued.

A State Department spokesman later said: "We are very disturbed about this because we feel it violates the understanding we had" with Biermann. He said the department would take up the issue with the Pentagon.

Biermann, invited here by the Washington-based United States Strategic Institute, has followed the pattern of previous South African officials in bypassing both his own embassy and the State Department. Instead, he has been seeing congressmen and other

government and military officials friendly to the South African cause at informal gatherings.

One dinner, given by Rep. Robert E. Bauman (R-Md.) in honor of the admiral, is said to have included 17 U.S. admirals. Asked about the dinner,

the congressman's secretary said, "I am not allowed to comment on it."

This "backdoor diplomacy" policy reportedly was devised by Eschel Rhodie, an advisor to Connie P. Mulder, the powerful South African interior and information minister widely regarded as the probable successor to Prime Minister John Vorster. The policy was initiated by Mulder himself in January when he made a two-week unofficial visit to the United States.

During his stay, Mulder saw an impressive array of American leaders, including Vice President Gerald Ford, Senate minority leader Hugh Scott, Senate minority whip Robert Griffin, House majority leader Tip O'Neill and several other influential House and Senate members.

He also is reported to have met with Vice Admiral Ray Peet, deputy assistant secretary in the office of the assistant secretary of defense for international security, which has responsibility for planning strategy in the Indian Ocean.

Adm. Biermann has been seeking to promote greater U.S. interest in South Africa, pointing out its valuable location for any Western defense of the oil lanes to the Persian Gulf in the face of the Soviet naval buildup in the Indian Ocean.

In an interview published in Newsweek's international edition Nov. 26, the South African military leader argued that the Cape of Good Hope oil route was endangered both by Soviet warships and Communist-armed guerrillas in white-ruled Rhodesia and the Portuguese overseas territories of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau.

Biermann argued that the South African system of apartheid—strict racial separation—should not be regarded as a stumbling block to U.S.-South African cooperation. "After all," he said, "the United States would not be creating a precedent by entering into a military alliance with a nation whose internal policies it did not approve of."

As the Soviet naval buildup in the Indian Ocean causes integrists, South Africa appears to be winning more allies for its arguments, particularly in Congress and at the Pentagon.

The U.S. Navy now is hard put to maintain more than a token presence in the Indian Ocean partly because of a

shortage of suitable port facilities there. The government is negotiating with Britain to obtain use of facilities on Diego Garcia, and island south of India, but the new Labor government has said it wants to reconsider the deal.

The South African naval base at Simonstown at the Cape of Good Hope is regarded as one of the best in the entire Indian Ocean area, but the Johnson administration ordered a halt in 1967 to U.S. naval ships calling there. The U.S. embargo on arms sales to South Africa dates back to 1963.

The U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration still has a tracking station there, but it is being phased out over the next two years. There also is the terminal station for the South Atlantic missile testing range, now in a "relatively inactive status," according to State Department sources.

"None of them have anything to do with the Indian Ocean or tracking Soviet vessels there," said one department official.

Despite South Africa's enhanced value as a result of the burgeoning East-West rivalry in the Indian Ocean, the Pentagon strongly denies reports that the NATO command has drawn up secret contingency plans for possible air and naval defense of that country.

According to one recent report, NATO's defense planning committee in June 1973 instructed the alliance's Atlantic headquarters in Norfolk, Va., to study the possibility that an allied task force could assist South Africa in an emergency. But the Defense Department insists there are no NATO instructions "for any such planning" in the case of either South Africa or "any other country in southern Africa."

The Pentagon said that "it supports neither side in the disputes between Portugal and the African nationalist movements in its territories."

But there is growing concern among State Department African affairs specialists over the possible erosion of this official policy in the face of the South African offensive here and demands Portugal has made on Washington.

Portugal, under the now ousted Caetano government, asked the United States to lift its embargo on the sale of arms destined for use in the African colonies. It also asked for U.S. diplomatic support at the United Nations for its African policies in return for continued American use of Portuguese bases on the mid-Atlantic Azores Islands.



# Far East

BALTIMORE SUN  
8 May 1974

## All guns, no butter make Saigon desperate

By MICHAEL PARKS  
Sun Staff Correspondent

Saigon—A new scenario for disaster is being written in South Vietnam. Now, as American aid is greatly diminished, the threat is potentially far more serious than it has been for a decade.

An experienced European ambassador commented, "Almost everyone here, Vietnamese and foreigners alike, perceives disaster about two or three years in the future when the South has lost its desire, and even ability to fight because of economic, political and eventually military collapse."

Virtually the only upbeat assessments in South Vietnam today are those coming out of the American Embassy. Officials there fear that any pessimistic accounts will further discourage a reluctant Congress from shoring up the Thieu government with more money—thus setting into motion forces that would lead to the government's collapse.

Yet even within the embassy there are many who not only acknowledge the validity of a disaster scenario, but some who also give fairly high odds on its being played out this time.

The most common scenario now is further deterioration of the economic situation leading to widespread political unrest.

"If the economic situation grows much worse," a former Thieu Cabinet minister said recently, "the morale of the armed forces will drop so low that they will not be able or willing to fight."

### Economic pessimism

The current cause for this  
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
10 May 1974

general pessimism is the economic situation.

Prices have risen 25 per cent so far, this year on top of the 67 per cent increase last year. Twenty per cent of the work force is unemployed.

Rice for a family of four now costs so much that it takes up the entire pay of most workers despite heavy government subsidies that keep prices at half those of the world market. Kerosene now costs so much that the urban poor in the cities have begun peeling the bark off trees for cooking fuel.

In the northern part of South Vietnam, people are dying of starvation because speculative rice hoarding has made this basic food too expensive to buy.

Even in the Mekong Delta, which in good years produced enough rice to feed all of Vietnam with a surplus for export, there are food shortages in the towns and a serious economic squeeze on farmers who no longer can get the fertilizer, insecticides and imported irrigation equipment they need to cultivate the high-yielding miracle rice introduced by the United States.

South Vietnam's basic problem is that the country still is so occupied with war—its Army of 1.1 million men is almost a fifth of the labor force—that it produces virtually nothing.

Its exports are only a tenth of its imports, and the foreign exchange it used to receive from the United States directly or indirectly has been sharply cut back. Saigon has been hurt further by the increases in world prices for petroleum products.

### Few if any solution

The government confesses it has no solutions beyond auster-

ity, seeking American assistance and hoping that foreign investment will increase.

There has in fact been little political translation of the economic deterioration—no strikes, no food riots, no demonstrations, no protests of any significance.

Most Vietnamese politicians, both supporters and critics of President Nguyen Van Thieu, said they feel that the political scene will not remain quiet much longer.

"A man who is starving does not much care what kind of government he has as long as he can eat," a Thieu supporter in the South Vietnamese Senate said. "There will be strikes, demonstrations, riots and so forth by year's end—six months from now."

This is also the assessment of President Thieu's security officials, who won permission to tighten controls recently on political activities, particularly in the cities.

A new surveillance system, for example, now is going into effect in Saigon, whose mayor, Brig. Gen. Do Kien Nhieu, told the capital's residents:

"The police will be watching each of you closely. We will know who does what, how many wives and children you have, what you do to earn your living, where you purchase or obtain your rice—anything you do, any motion you make will be watched, recorded and, if necessary, straightened out."

### No peace, no war

One South Vietnamese senator forecasts that there would be no Communist offensive for four or five years, just a period of no peace, no war, as President Thieu calls it.

"Another offensive would

## town

change everything," he said. "Economically, for instance, we still have not recovered from 1972. Any serious military reversal would greatly damage our political stability."

President Thieu's government repeatedly has predicted a general offensive this spring, but one analyst noted that "there has been no historical correlation between a buildup and an actual offensive."

He added that he believes the Communists have decided to take no chances and to raise their military capability in the South to its highest level ever before beginning reconstruction programs in North Vietnam and "liberated zones" in the South.

South Vietnamese and American officials now estimate that there are 220,000 to 240,000 North Vietnamese combat and support troops in South Vietnam and adjacent border areas of North Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. This compares with an estimated 145,000 when the Paris agreement was signed 15 months ago.

Viet Cong forces now are estimated to number about 80,000, a 10,000 man increase, with half of them in guerrilla units and the balance political officers.

This means, Saigon officials said, that there are more Communist troops in the South now with more tanks (between 450 and 600), more long-range artillery (about 200 of the 130-mm. Soviet-made field guns) and more anti-aircraft artillery and missiles than before the 1972 offensive.

By Dana Adams Schmidt  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

### Washington

The Defense Department is taking a restrained view of the cut in military aid funds for South Vietnam imposed by the U.S. Senate.

Nonetheless, the White House said this week the cuts could upset the military equilibrium in Southeast

### Asia.

The Senate voted, 43 to 38, to adopt an amendment by U.S. Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D) of Massachusetts to maintain the present ceiling of \$1.12 billion in military aid for the fiscal year that ends June 30.

The Nixon administration had wanted an extra \$256 million for the last two months in this fiscal year.

According to White House deputy press secretary Gerald L. Warren,

the Senate vote would raise questions about the reliability of American commitments. He said the South Vietnamese would be left without the resources needed to stand up to pressures from 120,000 men illegally introduced into South Vietnam by the North Vietnamese.

### Friedheim comments

But in response to questions later, Defense Department spokesman



Jerry W. Friedheim said only that by withholding requested funds the Senate would "at some point cause a bubble

in the pipeline and some reduction in the rate of deliveries."

But there would "not necessarily be any immediate effect" and "the logisticians will have the task of trying to reapportion the available supplies."

The department's spokesman made light of an allegation by Sen. J. William Fulbright (D) of Arkansas,

chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who has accused the Pentagon of slipping a \$400-million item which might be used for Vietnam into the budget under the guise of "war reserve materials."

### Fulbright's interpretation

According to the Senator, the budget did not indicate that these funds could be spent on military supplies for South Vietnam. They could, as he said he understood it, be used at the

Pentagon's discretion anywhere in the world.

Mr. Friedheim maintained, however, that this fund had been in the budget for three years, and its presence simply had been overlooked by the Senator and his aides.

The purpose of the fund was to give the United States a logistical cushion so that when an emergency arose it would not be necessary to draw on existing units in order to send ammunition or other equipment to allies. "There is no plan now," Mr. Friedheim said, "to use anything from this fund for Vietnam as far as I know."

BALTIMORE SUN  
6 May 1974

## Aid campaign reveals Saigon's weakness

By MICHAEL PARKS  
Sun Staff Correspondent

Saigon—With Congress trimming American aid to South Vietnam every chance it has, the government of President Nguyen Van Thieu and the American Embassy here have launched propaganda campaigns to reverse the cutbacks.

The stakes are high—the Nixon administration is asking Congress to appropriate \$2.4 billion in economic and military aid in the coming year—and the campaigns may well backfire by reviving protests against American involvement in Indochina and Washington's backing of General Thieu.

Graham A. Martin, the American ambassador in Saigon, has made himself the focus of controversy, much to the displeasure of the State Department in Washington, in his public efforts to more than double U.S. economic assistance here next year.

The Saigon government is playing up all the battles it loses, even contriving to lose some for international political impact, and is forecasting a major Communist offensive within a few weeks.

The embassy and government efforts pose several difficult questions about the current situation here, how much aid Saigon really needs and how long it will need it.

If South Vietnamese armed forces have improved so greatly since American withdrawal a year ago, how can the threat of a Communist takeover in one final, big offensive be real?

If the economy is ready to take off with rapid industrialization, as Ambassador Martin contends, why will the appropriation of just minimal amounts of economic aid, as Congress did last year, lead to economic, and possibly political, collapse here?

If President Thieu is so truly popular, as senior American officials contend, what does he have to fear from economic difficulties and a reduction of aid to the minimum—can he not simply "tough it out," as one American congressman suggested?

Senior American officials here explain away the apparent contradictions, which on their face would suggest that Saigon's dependence on American assistance is still so absolute that any diminution would lead to a major crisis in South Vietnam.

"The questions are not valid because this is not a black-and-white situation, but movement along a continuum," a ranking embassy officer said.

### Holding one's own

"It is a question of moving forward toward eventual independence, holding one's own on the brink here or slipping back. We need a lot more aid to move forward, perhaps a 50 per cent increase to hold our own. The current level is patently insufficient, in our opinion,

to prevent a crisis, possibly a collapse of the political-economic structure and even a Communist military takeover.

The aid proposal the Nixon administration submitted to Congress last month calls for \$750 million in economic assistance, more than doubling this year's \$354 million. This does not include military aid, which could run to \$1.8 billion, and food shipments that also underwrite the Saigon government budget and will range upward from \$300 million.

These figures are less than a private World Bank estimate, however, that Saigon will need economic assistance alone of about \$1 billion a year for the next five years, gradually tapering

to \$450 million in 1990. The 15-year total: at least \$11 billion.

Mr. Martin hopes to sell the increased aid as a two-year program, after which the American contribution would be cut to normal aid levels for a developing country. Two or three years of economic aid of more than \$700 million, he has said, will lead to rapid industrialization of South Vietnam and an economic takeoff like that of Taiwan and South Korea.

Economists and businessmen here, both Vietnamese and foreign, regard this as a will-o-the-wisp scheme as dangerous to the Thieu government as it is economically unsound.

They noted that neither South Korea nor Taiwan was fighting a guerrilla war when each began its fast-paced development, and that the United States is not militarily committed to South Vietnam's defense the way it was to Seoul's and Taipei's.

A respected South Vietnamese economist, a former Cabinet minister, raised another objection, which was echoed by a number of other Vietnamese. "This whole Martin theory of an economic takeoff is based on the trickle-down theory," he said. "He assumes that big capital investments will pump enough money into the economy for a boom with the profits and benefits trickling down to every worker to guarantee their political support," he said.

"But all our experience shows that such programs basically help the little guy only marginally, that the very rich just get richer. Even if everything worked well, it would be five to eight years before there was real growth in production and not just construction."

Saigon officials are worried that the Martin plan may backfire on them. "If he continues to tell Congress that we only need aid for two years

and then we are all set, he is going to leave us high and dry in 1976," one Thieu aide said. "We feel the United States has a much larger, more long-term commitment. Frankly, this economic takeoff theory is illusory."

Many observers get a similar feeling of unreality in other embassy assessments, which often seem to be word-for-word repetitions of the optimistic appraisals of the 1960's.

"I know the phrase has a bad connotation," a senior embassy official said. "We think we can see the light at the end of the tunnel."

American military analysts rate the South Vietnamese armed forces' fighting capability quite highly—and in the next sentence warn that a Communist force a fifth the size of Saigon's can launch a devastating offensive at any time.

### Communists held at bay

They then cautiously proceed to argue, on the other hand, that the South Vietnamese are successfully holding the Communists at bay, that because there has been no offensive the Communists are weak and that the Saigon forces can hold their own in big clashes as well as they have in small ones.

American officials take a perverse sort of pride in the way President Thieu has outmaneuvered all his opposition, putting them in tame opposition parties and rewriting the Constitution to give himself another term.

What most longtime observers here regard as the public's political acquiescence to President Thieu's rule is read by the embassy's ranking officials as "the active and indisputable support of at least 95 per cent of the people," in the words of one senior official.

American officials cite the lack of strikes, demonstrations and riots despite increasingly

critical economic problems as evidence of the government stability without mentioning recent orders to tighten police surveillance to prevent such outbreaks.

They cite the continuing flow of refugees from contested areas to the government side as evidence of Saigon's popularity but ignore the heavy artill-

ery and air bombardment of these areas by Saigon forces, the historical motivation for the majority of refugee movements.

BALTIMORE SUN  
10 May 1974

# Drab Hanoi rebuilds; bustling, glittering Saigon despairs

By MICHAEL PARKS  
Sun Staff Correspondent

Singapore — In Saigon the girls wore brightly colored aodais, the graceful Vietnamese national dress. The streets bustled with cars, trucks and motorbikes. Shop windows were full of imported consumer goods.

The girls in Hanoi were dressed in old, often patched work clothes modeled after military uniforms. Bicycles, some 30 years old, outnumbered cars and trucks by 500 to 1. Shop windows held little to attract attention.

The contrast between the two Vietnamese capitals on recent visits was sharp — an Asian version of the bright lights of West Berlin versus the drab conformity and poverty of the socialist East.

But in Vietnam these outward appearances were misleading. They failed to reflect the mood of either capital.

Hanoi's mood today is one of optimism. Soldiers are coming home from the war for the first time in many years. The country is caught up in an energetic reconstruction campaign. There is more food available now than in most of the past decade.

The people remain determined to win a struggle begun almost a generation ago, but most see it coming to a successful end.

In Saigon there is widespread pessimism and, increasingly, despair. Young men of 18 still are drafted into the Army for the next 27 years of their lives; there has been no demobilization; Saigon's back streets are filled everyday with funeral processions, not the homecoming parties of Hanoi.

Reconstruction is at a minimum. There is enough food but people die of starvation because the cost has become so high.

"The South Vietnamese are having their living standards reduced to the level of those in the North, and it is a very painful adjustment," an American economist in Saigon said.

Because of considerably

greater foreign economic aid in the South and Northern emphasis on heavy industry in economic development, the average Saigon family will probably continue to live better than the average Hanoi family for several more years in terms of quantity and quality of food, housing and clothing.

The North Vietnamese acknowledge a substantial difference in living standards between North and South, but place it in a different perspective. "The South's prosperity is bought entirely with American money," a North Vietnamese official said in Hanoi.

"We, too, have had help—from the Soviet Union, from China, from other socialist countries and many friends around the world—but the scale is of an entirely different magnitude."

One of the most substantial differences between living conditions in North and South Vietnam is the large and still growing gap between rich and poor in the South compared with a relatively uniform level of poverty in the North.

The war, American aid and economic speculation have made a number of men very rich in South Vietnam, but 87 per cent of the country's 20 million people now must live on a subsistence income or less, according to a just-prepared secret South Vietnamese government report.

The North, too, has a privileged elite—government and Vietnam Workers party officials—who receive preference in housing allocations, supplemental rations, goods from special stores and moderately higher pay.

But even this elite rides to work on bicycles, shunning chauffeur-driven official cars that are de rigueur in Saigon. Their homes and clothes in fact appear little better than those of ordinary workers.

"No one has made money from the war here in the North," one Army officer said. "We are all equally poor."

Hanoi and Saigon have different life styles reflecting in some measure their different social systems and separate development over the past 20 years.

Hanoi is probably Asia's quietest capital, and life is slower and far more disciplined than in Saigon, where there are many bars, brothels, beggars and black markets.

## Housing shortages

There are acute housing shortages in both capitals, and it is hard to say where the situation is worse.

Both countries are seriously concerned now by postwar social ills, particularly crime and corruption. But their problems are of entirely different orders of magnitude.

Asked for an example of major corruption in Hanoi, a North Vietnamese official replied, "Bureaucrats taking a bribe to put a person's name high on the list for new apartments." The likely bribe: About \$13.

A South Vietnamese Cabinet minister answered the same question this way: "The biggest single bribe I know about recently was paid by the wife of a general for a special import license—\$85,000."

Although crimes of violence are reported on the increase in Hanoi, there is no comparison with the robberies, assaults and murders that became commonplace in South Vietnamese cities several years ago and are multiplying as the economic situation worsens.

## Units of 30 families

A surprise to a Western visitor to Hanoi is the small number of policemen on the streets, even directing traffic. Saigon and most European Communist capitals have many more.

Hanoi authorities, of course, have other ways to monitor the activities of citizens, and Saigon now is adopting one of

them—division of the city into units of about 30 families to be watched over by one policeman or security agent.

A major difference in life between the two Vietnams is the way in which young men go into the Army.

In the South, barring a student deferment, a large bribe or both, they are conscripted at the age of 18 and are moved to the reserves when they are 45.

In the North, there is no conscription as such—the recruits all volunteer at a series of rallies where social and political pressure is used on them, their parents and neighbors. The same approach is apparently used with deserters. As for those who just refuse to go—and there reportedly have been a number in Catholic regions—they stay home and work.

Each central government now is trying to refashion its system for controlling the countryside—a centuries-old issue in Vietnam.

Hanoi will continue to use the Vietnam Workers party, which is the Communist party in North Vietnam, to give political direction to local officials, who are elected.

Saigon, however, is replacing its elected local officials with Army officers, thus virtually writing off any sort of democratic government as an unneeded luxury in wartime.

On paper, Saigon still has a wide diversity of political opinion. In practice, the opposition parties have been reduced to a token force with little more effective power than non-Communist groups have in North Vietnam.

The spiritual fatigue in the South is such now that few people care, and the fundamental weakness on the Saigon side remains as it has for years: The Communists are well organized, disciplined and motivated, while the non-Communists are relatively lazy, disorganized, corrupt and given to bitter intramural quarrels.

WASHINGTON STAR

8 MAY 1974

**PACT OBSERVED****U.S. Quitting  
Laos Quietly**By Tammy Arbuckle  
Star-News Special Correspondent

VIENTIANE — The withdrawal of American military personnel and Thai irregular troops under U.S. command from Laos is being carried out under considerable secrecy, a high-ranking U.S. Embassy official has admitted here.

The official said the pull-out is being conducted as quietly as possible and no publicity was wanted. He refused to disclose how many Americans or Thais had already left.

The reason for this ultra-quiet withdrawal, according to the official, was, "The North Vietnamese withdrawal is not going to be observed, so why should there be observers of our withdrawal or the Thais withdrawal?"

ALL FOREIGN troops in Laos are supposed to be moved out of the country within 60 days of formation of a Laos coalition government under the Laos cease-

fire accords and protocols. The coalition government was formed April 5 which means all foreign forces should be gone by June 4.

U.S. officials say all Americans and Thais would be gone by that date, and probably several days before it. He expects everybody will be out by the last days of May.

Informed sources said areas of this side will be open for inspection "and nobody will be able to find a single Thai or American."

At the height of the Lao war, there were 227 U.S. Army and Air Force personnel, 275 civilian pilots and about 50 CIA members involved. There were 17,700 Thai irregulars.

IN NORTHERN LAOS there were about 10,000 North Vietnamese and another 15,000 NVA at most in South Laos actually involved in combat.

The departure of the CIA personnel is now virtually complete, informed sources

say. American military personnel are expected to be down to 30 persons by June 4. These 30 being allowed to stay under the terms of the Laos protocol, and they are to be listed on the diplomatic roll.

At last count in April there were 185 U.S. military here. Some are still in field posts. Most of the civilian pilots have left.

Of the Thais, there were just over 4,000 in April. The United States is responsible for flying them back to Thailand.

There has been no real sign of any withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from Laos yet.

"There was an ooze back a few months ago," a well-informed source said, "but it was mostly logistic types. There has been nothing recently."

In South Laos, the North Vietnamese have turned east toward South Vietnam away from the Lao and the Mekong Valley, although they still hold these positions.

THE BELIEF now exists that Hanoi troops simply will not withdraw. Pro-Communist Pathet Lao officials continue to deny their presence in Laos, although

reporters have seen their dead and wounded in Laos combat.

Lao officials say there is no sign of Hanoi being willing to take back 150 North Vietnamese prisoners of war held in a prison outside Vientiane. North Vietnamese dismiss them as local hoodlums rounded up by the Lao for prisoners' roles, but this correspondent saw some of them being captured.

After the Paris peace agreements of 1973, U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger made it clear that the United States expected Hanoi's troops to withdraw from the Laos Ho Chi Minh Trail and the rest of the country. American officials decline to speculate on what U.S. reaction would be if Hanoi fails to comply. The quiet withdrawal, however, could lead to problems for Americans.

The Communist leader and foreign minister in the Laos coalition, Phoumi Vongvichit, has expressed doubts that any U.S. pullout is taking place and it is possible the Communists may claim there has been no withdrawal at all or an incomplete withdrawal to camouflage NVA failure to quit the country.

NEW YORK TIMES

9 May 1974

**U.S. STOCKS ARMS  
FOR ASIAN ALLIES**

Without Clearly Informing  
Congress, Pentagon Has  
Built Up a Reserve

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 8—

Without ever clearly informing Congress, the Defense Department has been building a \$1-billion stockpile of weapons and military equipment to turn over to Asian allies in event of war.

The Defense Department acknowledged in a statement today that there was a weapons stockpile for South Korea, South Vietnam and Thailand. The existence of the stockpile was first disclosed last Sunday by Sen. J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator Fulbright, in a statement issued in Arkansas, ac-

cused the Pentagon of concealing the existence of the stockpile in the over-all Defense budget and said that the action was "typical of the way the executive branch tries to get around Congressional cuts" in arms aid. The Senator also questioned the legality of buying military equipment for foreign forces with funds other than those specifically provided by Congress for military aid.

**A Search for Testimony**

The Pentagon spokesman, Jerry W. Friedheim, insisted that the stockpile was "well known" to Congress and argued that Congressional approval of funds for the stockpile over the last two years demonstrated it was not a "hidden program." After two days of research, however, the Defense Department was unable to provide any testimony showing where it had explained the stockpile to Congressional committees.

The only statement the Pentagon could immediately point to was one made by Thomas H. Moorer, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his annual report to Congress earlier this year.

Nothing that the war reserves of United States forces had been seriously depleted by

the resupply of Israel during last fall's war, the admiral said: "We anticipate establishing a stock of munitions and equipment base in the continental United States which can be used to support allies under emergency conditions."

The Moorer statement made no reference to a stockpile already established for the three Asian nations, with some of the equipment stored in the western Pacific. In response to press inquiries, the Defense Department said that funding for what is officially known as "war reserve stocks, allies" went back to the fiscal year 1952.

A total of less than \$25-million was included in the 1952 budget when the stockpile concept was initiated. Last year's budget, according to the Pentagon, contained \$500-million for this, and it said \$400-million was being included in the Defense budget for the coming fiscal year, now being considered by Congress.

**What Budget Shows**

Funds for the stockpile are included under a general heading, "support of other nations," and the item totals \$2.2-billion in the new budget. The President's budget message, as well

as back-up materials supplied to Congress by the Defense Department, describes this program as including support for South Vietnam forces as well as the costs of international military headquarters and military aid missions abroad.

At no point does the budget material say that one fifth of the budget item would go to build up a stockpile for Asian allies. A footnote in the President's budget message says that the \$2.2-billion request for "support of other nations" excludes military assistance and military sales programs, which total \$1.9-billion.

Both South Korea and Thailand are supported through the military assistance programs. Military aid to South Vietnam is provided through the program of "support to other nations."

Apparently proceeding on the assumption that it was authorizing military aid for South Vietnam, Congress last year approved the "support to other nations" item without inquiring what else might be included. Nor does it appear that the Defense Department ever put on the public record what else was included.

The funding for the stock-

for the Asian nations was discovered when Norvill Jones, a staff consultant on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote the Pentagon asking for a breakdown of the \$2.2-billion. Back came the infor-

mation that \$490-million was for buying equipment for "contingency use" by South Korea, South Vietnam and Thailand.

**The Stockpile Concept**

According to Pentagon offi-

als, the stockpile consists of ammunition, trucks, tanks, radios, spare parts and other types of equipment that would be expended or lost in the early stages of a war.

The Defense Department has

additionally maintained war reserves to support United States forces once committed to combat, but it has now gone a step further in establishing additional reserves that could be used by Asian allies.

**Washington Star-News**

Friday, May 3, 1974

# U.S. Renews Controversial Program for Laos

By Tammy Arbuckle

Star-News Special Correspondent

**VIENTIANE — U.S.** Ambassador Charles Whitehouse and Lao Foreign Affairs Minister Phoumi Vongvichit have signed the Foreign Exchange Operations Fund (FEOF) agreement to continue for an 11th year what diplomats here describe as a "scandal-riddled" program.

The agreement calls for a contribution by the United States of \$16.1 million. The lion's share of a total of over \$27 million. The remainder of which is put up by Britain, Australia, Japan and France to back the economically worthless kip. Theoretically the plan is to get the Lao economy going as part of a political effort to prevent a Communist takeover.

The United States puts an additional \$14 million dollars into the fund through the Agency for International Development (AID) financing to make a total U.S. contribution of \$17.5 million for this calendar year.

A U.S. official here described the signing as a "conditional commitment" by the United States because the \$17.5 million is part of \$939.8 million dollars for Indochina, which President Nixon asked for on April 24 in his foreign aid bill message to Congress. The money for FEOF, therefore, has yet to be appropriated by Congress.

**IT CAME AS NO** surprise to informed diplomats that Phoumi Vongvichit signed the agreement without complaint, although, besides being foreign minister in the coalition government, he is secretary general of the Communist Lao Peoples party Central Committee, the 4th ranked Communist in Laos, and as recently as April 22 was lambasting the "U.S. imperialists."

Far from attaining its objectives, the FEOF is a contributing instrument, whose effects will give the pro-Communist Pathet Lao more votes in the Mekong Valley, the most populous part of Laos, and help bring

them to power legally if Lao elections take place.

For the fund has made possible a display of luxury goods here in Vientiane, which are quite unattainable by the majority of the Lao population. It has created a small group of very rich Lao and Chinese, the corruption of many of whom is rather noticeable. The Communist cadre and troops numbering close on 2,000 who came here as part of the Laos cease-fire agreements have only to point their fingers and tell the population "look."

The FEOF program provides Laos with dollars to bring in imports, which the country cannot pay for itself, because of its own very small export earnings.

**AT THE SAME** time, the dollar is used to back the kip and "stabilize" it at a steady rate to help development. It might have worked if the imports had been severely restricted to the smallest possible list of absolutely essential commodities, which a country in the earliest stages of development needs.

But U.S. officials made the error of tying the program to politics of support for their rightist allies. The U.S. was supporting a rightist elite against the North Vietnamese supported Pathet Lao and the building of an economy that would give the rightists support became the order of the day.

"The larger Laos economy was lost sight of," diplomats said. Vientiane has now become a city-state with an economy of its own, unrelated to the rest of Laos. Vientiane's economy is not even related to the lives and income of most of its citizens.

The imports, which FEOF dollars bring in, include Mercedes-Benz cars, radios, hi-fi equipment, whiskey, television sets, choco-

late biscuits and other luxury items.

No ordinary Lao can afford to buy these.

It is all purchased by the large foreign diplomatic community, by Thais from across the Mekong River, because the goods are cheaper than in Thailand; and by the Chinese and relatively small number of Lao who are involved in the money merry-go-round of FEOF imports.

By contrast the average Lao in his wooden house in Vientiane's suburbs earns about \$15 dollars a month.

Asked about the American aid, the stock answer is, "Oh, the Americans bring things from themselves to buy, not for us."

Unmed milk, for example, is one item brought in at a subsidized two-tier rate under the FEOF system. A can of condensed milk in Vientiane costs double its purchase price in neighboring Thailand a thousand yards away across the Mekong.

The reason is that a company somewhat ironically named the Laos Development Corp., which has a Lao general, Amkha Soukhavong, as its alleged front man, has the condensed milk monopoly. This monopoly was granted over the objections of Lao finance minister.

**THE MILK** frequently disappears from shops soon after its arrival, part of a hoarding and price-raising operation, certainly doing nothing to develop Laos nor endear the poorer Lao to FEOF.

Nor is AID likely to do anything about this practice.

Well informed sources said AID Director Charles Mann had specifically warned U.S. officials against attempts to unearth corruption in public. And, in at least one case, he had laid a complaint

against a diplomat from a FEOF contributing nation who had unearthed evidence of corruption involving FEOF funds.

The embassy concerned confirmed this allegation.

"U.S. AID is so scared of rocking its boat here," one source said, trying to explain AID cover-up of official corruption involving U.S. funds. The ordinary Lao sees all the corruption, the hoarding. The trucks moving goods out of sight after they arrive, the pay-offs to customs officials. He is faced with a dazzling array of goods, which he can never hope to buy, watches the foreigners having a good time living in large villas driving nice cars, buying in the shops, etc.

Naturally, there is social unrest caused by all this, a situation of which the Communists are not slow to take advantage. They promise cheaper food, a better life and point to the cars, goods, and corruption all over Vientiane. They say officials are unwilling to make changes.

"It was a political game. Now they are stuck with it," one diplomat said.

U.S. officials fear that if Vientiane's private money-making economy is dismantled by ending FEOF, then those who benefit — the U.S. rightist allies — will pull a coup or start assassination of the Communists sparking a bloody battle and collapse of the political accommodations that have been made.

Diplomats say, however, they think this will be the last year, when the rightist elite working with Chinese businessmen, will make big financial killings.

"The Pathet Lao are going to clip their wings," diplomats say, pointing to Pathet Lao officials moving into ministries, particularly the Finance Ministry, quiet-

ly investigating the wheeling and dealing.

To cover up FEOF's nature as a political payoff, AID officials can produce wonderful statistics to show Congress why the program is so necessary.

They will say it's essential to bring in fuel for trucks to develop the economy by providing good transport. In actual fact, there are relatively few trucks and even fewer roads on which to drive them in Laos. Most of the \$2 million

worth of fuel FEOF helps to bring in is for private cars, which drive around and around this small capital and motorcycles for teen-aged sons of rich Chinese and Lao officials.

APART FROM the unnecessary nature of the imports, FEOF pays for to come into Laos, and the false economy of little benefit to the average Lao, diplomats have another complaint. The dollars brought into the country through

FEOF wind up very quickly in Hong Kong accounts of an estimated 800 Chinese businesses and in some Lao-held European bank accounts. The money does not stay in Laos as investment capital to stimulate an economy.

The Lao government buys the FEOF dollars at 600 kip to a dollar, then sells the dollar at 840 kip to the dollar to anybody from the bonafide importer to John Q. Public.

AID officials claim it has

to be done this way to keep Vientiane's businessmen confident in the kip.

"It's crazy," one diplomat said. "This must be the only country in the world outside the United States itself, where anybody can just walk into the bank and buy dollars. The importers take dollars, make their kip profit on the goods they brought in, transfer it back to dollars and send them off by personal courier to the Hong Kong bank on the weekly commercial Hong Kong-Vientiane flight.

BALTIMORE SUN

15 May 1974

## Korean student democrats fear Park

By MATTHEW J. SEIDEN  
Sun Staff Correspondent

Seoul—"You've read about life in police states, one student said." Now you can see for yourself what it's like."

The students talked quickly and quietly, constantly looking over their shoulders to make sure no one was watching this unusual meeting in a remote, wooded corner of a major South Korean university.

"Everyone is scared to death," a second student said. "All of us have classmates who have been arrested and just disappeared, with no charges and no trial. Their only crime was believing in democracy."

These young men, who must remain anonymous, are fairly typical Korean students. A mixture of the luckiest and the brightest, they are either the sons of the rich and powerful or Korea's best students—or both.

This spring, many of them feel that the nation's future rests on their shoulders.

More than their Western counterparts, Korean students since the Fifteenth Century have historically played a decisive role in political transitions. In this century, they led the resistance against Japan in Korea's colonial period and their demonstrations toppled the autocratic Syngman Rhee in 1960.

At the end of last year, students appeared once again to be heading for a reformist period. Calling for a democratic constitution and an end to martial law, student demonstrations were spreading rapidly throughout the country.

President Park Chung Hee said the demonstrators were being manipulated by the Communists. He responded to the threat with "emergency decrees" which established the death penalty for criticizing the present martial-law Constitution.

Since then at least several hundred people have been arrested while hundreds more have been interrogated and

harassed. The student movement appears at least temporarily shattered by the blow.

"We have no leaders now," a student said. "The brave ones are all in jail."

"The few who have returned from jail keep their mouths shut," another student said. "They won't say a word about what happened to them. That's how powerful the Korean CIA is."

"We can only talk like this with a foreigner," a third student said. "With our own people we never know who may be working for the government."

"All we want is the basic human liberty to speak what we think," one young man said. "We are not Communists or Socialists. Such a thought would never even sneak into our heads. We are anti-Communist to the bone marrow."

"In North Korea's radio propaganda, they mention their leader's name maybe 20 times a minute with a dozen beautiful adjectives each time. That's even worse than our

president's propaganda. So we can only assume that communism in the north is even worse than what we've got here."

Explaining why they feel the way they do, one student said, "After World War II, the United States took over and tried to set up a real democracy here. They put democracy in our textbooks and raised us on these high ideals."

"When 34,000 Americans died here, they said it was for democracy, and we believed it and we fought for democracy, too."

"Then there was the military coup that put President Park in power in 1961, and you know what my first reaction was? Shame. I was ashamed of my country, because the American textbooks said we should be past the stage of military juntas."

"Then, our freedoms have gotten less and less." He said, "Maybe the democracy the Americans gave us was only very short-lived, but once you taste it, you never forget."



# Western Hemisphere

NEW YORK TIMES

6 May 1974

## Cuba a Live Issue In Capital Again After Five Years

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 5 — Americans influential in the national policy-making process have begun to debate the issue of relation with Cuba after a lapse of more than five years.

Although leading officials of the Nixon Administration insist that no change is imminent in the United States policy of boycott toward the island, some officials comment that the mere emergence of the debate signifies an important change, whose end point—while still a long stretch down the road—could be resumption of relations.

On the surface, the new debate has been sparked by two Administration decisions favorable to Cuba, which were announced by the State Department April 18.

The first was to license American subsidiaries of three major motor vehicle companies in Argentina to export cars and trucks to Cuba. The second was Secretary of State Kissinger's acquiescence to demands of Latin-American and Caribbean foreign ministers to a vote among the members of the Organization of American States to determine whether Cuba should be invited to participate in the next round of the "new hemisphere dialogue" inaugurated by the Administration last year.

The debate has received an added fillip from a request by members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and four Congressmen for a "new look" at the United States policy toward Cuba.

However, Administration officials say the real impetus for the debate comes from the United States decision to cultivate Latin-American and Caribbean neighbors, following five years of neglect. This has automatically revived the question of Cuba—so near geographically to the United States and so far away in terms of political

orientation since the Bay of Pigs disaster and Soviet crisis of the early nineteen-sixties.

The issue has also drawn attention because five years of administration détente policy—involving principally the Soviet Union and China—have left only Cuba, Albania and Mongolia on the fringes. Again, Cuba attracts more interest because of proximity to the United States.

Recently President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger have been criticized—by Argentina, for instance—on the premise that the United States has sacrificed a constructive policy toward Latin America as a whole to its rigid stance on Cuba.

### U.S. Stance Softened

Mr. Kissinger has told his aides he believes just the reverse is true, that the Administration is so earnest about developing constructive relations with Latin America that it does not want the Cuba issue to impede "the new hemisphere dialogue." For this reason, he softened the United States stance on those aspects of Cuban policy affecting other Latin-American countries.

But he is strictly limiting further movement toward an eventual understanding with Cuba in the belief this would better suit the development of consensus in the hemisphere on the Cuban question.

Mr. Kissinger has told his aides that he believes that Administration approval of licenses for the Argentine subsidiaries to export to Cuba, and consideration of Cuba as a potential partner in "the new hemisphere dialogue" of foreign ministers represent sacrifice of the rigid stance on Cuba to the prospect of improved ties with the other Latin-American states.

He is also said to believe these decisions have bought time for the United States, perhaps 11 months, before new Latin-American pressure on the issue of Cuba must be faced.

Mr. Kissinger's conviction on this matter was reinforced by the behavior of 23 Latin-American and Caribbean countries at the Organization of American States General Assembly in Atlanta, which came to an end Wednesday.

Cuba's proponents, notably Argentina, Peru, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia, made only perfunctory statements asking

a reconsideration of the organization's 12-year-old political boycott and 10-year-old economic embargo against the Government of Premier Fidel Castro.

"Kissinger's success in his dialogue with the foreign ministers beforehand drew the breath out of the O.A.S. meeting," and aide said.

As assessed by Mr. Kissinger and his specialists, there are large obstacles to be overcome before Washington and Havana could begin a direct dialogue on improving relations. These include the following:

• Premier Castro's seemingly implacable hostility toward the United States, particularly toward the Nixon Administration. Although Washington believes the Castro leadership is no longer fomenting revolution in Latin America on a grand scale, Havana remains an "enemy" in the official view, to the extent that Foreign Minister Raúl Roa could go before the United Nations General Assembly last week and accuse the Administration of "filthy policies of economic blockade."

• Influential Cuban exiles and numerous conservative legislators, including at least 34 Senators, who would oppose an early rapprochement between the United States and Cuba.

• Remaining conservative governments in Latin America that would be frightened by United States acceptance of Castro Communism—chiefly Brazil, Paraguay, Chile, Bolivia and Ecuador.

• The Administration perception that to take up ties now with the Castro Government would be to strengthen the impression that President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger prefer dealing with enemies to dealing with friends, and also an impression that the way to get something out of the United States is to pull Uncle Sam's beard.

### Little Gain or Loss Now

For the present, Administration officials see neither great gain nor great loss in seeking better relations with the Castro leadership, and some think nothing substantive could take place until Mr. Nixon's successor is in office.

"It is an interesting market despite its small size," a State Department official observed. "And after the deprivations of 15 years it could use a lot. But

what are they going to pay with?"

"The main thing to gain would be symbolic of having put the past behind us," he remarked.

Nonetheless, this official and others have begun to envision a scenario in which Havana and Washington would eventually come to terms.

As they see it, the change would have to be brought about by the Castro Government through political gestures such as amnesty for some of Cuba's several thousand political prisoners, hundreds of whom have languished in island prison camps for 14 or more years.

"After all, when you think of détente, I think we have changed more than the Cubans," a United States official said. "The Cubans have modified the revolutionary impulse only because they had to."

In the Administration view, the rapprochement would require the mediation of a country that has close ties with both Cuba and the United States. At the moment, only Mexico, Peru and Algeria qualify for that role.

Also, the Castro Government is reported to be willing to meet "constructively" with the hemisphere foreign ministers as a participant in "the new hemisphere dialogue" in Buenos Aires next March. This could pave the way for a direct Havana-Washington dialogue, say United States officials, although they are not enthusiastic at this time about Cuban participation at Buenos Aires.

One part of the puzzle that still does not fit the considerations of the Administration officials is the role played by the Soviet Union, which is extending \$500-million in assistance to Cuba annually, according to the estimates here.

Some officials believe the Soviet Union enjoys the spectacle of the United States being discredited in its renewed efforts to cultivate its southern hemisphere neighbors by the continuing United States-Cuban hostility. But these same officials note that the Soviet Communist party chief, Leonid I. Brezhnev, on his visit to Havana early this year, urged moderation on Mr. Castro. They wonder how long "embarrassment" of the United States might be worth half a billion dollars a year to Moscow.